{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,4]],"date-time":"2026-07-04T17:38:17Z","timestamp":1783186697554,"version":"3.54.6"},"reference-count":54,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"3","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,3,12]],"date-time":"2020-03-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1583971200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"funder":[{"name":"National Key Research and Development Program of China","award":["2018YFB0803501"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["2018YFB0803501"]}]},{"name":"Singapore MOE T1","award":["SUTDT12017004"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["SUTDT12017004"]}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001809","name":"National Natural Science Foundation of China","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","award":["61833015"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["61833015"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001809","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]},{"name":"SUTD-ZJU IDEA","award":["SUTD-ZJU (VP) 201805"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["SUTD-ZJU (VP) 201805"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["ACM Trans. Cyber-Phys. Syst."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,7,31]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            Recent studies have exploited moving target defense (MTD) for thwarting false data injection (FDI) attacks against the state estimation (SE) by actively perturbing branch parameters (i.e., impedance or admittance) in power grids. To hide the activation of MTD from attackers, a new strategy named hidden MTD has been proposed by the latest literature. A hidden MTD can increase the defender\u2019s chance to detect FDI attacks and avoid the attacker from inferring new branch parameters. However, by using an\n            <jats:italic>MTD-confirming detector<\/jats:italic>\n            like the bad data detection (BDD) checker in SE, we observe that it is still possible for the attacker to detect this hidden MTD when the power flows change with time. To uncover the insight of MTD\u2019s hiddenness, we study the conditions needed for achieving a hidable MTD. We find that the hiddenness of MTD is closely related to the branch perturbations, system topology, and attacker\u2019s knowledge. From the attacker\u2019s perspective, we prove that an MTD can be detected by the attacker only if he\/she knows the previous parameters of a set of branches that forms a circle and the measurements corresponding to those branches after MTD. But once the attacker has full knowledge of branch parameters before MTD and has obtained all measurements after MTD, it is proved that we can never achieve a hidable and effective MTD. From the defender\u2019s perspective, since it is impossible to know the attacker\u2019s capability, we cannot determine whether a constructed MTD is hidable or not by purely depending on the MTD design. To address this issue, we propose that, by protecting a basic set of measurements, we always can achieve a hidable and effective MTD regardless of the changes of power flows, the attacker\u2019s knowledge, and the branch perturbations. Furthermore, we validate our findings with the IEEE standard test power systems.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3372751","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,3,12]],"date-time":"2020-03-12T07:49:20Z","timestamp":1583999360000},"page":"1-29","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":35,"title":["On Hiddenness of Moving Target Defense against False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"4","author":[{"given":"Zhenyong","family":"Zhang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-8158-150X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ruilong","family":"Deng","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"David K. Y.","family":"Yau","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Peng","family":"Cheng","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Jiming","family":"Chen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,3,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/MSP.2011.67"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TPWRS.2016.2631891"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/JPROC.2011.2161428"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/SURV.2011.122111.00145"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TII.2011.2166794"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2017.2702125"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","unstructured":"Homeland Security. 2018. Moving target defense. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.dhs.gov\/science-and-technology\/csd-mtd.  Homeland Security. 2018. Moving target defense. Retrieved from https:\/\/www.dhs.gov\/science-and-technology\/csd-mtd."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop Moving Target Defense (MTD\u201914)","author":"Rahman M. A.","unstructured":"M. A. Rahman , E. Al-Shaer , and R. B. Bobba . 2014. Moving target defense for hardening the security of the power system state estimation . In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop Moving Target Defense (MTD\u201914) . 59--68. M. A. Rahman, E. Al-Shaer, and R. B. Bobba. 2014. Moving target defense for hardening the security of the power system state estimation. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop Moving Target Defense (MTD\u201914). 59--68."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE\/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN\u201918)","author":"Lakshminaraytana S.","year":"2018","unstructured":"S. Lakshminaraytana and D. K. Y. Yau . 2018 . Cost-benefit analysis of moving-target defense in power grids . In Proceedings of the IEEE\/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN\u201918) . 1--12. S. Lakshminaraytana and D. K. Y. Yau. 2018. Cost-benefit analysis of moving-target defense in power grids. In Proceedings of the IEEE\/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN\u201918). 1--12."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_10_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TPEL.2007.909252"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_11_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE 40th North American Power Symposium (NAPS\u201909)","author":"Rogers K.","unstructured":"K. Rogers and T. Overbye . 2009. Some applications of distributed flexible AC transmission system (d-facts) devices in power systems . In Proceedings of the IEEE 40th North American Power Symposium (NAPS\u201909) . 1--8. K. Rogers and T. Overbye. 2009. Some applications of distributed flexible AC transmission system (d-facts) devices in power systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE 40th North American Power Symposium (NAPS\u201909). 1--8."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_12_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.24295\/CPSSTPEA.2016.00006"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_13_1","article-title":"False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grid","volume":"14","author":"Liu Y.","year":"2011","unstructured":"Y. Liu , P. Ning , and M. K. Reiter . 