{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,10,14]],"date-time":"2026-10-14T16:45:35Z","timestamp":1791996335796,"version":"4.4.0"},"reference-count":27,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2017,1,23]],"date-time":"2017-01-23T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1485129600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100000781","name":"European Research Council","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["Consolidator Grant CIRCUS-683032"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["Consolidator Grant CIRCUS-683032"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100000781","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Commun. ACM"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2017,1,23]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol supports various authentication modes, key exchange methods, and protocol extensions. Confusingly, each combination may prescribe a different message sequence between the client and the server, and thus a key challenge for TLS implementations is to define a composite state machine that correctly handles these combinations. If the state machine is too restrictive, the implementation may fail to interoperate with others; if it is too liberal, it may allow unexpected message sequences that break the security of the protocol. We systematically test popular TLS implementations and find unexpected transitions in many of their state machines that have stayed hidden for years. We show how some of these flaws lead to critical security vulnerabilities, such as FREAK. While testing can help find such bugs, formal verification can prevent them entirely. To this end, we implement and formally verify a new composite state machine for OpenSSL, a popular TLS library.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3023357","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2017,1,23]],"date-time":"2017-01-23T20:35:15Z","timestamp":1485203715000},"page":"99-107","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":30,"title":["A messy state of the union"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"60","author":[{"given":"Benjamin","family":"Beurdouche","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"INRIA"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Karthikeyan","family":"Bhargavan","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"INRIA"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Antoine","family":"Delignat-Lavaud","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Microsoft Research"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"C\u00e9dric","family":"Fournet","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Microsoft Research"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Markulf","family":"Kohlweiss","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Microsoft Research"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Alfredo","family":"Pironti","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"IOActive"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Pierre-Yves","family":"Strub","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"IMDEA Software Institute"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Jean Karim","family":"Zinzindohoue","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"INRIA &amp; Ecole des Ponts, ParisTech"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2017,1,23]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","volume-title":"ACM CCS","author":"Adrian D.","year":"2015","unstructured":"Adrian , D. , Bhargavan , K. , Durumeric , Z. , Gaudry , P. , Green , M. , Halderman , J.A. , Heninger , N. , Springall , D. , Thom\u00e9 , E. , Valenta , L. , VanderSloot , B. , Wustrow , E. , Zanella-B\u00e9guelin , S. , Zimmermann , P. Imperfect forward secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman fails in practice . In ACM CCS ( 2015 ), 5--17. Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P., Green, M., Halderman, J.A., Heninger, N., Springall, D., Thom\u00e9, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E., Zanella-B\u00e9guelin, S., Zimmermann, P. Imperfect forward secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman fails in practice. In ACM CCS (2015), 5--17."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.4018\/jsse.2011100103"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","volume-title":"USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT)","author":"Beurdouche B.","year":"2015","unstructured":"Beurdouche , B. , Delignat-Lavaud , A. , Kobeissi , N. , Pironti , A. , Bhargavan , K. Flex TLS : A tool for testing TLS implementations . In USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT) ( 2015 ). Beurdouche, B., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Kobeissi, N., Pironti, A., Bhargavan, K. FlexTLS: A tool for testing TLS implementations. In USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT) (2015)."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","first-page":"7627","author":"Bhargavan K.","year":"2014","unstructured":"Bhargavan , K. , Delignat-Lavaud , A. , Pironti , A. , Langley , A. , Ray , M. Transport Layer Security (TLS) session hash and extended master secret extension. IETF RFC 7627 , 2014 . Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., Langley, A., Ray, M. Transport Layer Security (TLS) session hash and extended master secret extension. IETF RFC 7627, 2014.","journal-title":"IETF RFC"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2133375.2133378"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SP.2013.37"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","volume-title":"CRYPTO","author":"Bhargavan K.","year":"2014","unstructured":"Bhargavan , K. , Fournet , C. , Kohlweiss , M. , Pironti , A. , Strub , P.-Y. , Zanella-B\u00e9guelin , S. Proving the TLS handshake secure (as it is) . In CRYPTO ( 2014 ), 235--255. Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M., Pironti, A., Strub, P.-Y., Zanella-B\u00e9guelin, S. Proving the TLS handshake secure (as it is). In CRYPTO (2014), 235--255."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","first-page":"98","author":"Bhargavan K.","year":"2014","unstructured":"Bhargavan , K. , Lavaud , A.D. , Fournet , C. , Pironti , A. , Strub , P.-Y. Triple handshakes and cookie cutters: Breaking and fixing authentication over TLS. In IEEE S&P (Oakland) ( 2014 ), 98 -- 113 . Bhargavan, K., Lavaud, A.D., Fournet, C., Pironti, A., Strub, P.