{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,4]],"date-time":"2026-04-04T06:05:20Z","timestamp":1775282720051,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":20,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,2]],"date-time":"2020-12-02T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1606867200000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["SIGecom Exch."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,2]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>In this letter, we summarize our recent work examining the incentives produced by algorithmic decision-making. Drawing upon principal-agent models in the mechanism design literature, we construct and analyze a model of strategic behavior under algorithmic evaluation. We characterize which behaviors can be incentivized by any reasonable mechanism, showing that simple linear mechanisms are sufficient to incentivize desired behavior. However, we find that it is computationally hard to optimize even simple objectives subject to the constraint that the resulting linear mechanism induces the desired incentives.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3440968.3440974","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,2]],"date-time":"2020-12-02T23:57:59Z","timestamp":1606953479000},"page":"45-52","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Algorithmic classification and strategic effort"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"18","author":[{"given":"Jon","family":"Kleinberg","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Cornell University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Manish","family":"Raghavan","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Cornell University"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,2]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Alon T. Dobson M. Procaccia A. D. Talgam-Cohen I. and Tucker-Foltz J. 2020. Multiagent evaluation mechanisms. In AAAI. 1774--1781.  Alon T. Dobson M. Procaccia A. D. Talgam-Cohen I. and Tucker-Foltz J. 2020. Multiagent evaluation mechanisms. In AAAI. 1774--1781.","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v34i02.5543"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","first-page":"941","article-title":"Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care","volume":"53","author":"Arrow K. J.","year":"1963","journal-title":"American Economic Review"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","unstructured":"Bechavod Y. Ligett K. Wu Z. S. and Ziani J. 2020. Causal feature discovery through strategic modification. arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.07024.  Bechavod Y. Ligett K. Wu Z. S. and Ziani J. 2020. 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Milli S. and Hardt M. 2019. Strategic classification is causal modeling in disguise. arXiv arXiv-1910.  Miller J. Milli S. and Hardt M. 2019. Strategic classification is causal modeling in disguise. arXiv arXiv-1910."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_18_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3287560.3287576"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_19_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning.","author":"Shavit Y."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_20_1","unstructured":"Tang W. Ho C.-J. and Liu Y. 2020. Linear models are robust optimal under strategic behavior.  Tang W. Ho C.-J. and Liu Y. 2020. Linear models are robust optimal under strategic behavior."}],"container-title":["ACM SIGecom Exchanges"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3440968.3440974","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3440968.3440974","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,17]],"date-time":"2025-06-17T22:02:51Z","timestamp":1750197771000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3440968.3440974"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,2]]},"references-count":20,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,2]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3440968.3440974"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3440968.3440974","relation":{},"ISSN":["1551-9031"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1551-9031","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2020,12,2]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2020-12-02","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}