2011 . False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grid . IEEE Trans. Inf. Syst. Sec. 14 , 1 (2011), article 13. Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter. 2011. False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grid. IEEE Trans. Inf. Syst. Sec. 14, 1 (2011), article 13.","journal-title":"IEEE Trans. Inf. Syst. Sec."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_14_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201911)","author":"Giani A.","unstructured":"A. Giani , E. Bitar , M. Garcia , M. McQueen , P. Khargonekar , and K. Poolla . 2011. Smart grid data integrity attacks: Characterizations and countermeasures . In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201911) . 232--237. A. Giani, E. Bitar, M. Garcia, M. McQueen, P. Khargonekar, and K. Poolla. 2011. Smart grid data integrity attacks: Characterizations and countermeasures. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201911). 232--237."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_15_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201911)","author":"Esmalifalak M.","unstructured":"M. Esmalifalak , H. Nguyen , R. Zheng , and Z. Han . 2011. Stealth false data injection using independent component analysis in smart grid . In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201911) . 244--248. M. Esmalifalak, H. Nguyen, R. Zheng, and Z. Han. 2011. Stealth false data injection using independent component analysis in smart grid. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201911). 244--248."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_16_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201911)","author":"D\u00e1n G.","unstructured":"G. D\u00e1n and H. Sandberg . 2011. Stealth attacks and protection schemes for state estimators in power systems . In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201911) . 214--219. G. D\u00e1n and H. Sandberg. 2011. Stealth attacks and protection schemes for state estimators in power systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201911). 214--219."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_17_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TII.2016.2614396"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_18_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3127021"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_19_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3226030"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_20_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TII.2015.2470218"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_21_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TII.2018.2863256"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_22_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3078621"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_23_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3204439"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_24_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2013.2294966"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_25_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2011.2119336"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_26_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2017.2679122"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_27_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE 51st Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS\u201917)","author":"Yao J.","unstructured":"J. Yao , P. Venkitasubramaniam , S. Kishore , L. V. Snyder , and R. S. Blum . 2017. Network topology risk assessment of stealthy cyber attacks on advanced metering infrastructure networks . In Proceedings of the IEEE 51st Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS\u201917) . 1--6. J. Yao, P. Venkitasubramaniam, S. Kishore, L. V. Snyder, and R. S. Blum. 2017. Network topology risk assessment of stealthy cyber attacks on advanced metering infrastructure networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE 51st Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS\u201917). 1--6."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_28_1","unstructured":"A. G. Illera and J. V. Vidal. 2014. Lights off! The darkness of the smart meters. Retrieved from http:\/\/youtube.be\/Z_y_vjYtAWM.  A. G. Illera and J. V. Vidal. 2014. Lights off! The darkness of the smart meters. Retrieved from http:\/\/youtube.be\/Z_y_vjYtAWM."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_29_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2018.2817515"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_30_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2018.2848256"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_31_1","first-page":"1","article-title":"Enhanced hidden moving target defense in smart grids","volume":"10","author":"Jue T.","year":"2018","unstructured":"T. Jue , R. Tan , X. Guan , and T. Liu . 2018 . Enhanced hidden moving target defense in smart grids . IEEE Trans. Smart Grids 10 , 2 (2018), 1 -- 1 . T. Jue, R. Tan, X. Guan, and T. Liu. 2018. Enhanced hidden moving target defense in smart grids. IEEE Trans. Smart Grids 10, 2 (2018), 1--1.","journal-title":"IEEE Trans. Smart Grids"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_32_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the International Conference on System Sciences (CSS\u201912)","author":"Morrow K. L.","unstructured":"K. L. Morrow , E. Heine , K. M. Rogers , R. B. Bobba , and T. J. Overbye . 2012. Topology perturbation for detecting malicious data injection . In Proceedings of the International Conference on System Sciences (CSS\u201912) . 2104--2113. K. L. Morrow, E. Heine, K. M. Rogers, R. B. Bobba, and T. J. Overbye. 2012. Topology perturbation for detecting malicious data injection. In Proceedings of the International Conference on System Sciences (CSS\u201912). 2104--2113."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_33_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201912)","author":"Davis K. R.","unstructured":"K. R. Davis , K. L. Morrow , R. Bobba , and E. Heine . 2012. Power flow cyber attacks and perturbation-based defense . In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201912) . 342--347. K. R. Davis, K. L. Morrow, R. Bobba, and E. Heine. 2012. Power flow cyber attacks and perturbation-based defense. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm\u201912). 342--347."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_34_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2014.2382714"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_35_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE\/ACM Workshop on Secure Control Systems (CPSWEEK\u201910)","author":"Bobba R. B.","year":"2010","unstructured":"R. B. Bobba 2010 . Detecting false data injection attacks on DC state estimation . In Proceedings of the IEEE\/ACM Workshop on Secure Control Systems (CPSWEEK\u201910) . 