{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,25]],"date-time":"2026-02-25T17:11:18Z","timestamp":1772039478783,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":88,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,16]],"date-time":"2019-11-16T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1573862400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000015","name":"U.S. Department of Energy","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["DE-OE0000779"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["DE-OE0000779"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000015","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000001","name":"National Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["NSF-1663051"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["NSF-1663051"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000001","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["ACM Trans. Cyber-Phys. Syst."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,4,30]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) play a significant role in our critical infrastructure networks from power-distribution to utility networks. The emerging smart-grid concept is a compelling critical CPS infrastructure that relies on two-way communications between smart devices to increase efficiency, enhance reliability, and reduce costs. However,\n            <jats:italic>compromised devices<\/jats:italic>\n            in the smart grid poses several security challenges. Consequences of propagating fake data or stealing sensitive smart grid information via compromised devices are costly. Hence, early behavioral detection of compromised devices is critical for protecting the smart grid\u2019s components and data. To address these concerns, in this article, we introduce a novel and configurable system-level framework to identify compromised smart grid devices. The framework combines system and function call tracing techniques with signal processing and statistical analysis to detect compromised devices based on their behavioral characteristics. We measure the efficacy of our framework with a realistic smart grid substation testbed that includes both resource-limited and resource-rich devices. In total, using our framework, we analyze six different types of compromised device scenarios with different resources and attack payloads. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed framework is the first in detecting compromised CPS smart grid devices with system and function-level call tracing techniques. The experimental results reveal an excellent rate for the detection of compromised devices. Specifically, performance metrics include accuracy values between 95% and 99% for the different attack scenarios. Finally, the performance analysis demonstrates that the use of the proposed framework has minimal overhead on the smart grid devices\u2019 computing resources.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3355300","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,18]],"date-time":"2019-11-18T13:01:53Z","timestamp":1574082113000},"page":"1-28","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":29,"title":["A System-level Behavioral Detection Framework for Compromised CPS Devices"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"4","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-7082-8423","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Leonardo","family":"Babun","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Florida International University, Miami, FL"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Hidayet","family":"Aksu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Florida International University, Miami, FL"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"A. Selcuk","family":"Uluagac","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Florida International University, Miami, FL"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,16]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2015 16th International Scientific Conference on Electric Power Engineering (EPE\u201915)","author":"Kanovsky A."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/MCOM.2017.1700871"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Circuits, Power and Computing Technologies (ICCPCT\u201915)","author":"Ansilla J. D.","year":"2015"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","volume-title":"Assessing the Vulnerability of Supply Chains","author":"Asbj\u00f8rnslett Bj\u00f8rn Egil","DOI":"10.1007\/978-0-387-79934-6_2"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","volume-title":"Abbas Acar, and A. Selcuk Uluagac.","author":"Babun Leonardo","year":"2018"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","volume-title":"Uluagac","author":"Babun Leonardo","year":"2018"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","volume-title":"Uluagac","author":"Babum Leonardo","year":"2019"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","volume-title":"The Rookit Arsenal: Escape and Evasion in the Dark Corners of the System","author":"Blunden Reverend Bill","edition":"2"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2016 4th International Symposium on Computational and Business Intelligence (ISCBI\u201916)","author":"Boumkheld N.","year":"2016"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_10_1","first-page":"5","article-title":"A detailed analysis of the GOOSE message structure in an IEC 61850 standard-based substation automation system","volume":"8","author":"Kriger C.","year":"2013","journal-title":"Int. J. Comp. Comm."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_11_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security\u201918)","author":"Celik Z. Berkay"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_12_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP\u201915)","author":"Wong Ch."