{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,18]],"date-time":"2025-06-18T04:14:21Z","timestamp":1750220061595,"version":"3.41.0"},"reference-count":36,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"1-2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,3,31]],"date-time":"2023-03-31T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1680220800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["ACM Trans. Econ. Comput."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,3,31]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            We study the efficiency of first-\/second-price sequential multiunit auctions with two buyers and complete information. Extending the primal-dual framework for obtaining efficiency bounds to this sequential setting, we obtain tight price of anarchy bounds. For general valuation functions, we show that the\n            <jats:italic>price of anarchy<\/jats:italic>\n            is exactly\n            <jats:italic>1\/T<\/jats:italic>\n            for auctions with\n            <jats:italic>T<\/jats:italic>\n            items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by\n            <jats:italic>1-1\/e\u2243 0.632<\/jats:italic>\n            . This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3584864","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,2,27]],"date-time":"2023-02-27T12:03:57Z","timestamp":1677499437000},"page":"1-26","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"11","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-7397-2773","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Mete \u015eeref","family":"Ahunbay","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Technical University of Munich, School of Computation, Information and Technology, Germany"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-2213-4937","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Adrian","family":"Vetta","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"McGill University, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Canada"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,24]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-030-57980-7_1"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_3_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-030-85947-3_2"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_4_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/jep.3.3.23"},{"issue":"2","key":"e_1_3_2_5_2","first-page":"501","article-title":"Testing for price anomalies in real-estate auctions","volume":"82","author":"Ashenfelter Orley","year":"1992","unstructured":"Orley Ashenfelter and David Genesove. 1992. Testing for price anomalies in real-estate auctions. American Economic Review 82, 2 (1992), 501\u2013505. http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/2117452.","journal-title":"American Economic Review"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_6_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/JSAC.2008.080916"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_7_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1109\/GAMENETS.2009.5137402"},{"issue":"5","key":"e_1_3_2_8_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1288","DOI":"10.1007\/s00224-017-9826-1","article-title":"A unifying tool for bounding the quality of non-cooperative solutions in weighted congestion games","volume":"62","author":"Bil\u00f2 Vittorio","year":"2018","unstructured":"Vittorio Bil\u00f2. 2018. A unifying tool for bounding the quality of non-cooperative solutions in weighted congestion games. Theor. Comp. Sys. 62, 5 (Jul.2018), 1288\u20131317.","journal-title":"Theor. Comp. 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Auctions with endogenous valuations: The persistence of monopoly revisited. American Economic Review 83, 1 (1992), 147\u2013160. https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/2117501.","journal-title":"American Economic Review"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_19_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s001990050260"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_20_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.5555\/2722129.2722199"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_21_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/BF01096996"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_22_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"227","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-642-33996-7_20","volume-title":"Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT\u201912)","author":"Markakis Evangelos","year":"2012","unstructured":"Evangelos Markakis and Orestis Telelis. 2012. Uniform price auctions: Equilibria and efficiency. In Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT\u201912). 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