{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,5,11]],"date-time":"2026-05-11T10:50:41Z","timestamp":1778496641905,"version":"3.51.4"},"reference-count":22,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2014,7,1]],"date-time":"2014-07-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1404172800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"funder":[{"name":"funding_agency","award":["grant_number, grant_number"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["grant_number, grant_number"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["ACM Trans. Econ. Comput."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2014,7]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            We study a market for private data in which a data analyst publicly releases a statistic over a database of private information. Individuals that own the data incur a cost for their loss of privacy proportional to the differential privacy guarantee given by the analyst at the time of the release. The analyst incentivizes individuals by compensating them, giving rise to a\n            <jats:italic>privacy<\/jats:italic>\n            <jats:italic>auction<\/jats:italic>\n            . Motivated by recommender systems, the statistic we consider is a linear predictor function with publicly known weights. The statistic can be viewed as a prediction of the unknown data of a new individual, based on the data of individuals in the database. We formalize the trade-off between privacy and accuracy in this setting, and show that a simple class of estimates achieves an order-optimal trade-off. It thus suffices to focus on auction mechanisms that output such estimates. We use this observation to design a truthful, individually rational, proportional-purchase mechanism under a fixed budget constraint. We show that our mechanism is 5-approximate in terms of accuracy compared to the optimal mechanism, and that no truthful mechanism can achieve a 2\u2009\u2212\u2009\n            <jats:italic>\u03b5<\/jats:italic>\n            approximation, for any\n            <jats:italic>\u03b5<\/jats:italic>\n            \u2009&gt;\u20090.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/2629665","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2014,7,29]],"date-time":"2014-07-29T12:28:17Z","timestamp":1406636897000},"page":"1-22","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":28,"title":["Privacy Auctions for Recommender Systems"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"2","author":[{"given":"Pranav","family":"Dandekar","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Stanford University and Technicolor"}]},{"given":"Nadia","family":"Fawaz","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Technicolor"}]},{"given":"Stratis","family":"Ioannidis","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Technicolor"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2014,7]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2492002.2482549"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/11787006_1"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/11681878_14"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Fleischer L. and Lyu Y.-H. 2012. Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data. CoRR abs\/1204.4031.  Fleischer L. and Lyu Y.-H. 2012. Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data. CoRR abs\/1204.4031.","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229054"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1993574.1993605"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Hastie T. Tibshirani R. and Friedman J. 2009. The Elements of Statistical Learning 2nd Ed. Springer.  Hastie T. Tibshirani R. and Friedman J. 2009. The Elements of Statistical Learning 2nd Ed. Springer.","DOI":"10.1007\/978-0-387-84858-7"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","unstructured":"Joseph J. King J. Hoofnagle C. J. Bleakley A. and Hennessy M. 2009. Americans reject tailored advertising and three activities that enable it. http:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=1478214.  Joseph J. King J. Hoofnagle C. J. Bleakley A. and Hennessy M. 2009. Americans reject tailored advertising and three activities that enable it. http:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=1478214."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1526709.1526733"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-35311-6_28"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_10_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/MIC.2003.1167344"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_11_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/98124"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_12_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1557019.1557090"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_13_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2007.41"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_14_1","unstructured":"Mello J. P. 2012. Facebook hit with lawsuit alleging privacy wrongs. PCWorld.  Mello J. P. 2012. Facebook hit with lawsuit alleging privacy wrongs. PCWorld ."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_15_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SP.2008.33"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_16_1","unstructured":"Netflix Privacy Litigation. www.videoprivacyclass.com.  Netflix Privacy Litigation. www.videoprivacyclass.com."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_17_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229073"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_18_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2090236.2090254"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_19_1","unstructured":"Ribeiro J. 2012. Google faces class-action lawsuits over new privacy policy. PCWorld.  Ribeiro J. 2012. Google faces class-action lawsuits over new privacy policy. PCWorld ."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_20_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229076"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_21_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/371920.372071"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_22_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2010.78"}],"container-title":["ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/2629665","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/2629665","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,18]],"date-time":"2025-06-18T06:13:30Z","timestamp":1750227210000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/2629665"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2014,7]]},"references-count":22,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2014,7]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/2629665"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/2629665","relation":{},"ISSN":["2167-8375","2167-8383"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2167-8375","type":"print"},{"value":"2167-8383","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2014,7]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2012-10-01","order":0,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2014-02-01","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2014-07-01","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}