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_13_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SP.2018.00016"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_14_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SP.2018.00016"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_15_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM\u201918)","author":"Clemens J.","year":"2018"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_16_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/2831090.2831115"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_17_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS\u201916)","author":"Formby D."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_18_1","unstructured":"D. van Opstal U. S. Resilience Project. 2012. Supply Chain Solutions for Smart Grid Security: Building on Business Best Practices. Retrieved from http:\/\/usresilienceproject.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/09\/report-Supply_Chain_Solutions_for_Smart_Grid_Security.pdf.  D. van Opstal U. S. Resilience Project. 2012. Supply Chain Solutions for Smart Grid Security: Building on Business Best Practices. Retrieved from http:\/\/usresilienceproject.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/09\/report-Supply_Chain_Solutions_for_Smart_Grid_Security.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_19_1","first-page":"251","article-title":"Vulnerabilities and countermeasures - A survey on the cyber security issues in the transmission subsystem of a smart grid","volume":"1","author":"Deng Y.","year":"2012","journal-title":"J. Cyber Secur. Mobil."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_20_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/DISCEX.2001.932213"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_21_1","unstructured":"European Network and Information Security Agency (enisa). 2012. Smart Grid Security. Annex II: Security Aspects of the Smart Grid. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.enisa.europa.eu\/topics\/critical-information-infrastructures-and-services\/smart-grids\/smart-grids-and-smart-metering\/ENISA_Annex%20II%20-%20Security%20Aspects%20of%20Smart%20Grid.pdf.  European Network and Information Security Agency (enisa). 2012. Smart Grid Security. Annex II: Security Aspects of the Smart Grid. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.enisa.europa.eu\/topics\/critical-information-infrastructures-and-services\/smart-grids\/smart-grids-and-smart-metering\/ENISA_Annex%20II%20-%20Security%20Aspects%20of%20Smart%20Grid.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_22_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2015.2439580"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_23_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/829515.830554"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_24_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium. 163--176","author":"Garfinkel Tal","year":"2003"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_25_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/MTV.2013.28"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_26_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2011 USENIX Conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIXATC\u201911)","author":"Guo P. J."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_27_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ijcip.2017.03.004"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_28_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SmartGridComm.2014.7007752"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_29_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/MWC.2017.1600283WC"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_30_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/MNET.2017.1700065"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_31_1","volume-title":"RTU2020 Remote Terminal Unit Specifications.","year":"2014"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_32_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on USENIX Windows NT Symposium -","volume":"3","author":"Hunt G."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_33_1","unstructured":"IEC 61850-1. 2003. Communication Networks and Systems in Substations Introduction and Overview. Retrieved from https:\/\/webstore.iec.ch\/p-preview\/info_iec61850-1%7Bed1.0%7Den.pdf.  IEC 61850-1. 2003. Communication Networks and Systems in Substations Introduction and Overview. Retrieved from https:\/\/webstore.iec.ch\/p-preview\/info_iec61850-1%7Bed1.0%7Den.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_34_1","unstructured":"IEC 61850-7-2. 2003. Communication Networks and Systems in Substations\u2014Basic Communication Structure for Substation and Feeder Equipment Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI). Retrieved from https:\/\/webstore.iec.ch\/p-preview\/info_iec61850-7-2%7Bed1.0%7Den.pdf.  IEC 61850-7-2. 2003. Communication Networks and Systems in Substations\u2014Basic Communication Structure for Substation and Feeder Equipment Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI). Retrieved from https:\/\/webstore.iec.ch\/p-preview\/info_iec61850-7-2%7Bed1.0%7Den.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_35_1","unstructured":"IEC 61850-8-1. 2003. Communication Nnetworks and Systems in Substations\u2014Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) Mappings to MMS (ISO 9506-1 and ISO 9506-2) and to ISO\/IEC 8802-3. Retrieved from https:\/\/webstore.iec.ch\/p-preview\/info_iec61850-8-1%7Bed1.0%7Den.pdf.  IEC 61850-8-1. 2003. Communication Nnetworks and Systems in Substations\u2014Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) Mappings to MMS (ISO 9506-1 and ISO 9506-2) and to ISO\/IEC 8802-3. Retrieved from https:\/\/webstore.iec.ch\/p-preview\/info_iec61850-8-1%7Bed1.0%7Den.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_36_1","unstructured":"IEC61850-7-1. 2003. Communication Networks and Systems for Power Utility Automation. Part 7-1: Basic Communication Structure\u2014Principles and Models. Retrieved from https:\/\/webstore.iec.ch\/publication\/6014.  IEC61850-7-1. 2003. Communication Networks and Systems for Power Utility Automation. Part 7-1: Basic Communication Structure\u2014Principles and Models. Retrieved from https:\/\/webstore.iec.ch\/publication\/6014."