{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,28]],"date-time":"2025-09-28T20:44:47Z","timestamp":1759092287980,"version":"3.41.0"},"reference-count":14,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,29]],"date-time":"2020-09-29T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1601337600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["GetMobile: Mobile Comp. and Comm."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,29]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>Based on the concept of hardware separation, ARM introduced TrustZone to build a trusted execution environment for applications. It has been quite successful in defending against various software attacks and forcing attackers to explore vulnerabilities in interface designs and side channels. In this article, we propose an innovative software-controlled hardware fault-based attack, VoltJockey, on multi-core processors that adopt dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) techniques for energy efficiency. We deliberately manipulate the processor voltage via DVFS to induce hardware faults into the victim cores, and therefore breaking TrustZone. The entire attack process is based on software without any involvement of hardware, which makes VoltJockey stealthy and hard to prevent.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3427384.3427394","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,30]],"date-time":"2020-09-30T04:14:05Z","timestamp":1601439245000},"page":"30-33","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["VoltJockey"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"24","author":[{"given":"Pengfei","family":"Qui","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Tsinghua University, Beijing, China"}]},{"given":"Dongsheng","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Tsinghua University &amp; Peng Cheng Laboratory, Beijing, China"}]},{"given":"Yongqiang","family":"Lyu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Tsinghua University, Beijing, China"}]},{"given":"Gang","family":"Qu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Univ. of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,29]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","unstructured":"ARM Architecture. \"Security technology building a secure system using trustzone technology (white paper).\" ARM Limited (2009).  ARM Architecture. \"Security technology building a secure system using trustzone technology (white paper).\" ARM Limited (2009)."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","unstructured":"Dan Rosenberg. \"Reflections on trusting trustzone.\" Black Hat Conference. 2014.  Dan Rosenberg. \"Reflections on trusting trustzone.\" Black Hat Conference. 2014."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","volume-title":"A survey of Android exploits in the wild","author":"Meng Huasong","year":"2018","unstructured":"Huasong Meng , \" A survey of Android exploits in the wild .\" 2018 . Computers & Security , 76, 71--91. Huasong Meng, et al. \"A survey of Android exploits in the wild.\" 2018. Computers & Security, 76, 71--91."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","unstructured":"Dan Rosenberg. \"Qsee trustzone kernel integer over flow vulnerability.\" Black Hat Conference. 2014.  Dan Rosenberg. \"Qsee trustzone kernel integer over flow vulnerability.\" Black Hat Conference. 2014."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/3241094.3241138"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/3241189.3241272"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3319535.3354201"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/43.811318"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/32.44380"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_10_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/151116"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_11_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/EDCC-7.2008.11"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_12_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/FDTC.2009.30"},{"volume-title":"2010 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). IEEE.","author":"Barenghi Alessandro","key":"e_1_2_1_13_1","unstructured":"Alessandro Barenghi , voltage fault attacks to AES.\" 2010 . 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). IEEE. Alessandro Barenghi, et al. \"Low voltage fault attacks to AES.\" 2010. 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). IEEE."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_14_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jss.2013.02.021"}],"container-title":["GetMobile: Mobile Computing and Communications"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3427384.3427394","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3427384.3427394","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,17]],"date-time":"2025-06-17T22:02:26Z","timestamp":1750197746000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3427384.3427394"}},"subtitle":["Abusing the Processor Voltage to Break Arm TrustZone"],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,29]]},"references-count":14,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,29]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3427384.3427394"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3427384.3427394","relation":{},"ISSN":["2375-0529","2375-0537"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"2375-0529"},{"type":"electronic","value":"2375-0537"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020,9,29]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2020-09-29","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}