1--9. R. B. Bobba et al. 2010. Detecting false data injection attacks on DC state estimation. In Proceedings of the IEEE\/ACM Workshop on Secure Control Systems (CPSWEEK\u201910). 1--9."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_36_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM\u201917)","author":"Markwood I.","unstructured":"I. Markwood , Y. Liu , K. Kwiat , and C. Kamhoua . 2017. Electric grid power flow model camouflage against topology leaking attacks . In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM\u201917) . 1--9. I. Markwood, Y. Liu, K. Kwiat, and C. Kamhoua. 2017. Electric grid power flow model camouflage against topology leaking attacks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM\u201917). 1--9."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_37_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2015.2508449"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_38_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2013.2245155"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_39_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2015.2388545"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_40_1","first-page":"1","article-title":"Detecting false data injection attacks against power system state estimation with fast go-decomposition (GoDec) approach","volume":"15","author":"Li B.","year":"2018","unstructured":"B. Li , T. Ding , C. Huang , J. Zhao , and Y. Yang . 2018 . Detecting false data injection attacks against power system state estimation with fast go-decomposition (GoDec) approach . IEEE Trans. Indust. Inf. 15 , 5 (2018), 1 -- 12 . B. Li, T. Ding, C. Huang, J. Zhao, and Y. Yang. 2018. Detecting false data injection attacks against power system state estimation with fast go-decomposition (GoDec) approach. IEEE Trans. Indust. Inf. 15, 5 (2018), 1--12.","journal-title":"IEEE Trans. Indust. Inf."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_41_1","first-page":"2042","article-title":"Bad data detection in the context of leverage point attacks in modern power","volume":"9","author":"Majumdar A.","year":"2018","unstructured":"A. Majumdar and B. C. Pal . 2018 . Bad data detection in the context of leverage point attacks in modern power . IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 9 , 3 (2018), 2042 -- 2054 . A. Majumdar and B. C. Pal. 2018. Bad data detection in the context of leverage point attacks in modern power. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 9, 3 (2018), 2042--2054.","journal-title":"IEEE Trans. Smart Grid"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_42_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT\u201919)","author":"Zhang Z.","unstructured":"Z. Zhang , R. Deng , D. K. Y. Yau , P. Cheng , and J. Chen . 2019. On effectiveness of detecting FDI attacks on power grid using moving target defense . In Proceedings of the IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT\u201919) . 1--5. Z. Zhang, R. Deng, D. K. Y. Yau, P. Cheng, and J. Chen. 2019. On effectiveness of detecting FDI attacks on power grid using moving target defense. In Proceedings of the IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT\u201919). 1--5."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_43_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/JSTSP.2018.2846542"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_44_1","unstructured":"NESCOR. 2014. Electric sector failure scenarios and impact analyses. Retrieved from http:\/\/smartgrid.epri.com\/doc\/NESCOR%20failure%20scenarios%2006-30-14a.pdf.  NESCOR. 2014. Electric sector failure scenarios and impact analyses. Retrieved from http:\/\/smartgrid.epri.com\/doc\/NESCOR%20failure%20scenarios%2006-30-14a.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_45_1","unstructured":"S. McIntyre. 2019. Smart meter security testing framework. Retrieved from https:\/\/github.com\/securestate\/termineter.  S. McIntyre. 2019. Smart meter security testing framework. Retrieved from https:\/\/github.com\/securestate\/termineter."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_46_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2013.2291661"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_47_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2015.2394358"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_48_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSG.2016.2521178"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_49_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TSP.2014.2385670"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_50_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TPWRS.2010.2051168"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_51_1","unstructured":"NYISO load data. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.nyiso.com\/public\/markets_operations\/mar-ket_data\/load_data\/index.jsp.  NYISO load data. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.nyiso.com\/public\/markets_operations\/mar-ket_data\/load_data\/index.jsp."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_52_1","unstructured":"R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson. 1990. Matrix Analysis. Cambridge University Press New York.  R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson. 1990. Matrix Analysis. Cambridge University Press New York."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_53_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TIFS.2019.2928624"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_54_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the ACM 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC\u201910)","author":"Stephen M.","unstructured":"M. Stephen , P. Dmitry , M. Sergei , D. Adam , and M. Patrick . 2010. Multi-vendor penetration testing in the advanced metering infrastructure . In Proceedings of the ACM 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC\u201910) . 107--116. M. Stephen, P. Dmitry, M. Sergei, D. Adam, and M. Patrick. 2010. Multi-vendor penetration testing in the advanced metering infrastructure. In Proceedings of the ACM 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC\u201910). 107--116."}],"container-title":["ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3372751","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3372751","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,17]],"date-time":"2025-06-17T23:24:05Z","timestamp":1750202645000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3372751"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020,3,12]]},"references-count":54,"journal-issue":{"issue":"3","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,7,31]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3372751"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3372751","relation":{},"ISSN":["2378-962X","2378-9638"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2378-962X","type":"print"},{"value":"2378-9638","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020,3,12]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2019-03-01","order":0,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2019-11-01","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2020-03-12","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}