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_37_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TII.2012.2228874"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_38_1","unstructured":"Interos Solutions Inc. 2018. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities from China in U.S. Federal Information and Communications Technology. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.uscc.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/Research\/Interos_Supply%20Chain%20Vulnerabilities%20 from%20China%20in%20U.S.%20Federal%20ICT_final.pdf.  Interos Solutions Inc. 2018. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities from China in U.S. Federal Information and Communications Technology. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.uscc.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/Research\/Interos_Supply%20Chain%20Vulnerabilities%20 from%20China%20in%20U.S.%20Federal%20ICT_final.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_39_1","unstructured":"J. Ellperin and A. Entous. 2016. Russian operation hacked a Vermont utility showing risk to U.S. electrical grid security officials say. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/national-security\/russian-hackers-penetrated-us-electricity-grid-through-a-utility-in-vermont\/2016\/12\/30\/8fc90cc4-ceec-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b0436f_story.html?utm_term&equals;.7445133366ca.  J. Ellperin and A. Entous. 2016. Russian operation hacked a Vermont utility showing risk to U.S. electrical grid security officials say. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/national-security\/russian-hackers-penetrated-us-electricity-grid-through-a-utility-in-vermont\/2016\/12\/30\/8fc90cc4-ceec-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61b0436f_story.html?utm_term&equals;.7445133366ca."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_40_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/ICIT.2017.7915429"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_41_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium.","author":"Jain K."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_42_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE International Test Conference (ITC\u201913)","author":"Huang K."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_43_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE\/ACM 2nd International Workshop on Software Engineering for Smart Cyber-Physical Systems (SEsCPS\u201916)","author":"Kang E.","year":"2016"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_44_1","unstructured":"Kaspersky. 2016. BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine. Retrieved from https:\/\/usa.kaspersky.com\/resource-center\/threats\/blackenergy.  Kaspersky. 2016. BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine. Retrieved from https:\/\/usa.kaspersky.com\/resource-center\/threats\/blackenergy."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_45_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/ICC.2018.8423022"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_46_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/ICPES.2016.7584204"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_47_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/MSP.2010.49"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_48_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2013 USENIX Conference on Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC\u201913)","author":"Kim T."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_49_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/CPSRSG.2016.7684103"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_50_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/MSPEC.2013.6471059"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_51_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE ICC International Conference on Communications. IEEE, 7.","author":"Babun L."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_52_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TII.2017.2689337"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_53_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/HICSS.2007.586"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_54_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s41635-017-0013-2"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_55_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1314354.1314362"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_56_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2013 11th Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST\u201913)","author":"Saeed M. Q."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_57_1","unstructured":"M. Sillgith. 2016. Open source library for IEC 61850: Release 0.9. Retrieved from http:\/\/libiec61850.com\/libiec61850\/.  M. Sillgith. 2016. Open source library for IEC 61850: Release 0.9. Retrieved from http:\/\/libiec61850.com\/libiec61850\/."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_58_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-29860-8_10"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_59_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/CCA.2016.7587875"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_60_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/COMST.2014.2320093"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_61_1","volume-title":"Department of Homeland Security","author":"National Cybersecurity 8 Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)","year":"2018"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_62_1","unstructured":"NIST Special Publication 1108r3. 2014. NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards release 3.0. Retrieved from http:\/\/nvlpubs.nist.gov\/nistpubs\/SpecialPublications\/NIST.SP.1108r3.pdf.  NIST Special Publication 1108r3. 2014. NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards release 3.0. Retrieved from http:\/\/nvlpubs.nist.gov\/nistpubs\/SpecialPublications\/NIST.SP.1108r3.