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Econ. Comput."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,31]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin\u2019s challenges are (i) securing sufficient miner revenues as block rewards decrease, and (ii) alleviating the throughput limitation due to a small maximal block size cap. These issues are strongly related as increasing the maximal block size may decrease revenue due to Bitcoin\u2019s pay-your-bid approach. To decouple them, we analyze the \u201cmonopolistic auction\u201d [\n            <jats:xref ref-type=\"bibr\">16<\/jats:xref>\n            ], showing (i) its revenue does not decrease as the maximal block size increases, (ii) it is resilient to an untrusted auctioneer (the miner), and (iii) simplicity for transaction issuers (bidders), as the average gain from strategic bid shading (relative to bidding one\u2019s value) diminishes as the number of bids increases.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3530799","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,5,18]],"date-time":"2022-05-18T13:00:35Z","timestamp":1652878835000},"page":"1-31","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":20,"title":["Redesigning Bitcoin\u2019s Fee Market"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"10","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-5215-5165","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ron","family":"Lavi","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Bath, United Kingdom, Technion\u2013Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-7567-3822","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Or","family":"Sattath","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8539-9222","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Aviv","family":"Zohar","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem , Israel"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2022,5,18]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_3_2_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/3-540-45664-3_8"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_3_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/restud\/rdy042"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_4_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Sarah Azouvi and Alexander Hicks. 2019. SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies. arXiv:1905.08595. Retrieved from http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1905.08595.","DOI":"10.21428\/58320208.8e7f4fab"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_5_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2229012.2229022"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_6_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Soumya Basu David Easley Maureen O\u2019Hara and Emin G\u00fcn Sirer. 2019. Towards a Functional Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies. arxiv:1901.06830. Retrieved from http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1901.06830.","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.3318327"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_7_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/11889663_10"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_8_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-662-53357-4_2"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_9_2","unstructured":"Vitalik Buterin Eric Conner Rick Dudley Matthew Slipper Ian Norden and Abdelhamid Bakhta. 2019. EIP-1559: Fee market change for ETH 1.0 chain. 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Retrieved April 29 2022 from https:\/\/lists.linuxfoundation.org\/pipermail\/bitcoin-dev\/2017-September\/015093.html."},{"key":"e_1_3_3_16_2","unstructured":"Mark Friedenbach. 2018. Forward Blocks: On-Chain\/Settlement Capacity Increases without the Hard-Fork. Retrieved from http:\/\/freico.in\/forward-blocks-scalingbitcoin-paper.pdf."},{"key":"e_1_3_3_17_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2006.02.003"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_18_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.2400519"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_19_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Gur Huberman Jacob D. Leshno and Ciamac C. Moallemi. 2017. Monopoly without a monopolist: An economic analysis of the bitcoin payment system. Retrieved from https:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=3025604.","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.3032375"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_20_2","volume-title":"Proceedings of WEIS","volume":"2013","author":"Kroll Joshua A.","year":"2013","unstructured":"Joshua A. Kroll, Ian C. Davey, and Edward W. Felten. 2013. The economics of bitcoin mining, or bitcoin in the presence of adversaries. In Proceedings of WEIS, Vol. 2013."},{"key":"e_1_3_3_21_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0950-3293(02)00059-9"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_22_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3308558.3313454"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_23_2","article-title":"Bitcoin: An Impossibility Theorem for Proof-of-Work based Protocols","author":"Leshno Jacob","year":"2019","unstructured":"Jacob Leshno and Philipp Strack. 2019. Bitcoin: An Impossibility Theorem for Proof-of-Work based Protocols. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper.","journal-title":"Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_24_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/3-540-36504-4_7"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_25_2","unstructured":"Ziyao Liu Nguyen Cong Luong Wenbo Wang Dusit Niyato Ping Wang Ying-Chang Liang and Dong In Kim. 2019. A survey on applications of game theory in Blockchain. arXiv:1902.10865. 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Transaction fee mechanism design for the Ethereum blockchain: An economic analysis of EIP-1559. arXiv:2012.00854.","DOI":"10.1145\/3465456.3467591"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_32_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-662-47854-7_32"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_33_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3243734.3243737"},{"issue":"2","key":"e_1_3_3_34_2","first-page":"155","article-title":"Willingness-to-pay in non-profit sports clubs","volume":"6","author":"Wicker Pamela","year":"2011","unstructured":"Pamela Wicker. 2011. Willingness-to-pay in non-profit sports clubs. International Journal of Sport Finance 6, 2 (2011), 155.","journal-title":"International Journal of Sport Finance"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_35_2","unstructured":"Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. 2018. An incentive analysis of some Bitcoin fee designs. arxiv:1811.02351. Retrieved April 29 2022 from http:\/\/arxiv.org\/abs\/1811.02351."}],"container-title":["ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3530799","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3530799","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,17]],"date-time":"2025-06-17T18:09:25Z","timestamp":1750183765000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3530799"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,31]]},"references-count":34,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,31]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3530799"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3530799","relation":{},"ISSN":["2167-8375","2167-8383"],"issn-type":[{"type":"print","value":"2167-8375"},{"type":"electronic","value":"2167-8383"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2022,3,31]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2019-12-01","order":0,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2021-12-01","order":1,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}},{"value":"2022-05-18","order":2,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}