{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,17]],"date-time":"2026-02-17T12:11:08Z","timestamp":1771330268063,"version":"3.50.1"},"publisher-location":"New York, NY, USA","reference-count":79,"publisher":"ACM","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,6]],"date-time":"2019-11-06T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1572998400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"funder":[{"name":"NSA SoS Initiative"},{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000001","name":"National Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["DGE-1565570"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["DGE-1565570"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000001","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100012659","name":"National Natural Science Foundation of China","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["61772518,61572278,U1736209"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["61772518,61572278,U1736209"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100012659","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"name":"Cyber Security Program of National Key RD Plan of China","award":["2017YFB0802100"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["2017YFB0802100"]}]},{"name":"Ripple University Blockchain Research Initiative"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,6]]},"DOI":"10.1145\/3319535.3345653","type":"proceedings-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,7]],"date-time":"2019-11-07T13:08:32Z","timestamp":1573132112000},"page":"2505-2520","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":37,"title":["Certificate Transparency in the Wild"],"prefix":"10.1145","author":[{"given":"Bingyu","family":"Li","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Chinese Academy of Sciences &amp; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Jingqiang","family":"Lin","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Chinese Academy of Sciences &amp; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Fengjun","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Qiongxiao","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Qi","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Tsinghua University, Beijing, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Jiwu","family":"Jing","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Congli","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Chinese Academy of Sciences &amp; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,6]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3133956.3134007"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_2_1","volume-title":"2nd Applied Networking Research Workshop (ANRW). 48--54","author":"Aertsen Maarten","unstructured":"Maarten Aertsen , Maciej Korczynski , Giovane Moura , Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob , and Jan van den Berg. 2017. No domain left behind: Is Let's Encrypt democratizing encryption? . In 2nd Applied Networking Research Workshop (ANRW). 48--54 . Maarten Aertsen, Maciej Korczynski, Giovane Moura, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob, and Jan van den Berg. 2017. No domain left behind: Is Let's Encrypt democratizing encryption?. In 2nd Applied Networking Research Workshop (ANRW). 48--54."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_3_1","volume-title":"22nd International World Wide Web Conference (WWW). 59--70","author":"Akhawe Devdatta","year":"2013","unstructured":"Devdatta Akhawe , Bernhard Amann , Matthias Vallentin , and Robin Sommer . 2013 . Here's my cert, so trust me, maybe? Understanding TLS errors on the web . In 22nd International World Wide Web Conference (WWW). 59--70 . Devdatta Akhawe, Bernhard Amann, Matthias Vallentin, and Robin Sommer. 2013. Here's my cert, so trust me, maybe? Understanding TLS errors on the web. In 22nd International World Wide Web Conference (WWW). 59--70."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_4_1","unstructured":"Alexa. 2018. Alexa Top 1M Websites. http:\/\/s3.amazonaws.com\/alexa-static\/top-1m.csv.zip.  Alexa. 2018. Alexa Top 1M Websites. http:\/\/s3.amazonaws.com\/alexa-static\/top-1m.csv.zip."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2523649.2523665"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_6_1","volume-title":"17th Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). 325--340","author":"Amann Johanna","year":"2017","unstructured":"Johanna Amann , Oliver Gasser , Quirin Scheitle , Lexi Brent , Georg Carle , and Ralph Holz . 2017 . Mission accomplished? HTTPS security after DigiNotar . In 17th Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). 325--340 . Johanna Amann, Oliver Gasser, Quirin Scheitle, Lexi Brent, Georg Carle, and Ralph Holz. 2017. Mission accomplished? HTTPS security after DigiNotar. In 17th Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). 