{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,28]],"date-time":"2026-04-28T02:17:43Z","timestamp":1777342663645,"version":"3.51.4"},"publisher-location":"New York, NY, USA","reference-count":15,"publisher":"ACM","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,4,20]],"date-time":"2020-04-20T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1587340800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,4,20]]},"DOI":"10.1145\/3366423.3380142","type":"proceedings-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,5,4]],"date-time":"2020-05-04T08:11:44Z","timestamp":1588579904000},"page":"596-605","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":15,"title":["Why Do Competitive Markets Converge to First-Price Auctions?"],"prefix":"10.1145","author":[{"given":"Renato","family":"Paes Leme","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Google"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Balasubramanian","family":"Sivan","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Google"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Yifeng","family":"Teng","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Wisconsin-Madison"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,4,20]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_1_1","volume-title":"Credible Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","author":"Akbarpour Mohammad","year":"2018","unstructured":"Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li . 2018 . Credible Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation , Ithaca, NY, USA , June 18-22, 2018. 371. Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li. 2018. Credible Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Ithaca, NY, USA, June 18-22, 2018. 371."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_2_1","volume-title":"Ausubel and Paul Milgrom","author":"M.","year":"2006","unstructured":"Lawrence\u00a0 M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom . 2006 . The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction. In Combinatorial Auctions, chapter 1. MIT Press . Lawrence\u00a0M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom. 2006. The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction. In Combinatorial Auctions, chapter 1. MIT Press."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_3_1","volume-title":"Package Bidding Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions. Revue \u00e9conomique 53, 3","author":"Ausubel M.","year":"2002","unstructured":"Lawrence\u00a0 M. Ausubel and Paul\u00a0 R. Milgrom . 2002. Package Bidding Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions. Revue \u00e9conomique 53, 3 ( 2002 ), 391\u2013402. Lawrence\u00a0M. Ausubel and Paul\u00a0R. Milgrom. 2002. Package Bidding Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions. Revue \u00e9conomique 53, 3 (2002), 391\u2013402."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_4_1","unstructured":"Google Ad\u00a0Manager Blog. 2019. An update on first price auctions for Google Ad Manager. https:\/\/www.blog.google\/products\/admanager\/update-first-price-auctions-google-ad-manager\/  Google Ad\u00a0Manager Blog. 2019. An update on first price auctions for Google Ad Manager. https:\/\/www.blog.google\/products\/admanager\/update-first-price-auctions-google-ad-manager\/"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-2354.00013"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2482540.2483188"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_7_1","unstructured":"Google Ad\u00a0Manager Help. 2019. Transition schedule to first-price auction. https:\/\/support.google.com\/admanager\/answer\/9298211?hl=en  Google Ad\u00a0Manager Help. 2019. Transition schedule to first-price auction. https:\/\/support.google.com\/admanager\/answer\/9298211?hl=en"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_8_1","volume-title":"Mechanism design by competing sellers. Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society","author":"McAfee R\u00a0Preston","year":"1993","unstructured":"R\u00a0Preston McAfee . 1993. Mechanism design by competing sellers. Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society ( 1993 ), 1281\u20131312. R\u00a0Preston McAfee. 1993. Mechanism design by competing sellers. Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society (1993), 1281\u20131312."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_9_1","volume-title":"Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research 6, 1","author":"Myerson B","year":"1981","unstructured":"Roger\u00a0 B Myerson . 1981. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research 6, 1 ( 1981 ), 58\u201373. Roger\u00a0B Myerson. 1981. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research 6, 1 (1981), 58\u201373."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_10_1","unstructured":"Mallesh Pai. 2009. Competing auctioneers. (2009).  Mallesh Pai. 2009. Competing auctioneers. (2009)."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_11_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1980534.1980541"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_12_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.2.2.132"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_13_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/jeth.1997.2278"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_14_1","first-page":"381","article-title":"Optimal auctions","volume":"71","author":"Riley J.G.","year":"1981","unstructured":"J.G. Riley and W.F. Samuelson . 1981 . Optimal auctions . The American Economic Review 71 , 3 (1981), 381 \u2013 392 . J.G. Riley and W.F. Samuelson. 1981. Optimal auctions. The American Economic Review 71, 3 (1981), 381\u2013392.","journal-title":"The American Economic Review"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_15_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x"}],"event":{"name":"WWW '20: The Web Conference 2020","location":"Taipei Taiwan","acronym":"WWW '20","sponsor":["SIGWEB ACM Special Interest Group on Hypertext, Hypermedia, and Web"]},"container-title":["Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3366423.3380142","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3366423.3380142","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,17]],"date-time":"2025-06-17T22:33:00Z","timestamp":1750199580000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3366423.3380142"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020,4,20]]},"references-count":15,"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3366423.3380142","10.1145\/3366423"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3366423.3380142","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020,4,20]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2020-04-20","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}