-Y. Triple handshakes and cookie cutters: Breaking and fixing authentication over TLS. In IEEE S&P (Oakland) (2014), 98--113.","journal-title":"TLS. In IEEE S&P (Oakland) ("},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","volume-title":"H., Aardal, K., Gilchrist, J., Guillerm, G., Leyland, P., Marchand, J., Morain, F., Muffett, A., Putnam, C., Zimmermann, P. Factorization of a 512-bit RSA modulus. In EUROCRYPT","author":"Cavallar S.","year":"2000","unstructured":"Cavallar , S. , Dodson , B. , Lenstra , A. , Lioen , W. , Montgomery , P. , Murphy , B. , te Riele , H., Aardal, K., Gilchrist, J., Guillerm, G., Leyland, P., Marchand, J., Morain, F., Muffett, A., Putnam, C., Zimmermann, P. Factorization of a 512-bit RSA modulus. In EUROCRYPT ( 2000 ), 1--18. Cavallar, S., Dodson, B., Lenstra, A., Lioen, W., Montgomery, P., Murphy, B., te Riele, H., Aardal, K., Gilchrist, J., Guillerm, G., Leyland, P., Marchand, J., Morain, F., Muffett, A., Putnam, C., Zimmermann, P. Factorization of a 512-bit RSA modulus. In EUROCRYPT (2000), 1--18."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_10_1","volume-title":"Datta","author":"Chaki S.","year":"2009","unstructured":"Chaki , S. , Datta , A. ASPIER : An automated framework for verifying security protocol implementations. In IEEE CSF ( 2009 ), 172--185. Chaki, S., Datta, A. ASPIER: An automated framework for verifying security protocol implementations. In IEEE CSF (2009), 172--185."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_11_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-33826-7_16"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_12_1","volume-title":"USENIX Security","author":"de Ruiter J.","year":"2015","unstructured":"de Ruiter , J. , Poll , E. Protocol state fuzzing of TLS implementations . In USENIX Security ( 2015 ), 193--206. de Ruiter, J., Poll, E. Protocol state fuzzing of TLS implementations. In USENIX Security (2015), 193--206."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_13_1","first-page":"5246","author":"Dierks T.","year":"2008","unstructured":"Dierks , T. , Rescorla , E. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2. IETF RFC 5246 , 2008 . Dierks, T., Rescorla, E. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2. IETF RFC 5246, 2008.","journal-title":"IETF RFC"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_14_1","volume-title":"Internet Draft","author":"Dierks T.","year":"2014","unstructured":"Dierks , T. , Rescorla , E. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 . Internet Draft , 2014 . Dierks, T., Rescorla, E. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3. Internet Draft, 2014."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_15_1","volume-title":"USENIX Security","author":"Durumeric Z.","year":"2013","unstructured":"Durumeric , Z. , Wustrow , E. , Halderman , J.A. ZMap: Fast Internet-wide scanning and its security applications . In USENIX Security ( 2013 ), 605--620. Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., Halderman, J.A. ZMap: Fast Internet-wide scanning and its security applications. In USENIX Security (2013), 605--620."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_16_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-32009-5_17"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_17_1","volume-title":"NDSS","author":"Jager T.","year":"2013","unstructured":"Jager , T. , Paterson , K.G. , Somorovsky , J. One bad apple: Backwards compatibility attacks on state-of-the-art cryptography . In NDSS ( 2013 ). Jager, T., Paterson, K.G., Somorovsky, J. One bad apple: Backwards compatibility attacks on state-of-the-art cryptography. In NDSS (2013)."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_18_1","volume-title":"ACM CCS","author":"Jager T.","year":"2015","unstructured":"Jager , T. , Schwenk , J. , Somorovsky , J. On the Security of TLS 1.3 and QUIC Against Weaknesses in PKCS#1 v1.5 Encryption . In ACM CCS ( 2015 ), 1185--1196. Jager, T., Schwenk, J., Somorovsky, J. On the Security of TLS 1.3 and QUIC Against Weaknesses in PKCS#1 v1.5 Encryption. In ACM CCS (2015), 1185--1196."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_19_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-40041-4_24"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_20_1","first-page":"7918","author":"Langley A.","year":"2010","unstructured":"Langley , A. , Modadugu , N. , Moeller , B. Transport Layer Security (TLS) False Start. IETF RFC 7918 , 2010 . Langley, A., Modadugu, N., Moeller, B. Transport Layer Security (TLS) False Start. IETF RFC 7918, 2010.","journal-title":"False Start. IETF RFC"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_21_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/EDCC.2010.31"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_22_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-54631-0_38"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_23_1","volume-title":"ACM CCS","author":"Mavrogiannopoulos N.","year":"2012","unstructured":"Mavrogiannopoulos , N. , Vercauteren , F. , Velichkov , V. , Preneel , B. A cross-cprotocol attack on the TLS protocol . In ACM CCS ( 2012 ), 62--72. Mavrogiannopoulos, N., Vercauteren, F., Velichkov, V., Preneel, B. A cross-cprotocol attack on the TLS protocol. In ACM CCS (2012), 62--72."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_25_1","volume-title":"ASIACRYPT","author":"Paterson K.G.","year":"2011","unstructured":"Paterson , K.G. , Ristenpart , T. , Shrimpton , T. Tag size does matter: Attacks and proofs for the TLS record protocol . In ASIACRYPT ( 2011 ), 372--389. Paterson, K.G., Ristenpart, T., Shrimpton, T. Tag size does matter: Attacks and proofs for the TLS record protocol. In ASIACRYPT (2011), 372--389."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_26_1","unstructured":"Ray M. Dispensa S. Renegotiating TLS 2009.  Ray M. Dispensa S. Renegotiating TLS 2009."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_27_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-27576-0_20"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_28_1","volume-title":"USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce","author":"Wagner D.","year":"1996","unstructured":"Wagner , D. , Schneier , B. Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol . In USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce ( 1996 ), 29--40. Wagner, D., Schneier, B. Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol. In USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce (1996), 29--40."}],"container-title":["Communications of the ACM"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3023357","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3023357","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,18]],"date-time":"2025-06-18T03:50:17Z","timestamp":1750218617000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3023357"}},"subtitle":["taming the composite state machines of TLS"],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2017,1,23]]},"references-count":27,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2017,1,23]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3023357"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3023357","relation":{},"ISSN":["0001-0782","1557-7317"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0001-0782","type":"print"},{"value":"1557-7317","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2017,1,23]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2017-01-23","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}