325--340."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_7_1","unstructured":"Apple Inc. 2018. Lists of available trusted root certificates in macOS. https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/HT202858.  Apple Inc. 2018. Lists of available trusted root certificates in macOS. https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/HT202858."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_8_1","unstructured":"Apple Inc. 2019. Apple's certificate Transparency policy. https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/HT205280.  Apple Inc. 2019. Apple's certificate Transparency policy. https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/HT205280."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2976749.2978404"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_10_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/CNS.2015.7346853"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_11_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2987443.2987454"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_12_1","unstructured":"Comodo CA Limited. 2018. crt.sh: Certificate search. https:\/\/crt.sh.  Comodo CA Limited. 2018. crt.sh: Certificate search. https:\/\/crt.sh."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_13_1","unstructured":"Comodo Group Inc. 2011. Comodo report of incident. https:\/\/www.comodo.com\/Comodo-Fraud-Incident-2011-03--23.html.  Comodo Group Inc. 2011. Comodo report of incident. https:\/\/www.comodo.com\/Comodo-Fraud-Incident-2011-03--23.html."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_14_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"David Cooper Stefan Santesson Stephen Farrell Sharon Boeyen Russell Housley and W. Timothy Polk. 2008. IETF RFC 5280 - Internet X.509 public key infrastructure certificate and certificate revocation list (CRL) profile.  David Cooper Stefan Santesson Stephen Farrell Sharon Boeyen Russell Housley and W. Timothy Polk. 2008. IETF RFC 5280 - Internet X.509 public key infrastructure certificate and certificate revocation list (CRL) profile.","DOI":"10.17487\/rfc5280"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_15_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-93713-7_62"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_16_1","unstructured":"Rasmus Dahlberg and Tobias Pulls. 2017. Verifiable Light-Weight Monitoring for Certificate Transparency Logs. arXiv ePrint. https:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1711.03952.  Rasmus Dahlberg and Tobias Pulls. 2017. Verifiable Light-Weight Monitoring for Certificate Transparency Logs. arXiv ePrint. https:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1711.03952."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_17_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-45741-3_8"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_18_1","volume-title":"13th Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). 291--304","author":"Durumeric Zakir","unstructured":"Zakir Durumeric , James Kasten , Michael Bailey , and J. Alex Halderman . 2013. Analysis of the HTTPS certificate ecosystem . In 13th Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). 291--304 . Zakir Durumeric, James Kasten, Michael Bailey, and J. Alex Halderman. 2013. Analysis of the HTTPS certificate ecosystem. In 13th Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). 291--304."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_19_1","unstructured":"P. Eckersley. 2011. A Syrian man-in-the-middle attack against Facebook. https:\/\/www.eff.org\/deeplinks\/2011\/05\/syrian-man-middle-against-facebook.  P. Eckersley. 2011. A Syrian man-in-the-middle attack against Facebook. https:\/\/www.eff.org\/deeplinks\/2011\/05\/syrian-man-middle-against-facebook."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_20_1","unstructured":"Graham Edgecombe. 2018. Certificate transparency monitor. https:\/\/ct.grahamedgecombe.com\/.  Graham Edgecombe. 2018. Certificate transparency monitor. https:\/\/ct.grahamedgecombe.com\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_21_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1515\/popets-2017-0052"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_22_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Chris Evans Chris Palmer and Ryan Sleevi. 2015. IETF RFC 7469 - Public key pinning extension for HTTP.  Chris Evans Chris Palmer and Ryan Sleevi. 