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Econ. Comput."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,6,30]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting, a monopolist seller with\n            <jats:italic>m<\/jats:italic>\n            heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to maximize her revenue. The buyer has a budget and additive valuations drawn independently for each item from (non-identical) distributions. We show that when the buyer\u2019s budget is publicly known, it is better to sell each item separately; selling the grand bundle extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. When the budget is private, we consider a standard Bayesian setting where buyer\u2019s budget\n            <jats:italic>b<\/jats:italic>\n            is drawn from a known distribution\n            <jats:italic>B<\/jats:italic>\n            . We show that if\n            <jats:italic>b<\/jats:italic>\n            is independent of the valuations (which is necessary) and distribution\n            <jats:italic>B<\/jats:italic>\n            satisfies monotone hazard rate condition, then selling items separately or in a grand bundle is still approximately optimal.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3434419","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,1,4]],"date-time":"2021-01-04T14:36:39Z","timestamp":1609770999000},"page":"1-25","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"9","author":[{"given":"Yu","family":"Cheng","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Duke University, Chicago, IL"}]},{"given":"Nick","family":"Gravin","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China"}]},{"given":"Kamesh","family":"Munagala","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Duke University"}]},{"given":"Kangning","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Duke University"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,1,4]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1109557.1109676"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229017"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3055399.3055426"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","volume-title":"Proc. 55th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science. 21--30","author":"Babaioff Moshe"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1080\/01621459.1965.10480836"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-662-48350-3_9"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2213977.2214020"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973075.47"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1806689.1806743"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_10_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1064009.1064014"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_11_1","volume-title":"Proc. 21st ACM-SIAM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms. 585--597","author":"Briest Patrick"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_12_1","volume-title":"Proc. 44th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing. 459--478","author":"Cai Yang"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_13_1","volume-title":"Proc. 53rd IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science. 130--139","author":"Cai Yang"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_14_1","volume-title":"Proc. 24th ACM-SIAM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms. 578--595","author":"Cai Yang"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_15_1","volume-title":"Proc. 54th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science. 618--627","author":"Cai Yang"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_16_1","volume-title":"Proc. 48th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing. 926--939","author":"Cai Yang"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_17_1","unstructured":"Yang Cai and Mingfei Zhao. 2017. 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