{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,18]],"date-time":"2025-06-18T04:23:12Z","timestamp":1750220592498,"version":"3.41.0"},"reference-count":20,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,23]],"date-time":"2021-03-23T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1616457600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000183","name":"Army Research Office","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["W911NF-11-1-0332, W911NF-12-1-0550"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["W911NF-11-1-0332, W911NF-12-1-0550"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000183","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000001","name":"National Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["IIS- 1527434, IIS-0953756, IIS-1814056, CCF-1101659, CCF-1337215"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["IIS- 1527434, IIS-0953756, IIS-1814056, CCF-1101659, CCF-1337215"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000001","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["ACM Trans. Econ. Comput."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,31]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            The\n            <jats:italic>revelation principle<\/jats:italic>\n            is a key tool in mechanism design. It allows the designer to restrict attention to truthful mechanisms, greatly facilitating analysis. This is also borne out algorithmically, allowing certain computational problems in mechanism design to be solved in polynomial time. Unfortunately, when not every type can misreport every other type (the\n            <jats:italic>partial verification<\/jats:italic>\n            model) or\u2014more generally\u2014misreporting can be costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold. This also leads to NP-hardness results. The primary contribution of this article consists of characterizations of conditions under which the revelation principle still holds when reporting can be costly. (These are generalizations of conditions given earlier for the partial verification case\u00a0[11, 21].) Furthermore, our results extend to cases where, instead of reporting types directly, agents send signals that do not directly correspond to types. In this case, we obtain conditions for when the mechanism designer can restrict attention to a given (but arbitrary) mapping from types to signals without loss of generality.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3434408","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,23]],"date-time":"2021-03-23T16:37:38Z","timestamp":1616517458000},"page":"1-35","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"9","author":[{"given":"Andrew","family":"Kephart","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Vincent","family":"Conitzer","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,23]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-009-9119-4"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s10994-010-5188-5"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2003.12.002"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2006.03.003"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229035"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI\u201902)","author":"Conitzer Vincent","year":"2002","unstructured":"Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm . 2002 . Complexity of mechanism design . In Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI\u201902) . 103--110. Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. 2002. Complexity of mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI\u201902). 103--110."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/988772.988793"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1014052.1014066"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2007.12.006"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_10_1","unstructured":"Raymond Deneckere and Sergei Severinov. 2014. Optimal Screening with Costly Misrepresentation. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.severinov.com\/working_papers\/screen_costly_nov2014.pdf Working Paper.  Raymond Deneckere and Sergei Severinov. 2014. Optimal Screening with Costly Misrepresentation. Retrieved from http:\/\/www.severinov.com\/working_papers\/screen_costly_nov2014.pdf Working Paper."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_11_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2297639"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_12_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2840728.2840730"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_13_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3982\/TE723"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_14_1","volume-title":"C","author":"Kartik Navin","year":"2014","unstructured":"Navin Kartik , Olivier Tercieux , and Richard Holden . 2014. Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty. Games Econ. Behav. 83 , C ( 2014 ), 284--290. Navin Kartik, Olivier Tercieux, and Richard Holden. 2014. Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty. Games Econ. Behav. 83, C (2014), 284--290."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_15_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS\u201915)","author":"Kephart Andrew","year":"2015","unstructured":"Andrew Kephart and Vincent Conitzer . 2015 . Complexity of mechanism design with signaling costs . In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS\u201915) . 357--365. Andrew Kephart and Vincent Conitzer. 2015. Complexity of mechanism design with signaling costs. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS\u201915). 357--365."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_17_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1086\/261657"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_18_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-4068(87)90007-3"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_19_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1882010"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_20_1","volume-title":"Mechanism design with partially verifiable information","author":"Strausz Roland","year":"2040","unstructured":"Roland Strausz . 2016. Mechanism design with partially verifiable information . Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No . 2040 . Roland Strausz. 2016. Mechanism design with partially verifiable information. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2040."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_21_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-010-9151-4"}],"container-title":["ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3434408","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3434408","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"syndication"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3434408","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,17]],"date-time":"2025-06-17T21:31:48Z","timestamp":1750195908000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3434408"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,23]]},"references-count":20,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,31]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3434408"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3434408","relation":{},"ISSN":["2167-8375","2167-8383"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"2167-8375"},{"type":"electronic","value":"2167-8383"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2021,3,23]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2017-03-01","order":0,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2020-08-01","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2021-03-23","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}