2015. IETF RFC 7469 - Public key pinning extension for HTTP.","DOI":"10.17487\/RFC7469"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_23_1","volume-title":"Facebook: Certificate transparency monitoring. https:\/\/developers.facebook.com\/tools\/ct\/search\/.","author":"Facebook Inc.","year":"2018","unstructured":"Facebook Inc. 2018 . Facebook: Certificate transparency monitoring. https:\/\/developers.facebook.com\/tools\/ct\/search\/. Facebook Inc. 2018. Facebook: Certificate transparency monitoring. https:\/\/developers.facebook.com\/tools\/ct\/search\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_24_1","unstructured":"Facebook Inc. 2019. Facebook Monitor Statement. https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/notes\/protect-the-graph\/detecting-phishing-domains-using-certificate-transparency\/2037453483161459\/ https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/notes\/protect-the-graph\/introducing-our-certificate-transparency-monitoring-tool\/1811919779048165\/.  Facebook Inc. 2019. Facebook Monitor Statement. https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/notes\/protect-the-graph\/detecting-phishing-domains-using-certificate-transparency\/2037453483161459\/ https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/notes\/protect-the-graph\/introducing-our-certificate-transparency-monitoring-tool\/1811919779048165\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_25_1","volume-title":"9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (AsiaCCS). 507--512","author":"Fahl S.","unstructured":"S. Fahl , Y. Acar , H. Perl , and M. Smith . 2014. Why Eve and Mallory (also) love webmasters: A study on the root causes of SSL misconfigurations . In 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (AsiaCCS). 507--512 . S. Fahl, Y. Acar, H. Perl, and M. Smith. 2014. Why Eve and Mallory (also) love webmasters: A study on the root causes of SSL misconfigurations. In 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (AsiaCCS). 507--512."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_26_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-76481-8_13"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_27_1","unstructured":"GlobalSign. 2011. Security incident report. https:\/\/www.globalsign.com\/resources\/globalsign-security-incident-report.pdf.  GlobalSign. 2011. Security incident report. https:\/\/www.globalsign.com\/resources\/globalsign-security-incident-report.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_28_1","unstructured":"Google Inc. 2018. Certificate transparency. http:\/\/www.certificate-transparency.org\/.  Google Inc. 2018. Certificate transparency. http:\/\/www.certificate-transparency.org\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_29_1","unstructured":"Google Inc. 2018. Certificate transparency in Chrome. https:\/\/groups.google.com\/a\/chromium.org\/forum\/#!msg\/ct-policy\/wHILiYf31DE\/iMFmpMEkAQAJ.  Google Inc. 2018. Certificate transparency in Chrome. https:\/\/groups.google.com\/a\/chromium.org\/forum\/#!msg\/ct-policy\/wHILiYf31DE\/iMFmpMEkAQAJ."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_30_1","unstructured":"Google Inc. 2018. Certificate transparency in Chrome policy. https:\/\/github.com\/chromium\/ct-policy\/blob\/master\/ct_policy.md.  Google Inc. 2018. Certificate transparency in Chrome policy. https:\/\/github.com\/chromium\/ct-policy\/blob\/master\/ct_policy.md."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_31_1","volume-title":"Google: HTTPS encryption on the web. https:\/\/transparencyreport.google.com\/https\/certificates.","author":"Google Inc.","year":"2018","unstructured":"Google Inc. 2018 . Google: HTTPS encryption on the web. https:\/\/transparencyreport.google.com\/https\/certificates. Google Inc. 2018. Google: HTTPS encryption on the web. https:\/\/transparencyreport.google.com\/https\/certificates."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_32_1","unstructured":"Google Inc. 2018. Known logs. http:\/\/www.certificate-transparency.org\/known-logs.  Google Inc. 2018. Known logs. http:\/\/www.certificate-transparency.org\/known-logs."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_33_1","unstructured":"Google Inc. 2019. Chromium STHSets. https:\/\/clients2.google.com\/service\/update2\/crx.  Google Inc. 2019. Chromium STHSets. https:\/\/clients2.google.com\/service\/update2\/crx."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_34_1","unstructured":"Google Inc. 2019. Google Gossip. https:\/\/www.gstatic.com\/ct\/gossip.  Google Inc. 2019. Google Gossip. https:\/\/www.gstatic.com\/ct\/gossip."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_35_1","unstructured":"Google Inc. 2019. Google Monitor Statement. https:\/\/transparencyreport.google.com\/https\/certificates.  Google Inc. 2019. Google Monitor Statement. https:\/\/transparencyreport.google.com\/https\/certificates."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_36_1","unstructured":"Google Inc. 2019. The root CA list accepted by the logs. https:\/\/groups.google.com\/a\/chromium.org\/forum\/#!msg\/ct-policy\/iNX-EmfRLOA\/ctBCTYGfAwAJ https:\/\/github.com\/chromium\/ct-policy\/issues\/.  Google Inc. 2019. The root CA list accepted by the logs. https:\/\/groups.google.com\/a\/chromium.org\/forum\/#!msg\/ct-policy\/iNX-EmfRLOA\/ctBCTYGfAwAJ https:\/\/github.com\/chromium\/ct-policy\/issues\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_37_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-54328-4_7"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_38_1","unstructured":"Heather Adkins. 