{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,18]],"date-time":"2025-06-18T04:19:23Z","timestamp":1750220363550,"version":"3.41.0"},"publisher-location":"New York, NY, USA","reference-count":41,"publisher":"ACM","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,7,18]],"date-time":"2021-07-18T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1626566400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/100000001","name":"NSF (National Science Foundation)","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["IIS-1838154, CCF-1703925, CCF-1814873, CCF-1563155, CCF-1844887"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["IIS-1838154, CCF-1703925, CCF-1814873, CCF-1563155, CCF-1844887"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100000001","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]},{"name":"NSFC","award":["61922052, 61932002"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["61922052, 61932002"]}]},{"name":"Science and Technology Innovation 2030 ? ``New Generation of Artificial Intelligence' Major Project No.(2018AAA0100903)"},{"name":"Innovation Program of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission"},{"name":"Program for Innovative Research Team of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (IRTSHUFE)"},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100012226","name":"Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100012226","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2021,7,18]]},"DOI":"10.1145\/3465456.3467621","type":"proceedings-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,7,18]],"date-time":"2021-07-18T10:28:50Z","timestamp":1626604130000},"page":"654-673","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms"],"prefix":"10.1145","author":[{"given":"Yaonan","family":"Jin","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Columbia University, New York, NY, USA"}]},{"given":"Shunhua","family":"Jiang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Columbia University, New York, NY, USA"}]},{"given":"Pinyan","family":"Lu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China"}]},{"given":"Hengjie","family":"Zhang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Columbia University, New York, NY, USA"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,7,18]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_1_1","volume-title":"Random Order Contention Resolution Schemes. In 59th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2018","author":"Adamczyk Marek","year":"2018","unstructured":"Marek Adamczyk and Michal Wlodarczyk . 2018 . Random Order Contention Resolution Schemes. In 59th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2018 , Paris, France, October 7--9 , 2018, Mikkel Thorup (Ed.). IEEE Computer Society, 790--801. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1109\/FOCS.2018.00080 Marek Adamczyk and Michal Wlodarczyk. 2018. Random Order Contention Resolution Schemes. In 59th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2018, Paris, France, October 7--9, 2018, Mikkel Thorup (Ed.). IEEE Computer Society, 790--801. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1109\/FOCS.2018.00080"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/120878422"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2018.08.003"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2014.36"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3219166.3219182"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/545381.545506"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_7_1","volume-title":"Martin Pal, and Balasubramanian Sivan.","author":"Beyhaghi Hedyeh","year":"2018","unstructured":"Hedyeh Beyhaghi , Negin Golrezaei , Renato Paes Leme , Martin Pal, and Balasubramanian Sivan. 2018 . Improved Approximations for Free-Order Prophets and Second-Price Auctions. CoRR , Vol. abs\/ 1807 .03435 (2018). arxiv: 1807.03435 http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1807.03435 Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Negin Golrezaei, Renato Paes Leme, Martin Pal, and Balasubramanian Sivan. 2018. Improved Approximations for Free-Order Prophets and Second-Price Auctions. CoRR, Vol. abs\/1807.03435 (2018). arxiv: 1807.03435 http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1807.03435"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_8_1","first-page":"180","article-title":"Auctions versus Negotiations","volume":"86","author":"Bulow Jeremy","year":"1996","unstructured":"Jeremy Bulow , Paul Klemperer , 1996 . Auctions versus Negotiations . American Economic Review , Vol. 86 , 1 (1996), 180 -- 194 . Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer, et al. 1996. Auctions versus Negotiations. American Economic Review, Vol. 86, 1 (1996), 180--194.","journal-title":"American Economic Review"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS.2017.54"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_10_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/TIT.2014.2365772"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_11_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2010","author":"Chawla Shuchi","year":"2010","unstructured":"Shuchi Chawla , Jason D. Hartline , David L. Malec , and Balasubramanian Sivan . 2010 . Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing . In Proceedings of the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2010 , Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 5- -8 June 2010. 311--320. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/1806689.1806733 Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, and Balasubramanian Sivan. 2010. Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing. In Proceedings of the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2010, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 5--8 June 2010. 311--320. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/1806689.1806733"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_12_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/2133036.2133090"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_13_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2591796.2591855"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_14_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2764468.2764491"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_15_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3033274.3085137"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_16_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3331033.3331039"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_17_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.orl.2018.11.010"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_18_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611975482.118"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_19_1","volume-title":"Revenue Gaps for Static and Dynamic Posted Pricing of Homogeneous Goods. CoRR","author":"Paul D\u00fc","year":"2016","unstructured":"Paul D\u00fc tting, Felix A. Fischer , and Max Klimm . 2016. Revenue Gaps for Static and Dynamic Posted Pricing of Homogeneous Goods. CoRR , Vol. abs\/ 1607 .07105 ( 2016 ). arxiv: 1607.07105 http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1607.07105 Paul D\u00fc tting, Felix A. Fischer, and Max Klimm. 2016. Revenue Gaps for Static and Dynamic Posted Pricing of Homogeneous Goods. CoRR, Vol. abs\/1607.07105 (2016). arxiv: 1607.07105 http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1607.07105"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_20_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611975031.46"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_21_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2764468.2764489"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_22_1","volume-title":"WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15--17, 2018, Proceedings. 154--167","author":"Giannakopoulos Yiannis","year":"2018","unstructured":"Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Keyu Zhu . 2018 . Optimal Pricing for MHR Distributions. In Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference , WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15--17, 2018, Proceedings. 154--167 . https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978--3-030-04612--5_11 Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Keyu Zhu. 2018. Optimal Pricing for MHR Distributions. In Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15--17, 2018, Proceedings. 154--167. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978--3-030-04612--5_11"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_23_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/365411.365768"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_24_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3417746"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_25_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/1070432.1070598"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_26_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, July 22--26","author":"Hajiaghayi Mohammad Taghi","year":"2007","unstructured":"Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi , Robert D. Kleinberg , and Tuomas Sandholm . 2007 . Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities . In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, July 22--26 , 2007, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. 58--65. http:\/\/www.aaai.org\/Library\/AAAI\/ 2007\/aaai07-009.php Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, and Tuomas Sandholm. 2007. Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, July 22--26, 2007, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. 58--65. http:\/\/www.aaai.org\/Library\/AAAI\/2007\/aaai07-009.php"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_27_1","volume-title":"October","volume":"122","author":"Hartline Jason D","year":"2013","unstructured":"Jason D Hartline . 2013 . Mechanism design and approximation. Book draft . October , Vol. 122 (2013). Jason D Hartline. 2013. Mechanism design and approximation. Book draft. October, Vol. 122 (2013)."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_28_1","volume-title":"Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009)","author":"Jason","year":"2009","unstructured":"Jason D. Hartline and Tim Roughgarden. 2009. Simple versus optimal mechanisms . In Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009) , Stanford, California, USA, July 6--10 , 2009 . 225--234. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/1566374.1566407 Jason D. Hartline and Tim Roughgarden. 2009. Simple versus optimal mechanisms. In Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), Stanford, California, USA, July 6--10, 2009. 225--234. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/1566374.1566407"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_29_1","volume-title":"WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10--12, 2019, Proceedings. 228--240","author":"Jin Yaonan","year":"2019","unstructured":"Yaonan Jin , Weian Li , and Qi Qi . 2019 a. On the Approximability of Simple Mechanisms for MHR Distributions. In Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference , WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10--12, 2019, Proceedings. 