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Internet Technol."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,11,30]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            Trust in Secure Sockets Layer\u2013based communications is traditionally provided by Certificate (or Certification) Authorities (CAs) in the form of signed certificates. Checking the validity of a certificate involves three steps: (i) checking its expiration date, (ii) verifying its signature, and (iii) ensuring that it is not revoked. Currently, such certificate revocation checks (i.e., step (iii) above) are done either via Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) servers. Unfortunately, despite the existence of these revocation checks, sophisticated cyber-attackers can still trick web browsers to trust a\n            <jats:italic>revoked<\/jats:italic>\n            certificate, believing that it is still valid.\n          <\/jats:p>\n          <jats:p>\n            Although frequently\n            <jats:italic>updated<\/jats:italic>\n            ,\n            <jats:italic>nonced<\/jats:italic>\n            , and\n            <jats:italic>timestamped<\/jats:italic>\n            certificates can reduce the frequency and impact of such cyber-attacks, they add a huge burden to the CAs and OCSP servers. Indeed, CAs and\/or OCSP servers need to\n            <jats:italic>timestamp<\/jats:italic>\n            and\n            <jats:italic>sign<\/jats:italic>\n            on a regular basis all the responses, for every certificate they have issued, resulting in a very high overhead. To mitigate this and provide a solution to the described cyber-attacks, we present CCSP : a new approach to provide timely information regarding the status of certificates, which capitalizes on a newly introduced notion called\n            <jats:italic>Signed Collections<\/jats:italic>\n            . In this article, we present in detail the notion of\n            <jats:italic>Signed Collections<\/jats:italic>\n            and the complete design, implementation, and evaluation of our approach. Performance evaluation shows that CCSP (i) reduces space requirements by more than an order of magnitude, (ii) lowers the number of signatures required by six orders of magnitude compared to OCSP-based methods, and (iii) adds only a few milliseconds of overhead in the overall user latency.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3392096","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,7,7]],"date-time":"2020-07-07T12:39:34Z","timestamp":1594125574000},"page":"1-25","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":7,"title":["Design and Implementation of a Compressed Certificate Status Protocol"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"20","author":[{"given":"Michalis","family":"Pachilakis","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"FORTH-ICS\/University of Crete, Heraklion, Crete GR, Greece"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Antonios A.","family":"Chariton","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Crete, Heraklion, Heraklion Crete, Greece"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-1928-6534","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Panagiotis","family":"Papadopoulos","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Brave Software, London UK"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Panagiotis","family":"Ilia","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Eirini","family":"Degkleri","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Crete, Heraklion Crete, Greece"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Evangelos P.","family":"Markatos","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"FORTH-ICS\/University of Crete, Heraklion, Crete GR, Greece"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,10,6]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","volume-title":"\u201cSecure","author":"Google Alfred Ng.","unstructured":"Alfred Ng. 2018. 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