{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,28]],"date-time":"2025-09-28T20:26:28Z","timestamp":1759091188768,"version":"3.41.0"},"reference-count":32,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2018,5,31]],"date-time":"2018-05-31T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1527724800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["ACM Trans. Econ. Comput."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2018,5,31]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We study the value of data privacy in a game-theoretic model of trading private data, where a data collector purchases private data from strategic data subjects (individuals) through an incentive mechanism. One primary goal of the data collector is to learn some desired information from the elicited data. Specifically, this information is modeled by an underlying state, and the private data of each individual represents his of her knowledge about the state. Departing from most of the existing work on privacy-aware surveys, our model does not assume the data collector to be trustworthy. Further, an individual takes full control of his or her own data privacy and reports only a privacy-preserving version of his or her data.<\/jats:p>\n          <jats:p>In this article, the value of \u03f5 units of privacy is measured by the minimum payment among all nonnegative payment mechanisms, under which an individual\u2019s best response at a Nash equilibrium is to report his or her data in an \u03f5-locally differentially private manner. The higher \u03f5 is, the less private the reported data is. We derive lower and upper bounds on the value of privacy that are asymptotically tight as the number of data subjects becomes large. Specifically, the lower bound assures that it is impossible to use a lower payment to buy \u03f5 units of privacy, and the upper bound is given by an achievable payment mechanism that we design. Based on these fundamental limits, we further derive lower and upper bounds on the minimum total payment for the data collector to achieve a given accuracy target for learning the underlying state and show that the total payment of the designed mechanism is at most one individual\u2019s payment away from the minimum.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3232863","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2018,8,13]],"date-time":"2018-08-13T12:29:41Z","timestamp":1534163381000},"page":"1-26","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":9,"title":["The Value of Privacy"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"6","author":[{"given":"Weina","family":"Wang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Lei","family":"Ying","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Junshan","family":"Zhang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2018,8,9]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_2_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2746539.2746632"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2492002.2482549"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-13129-0_30"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_4_1","volume-title":"Thomas","author":"Cover Thomas M.","year":"2006","unstructured":"Thomas M. Cover and Joy A . Thomas . 2006 . Elements of Information Theory (2nd ed.). John Wiley 8 Sons, Hoboken, NJ. Thomas M. Cover and Joy A. Thomas. 2006. Elements of Information Theory (2nd ed.). John Wiley 8 Sons, Hoboken, NJ."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_5_1","volume-title":"Wainwright","author":"Duchi John C.","year":"2013","unstructured":"John C. Duchi , Michael I. Jordan , and Martin J . Wainwright . 2013 . Local privacy and minimax bounds: Sharp rates for probability estimation. In Advances Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS\u2019 13). 1529--1537. John C. Duchi, Michael I. Jordan, and Martin J. Wainwright. 2013. Local privacy and minimax bounds: Sharp rates for probability estimation. In Advances Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS\u201913). 1529--1537."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2013.53"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/11787006_1"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/11681878_14"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1561\/0400000042"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_10_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2660267.2660348"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_11_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1515\/popets-2016-0015"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_12_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229054"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_13_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2492002.2482585"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_14_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2600057.2602902"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_15_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1993574.1993605"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_16_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-31594-7_39"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_17_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TCOM.1967.1089532"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_18_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the Conference on Advances Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS\u201914)","author":"Kairouz Peter","year":"2014","unstructured":"Peter Kairouz , Sewoong Oh , and Pramod Viswanath . 2014 . Extremal mechanisms for local differential privacy . In Proceedings of the Conference on Advances Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS\u201914) . 2879--2887. Peter Kairouz, Sewoong Oh, and Pramod Viswanath. 2014. Extremal mechanisms for local differential privacy. In Proceedings of the Conference on Advances Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS\u201914). 2879--2887."},{"key":"e_1_2_2_19_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/090756090"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_20_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-662-54110-4_18"},{"key":"e_1_2_2_21_1","volume-title":"The data brokers: Selling your personal information. CBS News (March","author":"Kroft Steve","year":"2014","unstructured":"Steve Kroft . 2014. The data brokers: Selling your personal information. CBS News (March 2014 ). Steve Kroft. 2014. The data brokers: Selling your personal information. 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Communication Networks: An Optimization, Control and Stochastic Networks Perspective. 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