{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,28]],"date-time":"2026-03-28T04:57:57Z","timestamp":1774673877362,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":25,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2013,6,1]],"date-time":"2013-06-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1370044800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["SIGecom Exch."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2013,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            This paper is a survey of recent work at the intersection of mechanism design and privacy. The connection is a natural one, but its study has been jump-started in recent years by the advent of\n            <jats:italic>differential privacy<\/jats:italic>\n            , which provides a rigorous, quantitative way of reasoning about the costs that an agent might experience because of the loss of his privacy. Here, we survey several facets of this study, and differential privacy plays a role in more than one way. Of course, it provides us a basis for\n            <jats:italic>modeling<\/jats:italic>\n            agent costs for privacy, which is essential if we are to attempt mechanism design in a setting in which agents have preferences for privacy. It also provides a toolkit for controlling those costs. However, perhaps more surprisingly, it provides a powerful toolkit for controlling the stability of mechanisms in general, which yields a set of tools for designing novel mechanisms even in economic settings completely unrelated to privacy.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/2509013.2509016","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,1]],"date-time":"2013-08-01T15:14:00Z","timestamp":1375370040000},"page":"8-29","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":63,"title":["Privacy and mechanism design"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"12","author":[{"given":"Mallesh M.","family":"Pai","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Pennsylvania"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Aaron","family":"Roth","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Pennsylvania"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,6]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mksc.1040.0103"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SFCS.2005.50"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Bergemann D. Brooks B. and Morris S. 2013. The limits of price discrimination. Tech. rep. Cowles Foundation Working Paper Yale University.  Bergemann D. Brooks B. and Morris S. 2013. The limits of price discrimination. Tech. rep. Cowles Foundation Working Paper Yale University.","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.2288718"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2005.04.007"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/000282803322157124"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2492002.2482549"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mksc.1110.0691"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2090236.2090255"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/11681878_14"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_10_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Dwork C. and Roth A. 2013. The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy.  Dwork C. and Roth A. 2013. The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy .","DOI":"10.1561\/9781601988195"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_11_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Dziuda W. and Gradwohl R. 2012. Achieving coordination under privacy cncerns. Tech. rep. Working paper Northwestern University.  Dziuda W. and Gradwohl R. 2012. Achieving coordination under privacy cncerns. Tech. rep. Working paper Northwestern University.","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.2127227"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_12_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229054"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_13_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Flood M. Katz J. Ong S. and Smith A. 2013. Crptography and the economics of supervisory information: Balancing transparency and confidentiality. Tech. rep.  Flood M. Katz J. Ong S. and Smith A. 2013. Crptography and the economics of supervisory information: Balancing transparency and confidentiality. Tech. rep.","DOI":"10.26509\/frbc-wp-201312"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_14_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1993574.1993605"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_15_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Gradwohl R. 2012. Privacy in implementation. Tech. rep. Northwestern University.  Gradwohl R. 2012. Privacy in implementation. Tech. rep. Northwestern University.","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.2177549"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_16_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2012.36"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_17_1","unstructured":"Kearns M. Pai M. M. Roth A. and Ullman J. 2012. Mechanism design in large games: Incentives and privacy. arXiv preprint arXiv:1207.4084.  Kearns M. Pai M. M. Roth A. and Ullman J. 2012. Mechanism design in large games: Incentives and privacy. arXiv preprint arXiv:1207.4084 ."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_18_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-35311-6_28"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_19_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2007.41"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_20_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229073"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_21_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2090236.2090254"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_22_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2325713.2325714"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_23_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229076"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_24_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Taylor C. R. 2004. Consumer privacy and the market for customer information. RAND Journal of Economics 631--650.  Taylor C. R. 2004. Consumer privacy and the market for customer information. 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