228--240 . https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978--3-030--35389--6_17 Yaonan Jin, Weian Li, and Qi Qi. 2019 a. On the Approximability of Simple Mechanisms for MHR Distributions. In Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10--12, 2019, Proceedings. 228--240. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978--3-030--35389--6_17"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_30_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3313276.3316331"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_31_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3381329.3381335"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_32_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/19M126178X"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_33_1","volume-title":"2019 b. Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions. CoRR","author":"Jin Yaonan","year":"2019","unstructured":"Yaonan Jin , Pinyan Lu , and Tao Xiao . 2019 b. Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions. CoRR , Vol. abs\/ 1912 .10069 ( 2019 ). arxiv: 1912.10069 http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1912.10069 Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, and Tao Xiao. 2019 b. Learning Reserve Prices in Second-Price Auctions. CoRR, Vol. abs\/1912.10069 (2019). arxiv: 1912.10069 http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1912.10069"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_34_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3144722.3144725"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_35_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.orl.2020.02.002"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_36_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1284320.1284321"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_37_1","article-title":"Learning Algorithms for Second-Price Auctions with Reserve","volume":"17","author":"Mohri Mehryar","year":"2016","unstructured":"Mehryar Mohri and Andres Mu n oz Medina . 2016 . Learning Algorithms for Second-Price Auctions with Reserve . Journal of Machine Learning Research , Vol. 17 (2016), 74:1--74:25. http:\/\/jmlr.org\/papers\/v17\/14--499.html Mehryar Mohri and Andres Mu n oz Medina. 2016. Learning Algorithms for Second-Price Auctions with Reserve. Journal of Machine Learning Research, Vol. 17 (2016), 74:1--74:25. http:\/\/jmlr.org\/papers\/v17\/14--499.html","journal-title":"Journal of Machine Learning Research"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_38_1","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 29th Conference on Learning Theory, COLT 2016, New York, USA, June 23--26, 2016 (JMLR Workshop and Conference Proceedings), Vitaly Feldman, Alexander Rakhlin, and Ohad Shamir (Eds.)","volume":"49","author":"Morgenstern Jamie","year":"2016","unstructured":"Jamie Morgenstern and Tim Roughgarden . 2016 . Learning Simple Auctions . In Proceedings of the 29th Conference on Learning Theory, COLT 2016, New York, USA, June 23--26, 2016 (JMLR Workshop and Conference Proceedings), Vitaly Feldman, Alexander Rakhlin, and Ohad Shamir (Eds.) , Vol. 49 . JMLR.org, 1298--1318. http:\/\/proceedings.mlr.press\/v49\/morgenstern16.html Jamie Morgenstern and Tim Roughgarden. 2016. Learning Simple Auctions. In Proceedings of the 29th Conference on Learning Theory, COLT 2016, New York, USA, June 23--26, 2016 (JMLR Workshop and Conference Proceedings), Vitaly Feldman, Alexander Rakhlin, and Ohad Shamir (Eds.), Vol. 49. JMLR.org, 1298--1318. http:\/\/proceedings.mlr.press\/v49\/morgenstern16.html"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_39_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.6.1.58"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_40_1","volume-title":"Budget Feasible Mechanisms. In 51th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2010","author":"Singer Yaron","year":"2010","unstructured":"Yaron Singer . 2010 . Budget Feasible Mechanisms. In 51th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2010 , October 23 --26 , 2010, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA. IEEE Computer Society, 765--774. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1109\/FOCS.2010.78 Yaron Singer. 2010. Budget Feasible Mechanisms. In 51th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2010, October 23--26, 2010, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA. IEEE Computer Society, 765--774. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1109\/FOCS.2010.78"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_41_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611973082.56"}],"event":{"name":"EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","sponsor":["SIGecom Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation"],"location":"Budapest Hungary","acronym":"EC '21"},"container-title":["Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3465456.3467621","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3465456.3467621","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"syndication"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3465456.3467621","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,17]],"date-time":"2025-06-17T20:17:28Z","timestamp":1750191448000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3465456.3467621"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2021,7,18]]},"references-count":41,"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3465456.3467621","10.1145\/3465456"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3465456.3467621","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2021,7,18]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2021-07-18","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}