2011. An update on attempted man-in-the-middle attacks. https:\/\/security.googleblog.com\/2011\/08\/update-on-attempted-man-in-middle.html.  Heather Adkins. 2011. An update on attempted man-in-the-middle attacks. https:\/\/security.googleblog.com\/2011\/08\/update-on-attempted-man-in-middle.html."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_39_1","unstructured":"Benjamin Hof and Georg Carle. 2017. Software distribution transparency and auditability. arXiv ePrint. https:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1711.07278.  Benjamin Hof and Georg Carle. 2017. Software distribution transparency and auditability. arXiv ePrint. https:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1711.07278."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_40_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"P. Hoffman and J. Schlyter. 2012. IETF RFC 6698 - The DNS-based authentication of named entities (DANE) transport layer security (TLS) protocol: TLSA.  P. Hoffman and J. Schlyter. 2012. IETF RFC 6698 - The DNS-based authentication of named entities (DANE) transport layer security (TLS) protocol: TLSA.","DOI":"10.17487\/rfc6698"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_41_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2068816.2068856"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_42_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SP.2014.13"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_43_1","volume-title":"17th Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC). 329--337","author":"Kasten J.","unstructured":"J. Kasten , E. Wustrow , and A. Halderman . 2013. CAge: Taming certificate authorities by inferring restricted scopes . In 17th Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC). 329--337 . J. Kasten, E. Wustrow, and A. Halderman. 2013. CAge: Taming certificate authorities by inferring restricted scopes. In 17th Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC). 329--337."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_44_1","unstructured":"Stephen Kent. 2019. IETF Draft - Attack and Threat Model for Certificate Transparency.  Stephen Kent. 2019. IETF Draft - Attack and Threat Model for Certificate Transparency."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_45_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SP.2018.00015"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_46_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Ben Laurie Adam Langley and Emilia K\"a sper. 2013. IETF RFC 6962 - Certificate transparency.  Ben Laurie Adam Langley and Emilia K\"a sper. 2013. IETF RFC 6962 - Certificate transparency.","DOI":"10.17487\/rfc6962"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_47_1","unstructured":"Let's Encrypt. 2018. A free automated and open certificate authority (CA). https:\/\/letsencrypt.org\/.  Let's Encrypt. 2018. A free automated and open certificate authority (CA). https:\/\/letsencrypt.org\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_48_1","volume-title":"18th IEEE International Conference On Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom).","author":"Li Bingyu","unstructured":"Bingyu Li , Dawei Chu , Jingqiang Lin , Quanwei Cai , Congli Wang , and Lingjia Meng . 2019. The Weakest Link of Certificate Transparency: Exploring the TLS\/HTTPS Configurations of Third-Party Monitors . In 18th IEEE International Conference On Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom). Bingyu Li, Dawei Chu, Jingqiang Lin, Quanwei Cai, Congli Wang, and Lingjia Meng. 2019. The Weakest Link of Certificate Transparency: Exploring the TLS\/HTTPS Configurations of Third-Party Monitors. In 18th IEEE International Conference On Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_49_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2751323.2751324"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_50_1","volume-title":"24th USENIX Security Symposium. 383--398","author":"Melara Marcela S.","unstructured":"Marcela S. Melara , Aaron Blankstein , Joseph Bonneau , Edward W. Felten , and Michael J. Freedman . 2015. CONIKS: Bringing key transparency to end users . In 24th USENIX Security Symposium. 383--398 . Marcela S. Melara, Aaron Blankstein, Joseph Bonneau, Edward W. Felten, and Michael J. Freedman. 2015. CONIKS: Bringing key transparency to end users. In 24th USENIX Security Symposium. 383--398."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_51_1","unstructured":"Microsoft Corporation. 2018a. Certificate transparency in Microsoft. https:\/\/blogs.msdn.microsoft.com\/azuresecurity\/2018\/04\/25\/certificate-transparency\/.  Microsoft Corporation. 2018a. Certificate transparency in Microsoft. https:\/\/blogs.msdn.microsoft.com\/azuresecurity\/2018\/04\/25\/certificate-transparency\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_52_1","unstructured":"Microsoft Corporation. 