{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,7]],"date-time":"2025-10-07T14:40:33Z","timestamp":1759848033625,"version":"3.41.0"},"reference-count":11,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2015,12,2]],"date-time":"2015-12-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1449014400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001821","name":"Vienna Science and Technology Fund","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["ICT10-002"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["ICT10-002"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001821","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["ACM Trans. Econ. Comput."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2016,1,5]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We study individual rational, Pareto-optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. We consider settings with multiunit demand and additive valuations. For single-dimensional valuations we prove a positive result for randomized mechanisms, and a negative result for deterministic mechanisms. While the positive result allows for private budgets, the negative result is for public budgets. For multidimensional valuations and public budgets we prove an impossibility result that applies to deterministic and randomized mechanisms. Taken together this shows the power of randomization in certain settings with heterogeneous items, but it also shows its limitations.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/2818351","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2015,12,4]],"date-time":"2015-12-04T13:43:07Z","timestamp":1449236587000},"page":"1-17","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"4","author":[{"given":"Paul","family":"D\u00fctting","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom"}]},{"given":"Monika","family":"Henzinger","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria"}]},{"given":"Martin","family":"Starnberger","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2015,12,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/874063.875583"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/0002828043052330"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.96.3.602"},{"volume-title":"Proceedings of the 21st Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. 554--572","author":"Bhattacharya S.","key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","unstructured":"S. Bhattacharya , V. Conitzer , K. Munagala , and L. Xia . 2010. Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions . In Proceedings of the 21st Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. 554--572 . S. Bhattacharya, V. Conitzer, K. Munagala, and L. Xia. 2010. Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions. 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