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Hence,<jats:italic>\u201cmitigation only when detected\u201d<\/jats:italic>should be the approach to minimize the effects of such drawbacks. We propose a novel methodology of fine-grained detection of timing-based CSCA using a hardware-based detection module.<\/jats:p><jats:p>We discuss the design, implementation, and use of our proposed detection module in processor architectures. Our approach successfully detects attacks that flush secret victim information from cache memory like Flush+Reload, Flush+Flush, Prime+Probe, Evict+Probe, and Prime+Abort, commonly known as cache timing attacks. Detection is on time with minimal performance overhead. The parameterizable number of counters used in our module allows detection of multiple attacks on multiple sensitive locations simultaneously. The fine-grained nature ensures negligible false alarms, severely reducing the need for any unnecessary mitigation. The proposed work is evaluated by synthesizing the entire detection algorithm as an attack detection block, Edge-CaSCADe, in a RISC-V processor as a target example. The detection results are checked under different workload conditions with respect to the number of attackers and the number of victims having RSA-, AES-, and ECC-based encryption schemes like ECIES, and on benchmark applications like MiBench and Embench. More than 98% detection accuracy within 2% of the beginning of an attack can be achieved with negligible false alarms. The detection module has an area and power overhead of 0.9% to 2% and 1% to 2.1% for the targeted RISC-V processor core without cache for one to five counters, respectively. The detection module does not affect the processor critical path and hence has no impact on its maximum operating frequency.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3663673","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,5,11]],"date-time":"2024-05-11T11:12:06Z","timestamp":1715425926000},"page":"1-27","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":14,"title":["Lightweight Hardware-Based Cache Side-Channel Attack Detection for Edge Devices (Edge-CaSCADe)"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"23","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0003-1053-0873","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Pavitra","family":"Bhade","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Computer Science, Indian Institute of Technology Goa, Ponda, India"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0008-6120-2147","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Joseph","family":"Paturel","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"INRIA, University of Rennes, Rennes, France"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-4334-6418","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Olivier","family":"Sentieys","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"INRIA, University of Rennes, Rennes, France"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4532-2017","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Sharad","family":"Sinha","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Computer Science, Indian Institute of Technology Goa, Ponda, India"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,10]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_1_2_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.asoc.2016.09.014"},{"key":"e_1_3_1_3_2","first-page":"1","volume-title":"3rd IEEE International Conference on Fog and Mobile Edge Computing (FMEC\u201918)","author":"Bazm Mohammad-Mahdi","year":"2018","unstructured":"Mohammad-Mahdi Bazm, Thibaut Sautereau, Marc Lacoste, Mario S\u00fcdholt, and Jean-Marc Menaud. 2018. 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