{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,6,10]],"date-time":"2026-06-10T07:47:33Z","timestamp":1781077653387,"version":"3.54.1"},"publisher-location":"New York, NY, USA","reference-count":34,"publisher":"ACM","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,12]],"date-time":"2022-07-12T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1657584000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,12]]},"DOI":"10.1145\/3490486.3538357","type":"proceedings-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,13]],"date-time":"2022-07-13T13:29:36Z","timestamp":1657718976000},"page":"153-181","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["Robustly Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints"],"prefix":"10.1145","author":[{"given":"Ethan","family":"Che","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Columbia Business School, New York, NY, USA"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,13]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_1_1","volume-title":"Anderson and Peter Nash","author":"Edward","year":"1987","unstructured":"Edward J. Anderson and Peter Nash . 1987 . Linear programming in infinite-dimensional spaces: Theory and applications. Wiley . Edward J. Anderson and Peter Nash. 1987. Linear programming in infinite-dimensional spaces: Theory and applications. Wiley."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1229312"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_3_1","volume-title":"SODA '13: Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms. 596--604","author":"Azar Pablo Daniel","unstructured":"Pablo Daniel Azar , Constantinos Daskalakis , Silvio Micali , and S. Matthew Weinberg . 2013. Optimal and efficient parametric auctions . In SODA '13: Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms. 596--604 . Pablo Daniel Azar, Constantinos Daskalakis, Silvio Micali, and S. Matthew Weinberg. 2013. Optimal and efficient parametric auctions. In SODA '13: Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms. 596--604."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2422436.2422464"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1593721"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_6_1","volume-title":"Correlation-Robust Analysis of Single Item Auction. SODA '19","author":"Bei Xiaohui","year":"2019","unstructured":"Xiaohui Bei , Nick Gravin , Pinyan Lu , and Zhihao Gavin Tang . 2019 . Correlation-Robust Analysis of Single Item Auction. SODA '19 (2019). Xiaohui Bei, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu, and Zhihao Gavin Tang. 2019. Correlation-Robust Analysis of Single Item Auction. SODA '19 (2019)."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_7_1","volume-title":"Informationally robust optimal auction design. (2016)","author":"Bergemann Dirk","year":"2065","unstructured":"Dirk Bergemann , Benjamin Brooks , and Stephen Morris . 2016. Informationally robust optimal auction design. (2016) . Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No . 2065 . Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris. 2016. Informationally robust optimal auction design. (2016). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2065."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20180773"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.x"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_10_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2011.10.018"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_11_1","volume-title":"An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design","author":"B\u00f6rgers Tilman","unstructured":"Tilman B\u00f6rgers . 2015. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design . Oxford University Press . Tilman B\u00f6rgers. 2015. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design. Oxford University Press."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_12_1","unstructured":"Benjamin Brooks. 2013. Surveying and selling: Belief and surplus extraction in auctions. (2013).  Benjamin Brooks. 2013. Surveying and selling: Belief and surplus extraction in auctions. (2013)."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_13_1","unstructured":"Benjamin Brooks and Songzi Du. 2021 a. Maxmin Auction Design with Known Expected Values. (2021).  Benjamin Brooks and Songzi Du. 2021 a. Maxmin Auction Design with Known Expected Values. (2021)."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_14_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA16297"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_15_1","volume-title":"Nenad Kos, Matthias Messner, Paulo Monteiro, and Humberto Moreira.","author":"Carrasco Vinicius","year":"2018","unstructured":"Vinicius Carrasco , Vitor Farinha Luz , Nenad Kos, Matthias Messner, Paulo Monteiro, and Humberto Moreira. 2018 . Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions. Journal of Economic Theory ( 2018). Vinicius Carrasco, Vitor Farinha Luz, Nenad Kos, Matthias Messner, Paulo Monteiro, and Humberto Moreira. 2018. Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions. Journal of Economic Theory (2018)."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_16_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20131159"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_17_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA14165"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_18_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2019.03.001"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_19_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2018.10.001"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_20_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.20150121"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_21_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA14993"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_22_1","volume-title":"The simple economics of optimal persuasion. Journal of Political Economy","author":"Dworczak Piotr","year":"2019","unstructured":"Piotr Dworczak and Giorgio Martini . 2019. The simple economics of optimal persuasion. Journal of Political Economy ( 2019 ). Piotr Dworczak and Giorgio Martini. 2019. The simple economics of optimal persuasion. Journal of Political Economy (2019)."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_23_1","volume-title":"Diogo Pocc as, and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis","author":"Giannakopoulos Yiannis","year":"2020","unstructured":"Yiannis Giannakopoulos , Diogo Pocc as, and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis . 2020 . Robust revenue maximization under minimal statistical information. In Web and Internet Economics. Springer International Publishing , Cham, 177--190. Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Pocc as, and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis. 2020. Robust revenue maximization under minimal statistical information. In Web and Internet Economics. Springer International Publishing, Cham, 177--190."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_24_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1086\/344801"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_25_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2021.105403"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_26_1","volume-title":"Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design. Management Science","author":"Kocyigit Cagil","unstructured":"Cagil Kocyigit , Garud Iyengar , Daniel Kuhn , and Wolfram Wiesemann . 2019. Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design. Management Science , Vol. Articles in Advance (2019), 1-- 31 . Cagil Kocyigit, Garud Iyengar, Daniel Kuhn, and Wolfram Wiesemann. 2019. Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design. Management Science, Vol. Articles in Advance (2019), 1--31."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_27_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rdaa046"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_28_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-6451.00183"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_29_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.6.1.58"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_30_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0899-8256(03)00005-8"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_31_1","volume-title":"Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein","author":"Martin","year":"1994","unstructured":"Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein . 1994 . A Course in Game Theory. The MIT Press . Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. 1994. A Course in Game Theory. The MIT Press."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_32_1","volume-title":"A min-max solution of an inventory problem. (1957). Technical report P-910","author":"Scarf Herbert E.","unstructured":"Herbert E. Scarf . 1957. A min-max solution of an inventory problem. (1957). Technical report P-910 , The RAND Corporation . Herbert E. Scarf. 1957. A min-max solution of an inventory problem. (1957). Technical report P-910, The RAND Corporation."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_33_1","unstructured":"Alex Suzdaltsev. 2020. An Optimal Distributionally Robust Auction. (2020). arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.05192.  Alex Suzdaltsev. 2020. An Optimal Distributionally Robust Auction. (2020). arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.05192."},{"key":"e_1_3_2_1_34_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3982\/TE2089"}],"event":{"name":"EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","location":"Boulder CO USA","acronym":"EC '22","sponsor":["SIGecom Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation"]},"container-title":["Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3490486.3538357","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3490486.3538357","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,17]],"date-time":"2025-06-17T19:03:00Z","timestamp":1750186980000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3490486.3538357"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,12]]},"references-count":34,"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3490486.3538357","10.1145\/3490486"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3490486.3538357","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2022,7,12]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2022-07-13","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}