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Comput."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,31]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, chores, and copies, as a unified framework for studying: (1)\u00a0the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for goods with copies; (2)\u00a0the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for chores. We establish a tight relation between these issues via two conceptual contributions: First, a refinement of envy-based fairness notions that we term envy\n            <jats:italic>without commons<\/jats:italic>\n            (denoted EFX\n            <jats:sub>WC<\/jats:sub>\n            when applied to EFX). Second, a formal\n            <jats:italic>duality theorem<\/jats:italic>\n            relating the existence of a host of (refined) fair allocation concepts for copies to their existence for chores. We demonstrate the usefulness of our duality result by using it to characterize the existence of EFX for chores through the dual environment, as well as to prove EFX existence in the special case of leveled preferences over the chores. We further study the hierarchy among envy-freeness notions without commons and their \u03b1-MMS guarantees, showing, for example, that any EFX\n            <jats:sub>WC<\/jats:sub>\n            allocation guarantees at least\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(\\frac{4}{11}\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            -MMS for goods with copies.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3618116","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2023,9,22]],"date-time":"2023-09-22T12:06:54Z","timestamp":1695384414000},"page":"1-27","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":4,"title":["Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"11","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-2144-655X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Yotam","family":"Gafni","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Israel"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9674-1994","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Xin","family":"Huang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Israel"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-5215-5165","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ron","family":"Lavi","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Bath, UK, and Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Israel"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-2838-3264","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Inbal","family":"Talgam-Cohen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Israel"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2023,12,19]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_4_2_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/978-3-030-58285-2_1"},{"key":"e_1_3_4_3_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.24963\/ijcai.2018\/6"},{"issue":"1","key":"e_1_3_4_4_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"3","DOI":"10.1007\/s10458-021-09532-8","article-title":"Fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores","volume":"36","author":"Aziz Haris","year":"2021","unstructured":"Haris Aziz, Ioannis Caragiannis, Ayumi Igarashi, and Toby Walsh. 2021. 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