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_63_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TDSC.2015.2509994"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_64_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TNNLS.2015.2404803"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_65_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM\u201918)","author":"Pendergrass J. A.","year":"2018"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_66_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM\u201917)","author":"Pendleton M.","year":"2017"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_67_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SECON.2015.7132891"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_68_1","unstructured":"Reuters. 2016. U.S. Firm Blames Russian \u2019Sandworm\u2019 Hackers for Ukraine Outage. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-ukraine-cybersecurity-sandworm\/u-s-firm-blames-russian-sandworm-hackers-for-ukraine-outage-idUSKBN0UM00N20160108.  Reuters. 2016. U.S. Firm Blames Russian \u2019Sandworm\u2019 Hackers for Ukraine Outage. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-ukraine-cybersecurity-sandworm\/u-s-firm-blames-russian-sandworm-hackers-for-ukraine-outage-idUSKBN0UM00N20160108."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_69_1","volume-title":"Probability Models for Computer Science","author":"Ross Sheldon M.","edition":"1"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_70_1","article-title":"Security of the smart grid - enhancing IEC 62351 to improve security in energy automation control","volume":"3","author":"Fries S.","year":"2010","journal-title":"Int. J. Adv. Secur."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_71_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2016.2550218"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_72_1","volume-title":"Smart grid security: Threats, challenges, and solutions. CoRR abs\/1606.06992","author":"Sanjab Anibal","year":"2016"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_73_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/WINCOM.2016.7777182"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_74_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP\u201901)","author":"Sekar R."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_75_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2011.2165090"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_76_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/INFCOMW.2013.6970712"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_77_1","unstructured":"Symantec. 2018. Sandworm Windows Zero-day Vulnerability Being Actively Exploited in Targeted Attacks. Retri-eved from https:\/\/www.symantec.com\/connect\/blogs\/sandworm-windows-zero-day-vulnerability-being-actively-exploited-targeted-attacks.  Symantec. 2018. Sandworm Windows Zero-day Vulnerability Being Actively Exploited in Targeted Attacks. Retri-eved from https:\/\/www.symantec.com\/connect\/blogs\/sandworm-windows-zero-day-vulnerability-being-actively-exploited-targeted-attacks."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_78_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/IRSEC.2015.7455127"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_79_1","unstructured":"The smart grid interoperability panel - cyber security working group. 2010. Introduction to NISTIR 7628: guidelines for smart grid cyber security. http:\/\/www.nist.gov\/smartgrid\/upload\/nistir-7628_total.pdf.  The smart grid interoperability panel - cyber security working group. 2010. Introduction to NISTIR 7628: guidelines for smart grid cyber security. http:\/\/www.nist.gov\/smartgrid\/upload\/nistir-7628_total.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_80_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/DCOSS.2014.61"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_81_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.comnet.2012.12.017"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_82_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/MCOM.2012.6257525"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_83_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition (DATE\u201916)","author":"Obeng Y."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_84_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SURV.2012.010912.00035"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_85_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2013.2277940"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_86_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/CISS.2016.7460476"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_87_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE\u201917)","author":"Zhou L.","year":"2017"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_88_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/NAPS.2016.7747874"}],"container-title":["ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3355300","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3355300","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"syndication"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3355300","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,17]],"date-time":"2025-06-17T23:23:32Z","timestamp":1750202612000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3355300"}},"subtitle":["Smart-Grid Case"],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,16]]},"references-count":88,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,4,30]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3355300"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3355300","relation":{},"ISSN":["2378-962X","2378-9638"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2378-962X","type":"print"},{"value":"2378-9638","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,11,16]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2018-04-01","order":0,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2019-07-01","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2019-11-16","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}