{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,18]],"date-time":"2025-06-18T04:22:26Z","timestamp":1750220546653,"version":"3.41.0"},"reference-count":56,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,30]],"date-time":"2020-12-30T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1609286400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["ACM Trans. Archit. Code Optim."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,31]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            Intel\u2019s SGX architecture offers clients of public cloud computing platforms the ability to create hardware-protected\n            <jats:italic>enclaves<\/jats:italic>\n            whose contents are protected from privileged system software. However, SGX relies on system software for enclave memory management. In a sequence of recent papers, researchers have demonstrated that this reliance allows a malicious OS\/hypervisor to snoop on the page addresses being accessed from within an enclave via various channels. This page address stream can then be used to infer secrets if the enclave\u2019s page access pattern depends upon the secret and this constitutes an important class of side-channels.\n          <\/jats:p>\n          <jats:p>\n            We propose SG\n            <jats:sup>XL<\/jats:sup>\n            , a hardware-software co-designed system that significantly increases the difficulty of any page address-based side-channels through the use of large pages. A large page maps address ranges at a much larger granularity than the default page size (at least 512\u00d7 larger). SG\n            <jats:sup>XL<\/jats:sup>\n            thus significantly lowers resolution of the leaked page address stream and could practically throttle all flavors of page-address based side-channels. We detail the modifications needed to SGX\u2019s software stack and the (minor) hardware enhancements required for SG\n            <jats:sup>XL<\/jats:sup>\n            to guarantee the use of large pages in the presence of adversarial system software. We empirically show that SG\n            <jats:sup>XL<\/jats:sup>\n            could be one of those rare systems that enhances security with the potential of improving performance as well.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3433983","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,30]],"date-time":"2020-12-30T12:30:51Z","timestamp":1609331451000},"page":"1-25","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["SG\n            <sup>XL<\/sup>"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"18","author":[{"given":"Sujay","family":"Yadalam","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Wisconsin\u2013Madison"}]},{"given":"Vinod","family":"Ganapathy","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Indian Institute of Science"}]},{"given":"Arkaprava","family":"Basu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Indian Institute of Science"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,30]]},"reference":[{"volume-title":"Proceedings of the 44th Annual International Symposium on Computer Arc","author":"Aga S.","key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","unstructured":"S. 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