2018b. Microsoft trusted root certificate program: Participants. https:\/\/gallery.technet.microsoft.com\/Trusted-Root-Program-d17011b8.  Microsoft Corporation. 2018b. Microsoft trusted root certificate program: Participants. https:\/\/gallery.technet.microsoft.com\/Trusted-Root-Program-d17011b8."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_53_1","unstructured":"B. Morton. 2014. More Google fraudulent certificates. https:\/\/www.entrust.com\/google-fraudulent-certificates\/.  B. Morton. 2014. More Google fraudulent certificates. https:\/\/www.entrust.com\/google-fraudulent-certificates\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_54_1","unstructured":"Mozilla. 2018. Mozilla included CA certificate list. https:\/\/wiki.mozilla.org\/CA\/Included_Certificates.  Mozilla. 2018. Mozilla included CA certificate list. https:\/\/wiki.mozilla.org\/CA\/Included_Certificates."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_55_1","unstructured":"Mozilla. 2019. Mozilla CT Policy. https:\/\/groups.google.com\/a\/chromium.org\/forum\/m\/#!topic\/ct-policy\/Xx1bv8r33ZE.  Mozilla. 2019. Mozilla CT Policy. https:\/\/groups.google.com\/a\/chromium.org\/forum\/m\/#!topic\/ct-policy\/Xx1bv8r33ZE."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_56_1","unstructured":"Nginx. 2018. Certificate transparency in Nginx. http:\/\/www.certificate-transparency.org\/resources-for-site-owners\/nginx.  Nginx. 2018. Certificate transparency in Nginx. http:\/\/www.certificate-transparency.org\/resources-for-site-owners\/nginx."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_57_1","volume-title":"Daniel Kahn Gillmor, and Tom Ritter","author":"Nordberg Linus","year":"2018","unstructured":"Linus Nordberg , Daniel Kahn Gillmor, and Tom Ritter . 2018 . IETF Internet-Draft - Gossiping in CT. https:\/\/datatracker.ietf.org\/doc\/html\/draft-ietf-trans-gossip-05. Linus Nordberg, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, and Tom Ritter. 2018. IETF Internet-Draft - Gossiping in CT. https:\/\/datatracker.ietf.org\/doc\/html\/draft-ietf-trans-gossip-05."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_58_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-76481-8_14"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_59_1","unstructured":"OpenSSL. 2018. Certificate transparency in OpenSSL. https:\/\/www.openssl.org\/docs\/man1.1.0\/crypto\/ct.html.  OpenSSL. 2018. Certificate transparency in OpenSSL. https:\/\/www.openssl.org\/docs\/man1.1.0\/crypto\/ct.html."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_60_1","unstructured":"Opsmate Inc. 2018a. Certificate transparency ecosystem. https:\/\/sslmate.com\/labs\/ct_ecosystem\/ecosystem.html.  Opsmate Inc. 2018a. Certificate transparency ecosystem. https:\/\/sslmate.com\/labs\/ct_ecosystem\/ecosystem.html."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_61_1","unstructured":"Opsmate Inc. 2018b. Certificate transparency log growth. https:\/\/sslmate.com\/labs\/ct_growth\/.  Opsmate Inc. 2018b. Certificate transparency log growth. https:\/\/sslmate.com\/labs\/ct_growth\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_62_1","unstructured":"Opsmate Inc. 2018c. SSLMate: Cert Spotter. https:\/\/sslmate.com\/certspotter\/.  Opsmate Inc. 2018c. SSLMate: Cert Spotter. https:\/\/sslmate.com\/certspotter\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_63_1","unstructured":"Opsmate Inc. 2019. SSLMate Statement. https:\/\/sslmate.com\/blog\/post\/certspotter_apiv1 https:\/\/sslmate.com\/certspotter\/howithelps.  Opsmate Inc. 2019. SSLMate Statement. https:\/\/sslmate.com\/blog\/post\/certspotter_apiv1 https:\/\/sslmate.com\/certspotter\/howithelps."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_64_1","volume-title":"16th Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC). 307--315","author":"Perl H.","unstructured":"H. Perl , S. Fahl , and M. Smith . 2014. You won't be needing these any more: On removing unused certificates from trust stores .. In 16th Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC). 307--315 . H. Perl, S. Fahl, and M. Smith. 2014. You won't be needing these any more: On removing unused certificates from trust stores.. In 16th Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC). 307--315."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_65_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.infsof.2013.04.004"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_66_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.14722\/ndss.2014.23379"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_67_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3278532.3278562"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_68_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/ASE.2002.1115005"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_69_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-319-59870-3_22"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_70_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SP.2019.00027"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_71_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/EuroSP.2016.38"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_72_1","volume-title":"21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). 