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ACM"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,8,31]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            We consider a monopolist seller with\n            <jats:italic>n<\/jats:italic>\n            heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The seller aims to maximize his revenue.\n          <\/jats:p>\n          <jats:p>\n            We suggest using the\n            <jats:italic>a priori better<\/jats:italic>\n            of two simple pricing methods:\n            <jats:italic>selling the items separately<\/jats:italic>\n            , each at its optimal price, and\n            <jats:italic>bundling together<\/jats:italic>\n            , in which the entire set of items is sold as one bundle at its optimal price. We show that for any distribution, this mechanism achieves a constant-factor approximation to the optimal revenue. Beyond its simplicity, this is the first computationally tractable mechanism to obtain a constant-factor approximation for this multi-parameter problem. We additionally discuss extensions to multiple buyers and to valuations that are correlated across items.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3398745","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,16]],"date-time":"2020-06-16T23:14:20Z","timestamp":1592349260000},"page":"1-40","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":35,"title":["A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"67","author":[{"given":"Moshe","family":"Babaioff","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA"}]},{"given":"Nicole","family":"Immorlica","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA"}]},{"given":"Brendan","family":"Lucier","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Microsoft Research, Cambridge, MA"}]},{"given":"S. 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