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ACM"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,31]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            We prove that the\n            <jats:sans-serif>PoA<\/jats:sans-serif>\n            of\n            <jats:sans-serif>First Price Auctions<\/jats:sans-serif>\n            is 1-1\/\n            <jats:italic>e<\/jats:italic>\n            <jats:sup>2<\/jats:sup>\n            \u2248 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3617902","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,9,5]],"date-time":"2023-09-05T12:32:49Z","timestamp":1693917169000},"page":"1-86","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["First Price Auction is 1-1\/\n            <i>e<\/i>\n            <sup>2<\/sup>\n            Efficient"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"70","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-6256-7625","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Yaonan","family":"Jin","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Huawei TCS Lab, China"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0005-0569-4122","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Pinyan","family":"Lu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Laboratory of Interdisciplinary Research of Computation and Economics (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics), &amp; Huawei TCS Lab, China"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,14]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_3_2_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.geb.2018.08.003"},{"key":"e_1_3_3_3_2","volume-title":"Convergence of Probability Measures","author":"Billingsley Patrick","year":"2013","unstructured":"Patrick Billingsley. 2013. 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