406--417","author":"Szalachowski P.","unstructured":"P. Szalachowski , S. Matsumoto , and A. Perrig . 2014. PoliCert: Secure and flexible TLS certificate management . In 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). 406--417 . P. Szalachowski, S. Matsumoto, and A. Perrig. 2014. PoliCert: Secure and flexible TLS certificate management. In 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). 406--417."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_73_1","unstructured":"University of Michigan. 2018. Censys. https:\/\/censys.io\/.  University of Michigan. 2018. Censys. https:\/\/censys.io\/."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_74_1","volume-title":"16th Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). 543--549","author":"VanderSloot Benjamin","unstructured":"Benjamin VanderSloot , Johanna Amann , Matthew Bernhard , Zakir Durumeric , Michael Bailey , and J. Alex Halderman . 2016. Towards a complete view of the certificate ecosystem . In 16th Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). 543--549 . Benjamin VanderSloot, Johanna Amann, Matthew Bernhard, Zakir Durumeric, Michael Bailey, and J. Alex Halderman. 2016. Towards a complete view of the certificate ecosystem. In 16th Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). 543--549."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_75_1","unstructured":"VASCO Data Security International Inc. 2011. DigiNotar reports security incident. https:\/\/www.vasco.com\/about-vasco\/press\/2011\/news_diginotar_reports_security_incident.html.  VASCO Data Security International Inc. 2011. DigiNotar reports security incident. https:\/\/www.vasco.com\/about-vasco\/press\/2011\/news_diginotar_reports_security_incident.html."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_76_1","volume-title":"USENIX Annual Technical Conference (ATC).","author":"Wendlandt Dan","year":"2008","unstructured":"Dan Wendlandt , David G. Andersen , and Adrian Perrig . 2008 . Perspectives: Improving SSH-style host authentication with multi-path probing . In USENIX Annual Technical Conference (ATC). Dan Wendlandt, David G. Andersen, and Adrian Perrig. 2008. Perspectives: Improving SSH-style host authentication with multi-path probing. In USENIX Annual Technical Conference (ATC)."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_77_1","unstructured":"Wikipedia. 2017. Flame (malware). https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Flame_(malware).  Wikipedia. 2017. Flame (malware). https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Flame_(malware)."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_78_1","unstructured":"Wikipedia. 2018. List of Internet top-level domains. https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/List_of_Internet_top-level_domains.  Wikipedia. 2018. List of Internet top-level domains. https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/List_of_Internet_top-level_domains."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_79_1","unstructured":"K. Wilson. 2015. Distrusting new CNNIC certificates. https:\/\/blog.mozilla.org\/security\/2015\/04\/02\/distrusting-new-cnnic-certificates\/.  K. Wilson. 2015. Distrusting new CNNIC certificates. https:\/\/blog.mozilla.org\/security\/2015\/04\/02\/distrusting-new-cnnic-certificates\/."}],"event":{"name":"CCS '19: 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","location":"London United Kingdom","acronym":"CCS '19","sponsor":["SIGSAC ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control"]},"container-title":["Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3319535.3345653","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3319535.3345653","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"syndication"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3319535.3345653","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,17]],"date-time":"2025-06-17T23:24:02Z","timestamp":1750202642000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3319535.3345653"}},"subtitle":["Exploring the Reliability of Monitors"],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,6]]},"references-count":79,"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3319535.3345653","10.1145\/3319535"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3319535.3345653","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,6]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2019-11-06","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}