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We survey the literature from a culinary perspective, offering an intuitive illustration of the welfare in simultaneous and sequential auctions. Welfare in simultaneous first and second price auctions is high when bidders have complement-free valuations. In contrast, sequential second price auctions can lead to bad outcomes due to signaling problems and even in the case of first price, a good outcome is only guaranteed for unit demand bidders. We give an intuitive interpretation of an example with bad welfare in sequential first price auctions with submodular bidders from Paes Leme, Syrgkanis and Tardos (SODA'12).<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/2509002.2509008","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,1]],"date-time":"2013-08-01T15:14:00Z","timestamp":1375370040000},"page":"25-28","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":6,"title":["The dining bidder problem"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"11","author":[{"given":"Renato","family":"Paes Leme","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Cornell University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Vasilis","family":"Syrgkanis","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Cornell University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"\u00c9va","family":"Tardos","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Cornell University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2012,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bhawalkar K. and Roughgarden T. 2011. Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding. In SODA. 700--709. Bhawalkar K. and Roughgarden T. 2011. Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding. In SODA . 700--709.","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973082.55"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1998.0659"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-540-70575-8_67"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1132516.1132523"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Feldman M. Fu H. Gravin N. and Lucier B. 2012. Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient. CoRR abs\/1209.4703. Feldman M. Fu H. Gravin N. and Lucier B. 2012. Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient. CoRR abs\/1209.4703 .","DOI":"10.1145\/2488608.2488634"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","volume-title":"Arranging the Meal: A History of Table Service in France. California Studies in Food and Culture","author":"Flandrin J.","unstructured":"Flandrin , J. 2007. Arranging the Meal: A History of Table Service in France. California Studies in Food and Culture . University of California Press. Flandrin, J. 2007. Arranging the Meal: A History of Table Service in France. California Studies in Food and Culture. University of California Press."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1993574.1993619"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2005.02.006"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Paes Leme R. Syrgkanis V. and Tardos \u00c9. 2012. Sequential auctions and externalities. In SODA. 869--886. Paes Leme R. Syrgkanis V. and Tardos \u00c9. 2012. Sequential auctions and externalities. In SODA . 869--886.","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973099.70"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_10_1","unstructured":"Syrgkanis V. 2012. Bayesian games and the smoothness framework. CoRR abs\/1203.5155. Syrgkanis V. 2012. Bayesian games and the smoothness framework. 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