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We identify a list of desired properties of a contact tracing design from the four aspects of Privacy, Utility, Resiliency, and Efficiency (PURE). We also identify two main design choices for PCT protocols:\n            <jats:italic>what information patients report<\/jats:italic>\n            to the server and\n            <jats:italic>which party performs the matching<\/jats:italic>\n            . These two choices determine most of the PURE properties and enable us to conduct a comprehensive analysis and comparison of the existing protocols.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3485131","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,11,23]],"date-time":"2021-11-23T17:36:59Z","timestamp":1637689019000},"page":"1-36","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":9,"title":["PURE: A Framework for Analyzing Proximity-based Contact Tracing Protocols"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"55","author":[{"given":"Fabrizio","family":"Cicala","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Purdue University"}]},{"given":"Weicheng","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Purdue University"}]},{"given":"Tianhao","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Purdue University"}]},{"given":"Ninghui","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Purdue University"}]},{"given":"Elisa","family":"Bertino","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Purdue University"}]},{"given":"Faming","family":"Liang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Purdue University"}]},{"given":"Yang","family":"Yang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Florida"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,11,23]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_1_2_2","unstructured":"US Department of Defense. 2020. 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