{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,19]],"date-time":"2025-06-19T05:04:24Z","timestamp":1750309464098,"version":"3.41.0"},"reference-count":14,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"2","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,12,1]],"date-time":"2022-12-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1669852800000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["SIGecom Exch."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            We survey the main result from [Jin and Lu 2022]: For the first-price auction, the tight Price of Anarchy is 1 - 1\/e\n            <jats:sup>2<\/jats:sup>\n            \u2248 0.8647, which closes the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3699804.3699810","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,10,8]],"date-time":"2024-10-08T16:29:58Z","timestamp":1728404998000},"page":"69-74","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Settling the Efficiency of the First-Price Auction"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"20","author":[{"given":"Yaonan","family":"Jin","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Columbia University"}]},{"given":"Pinyan","family":"Lu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Shanghai University of Finance and Economics"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,10,8]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/2492002.2483188"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","volume-title":"ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '14","author":"Hartline J. D.","year":"2014","unstructured":"Hartline, J. D., Hoy, D., and Taggart, S. 2014. Price of anarchy for auction revenue. In ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '14, Stanford, CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014, M. Babaioff, V. Conitzer, and D. A. Easley, Eds. ACM, 693--710."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/1566374.1566407"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0308738101"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3188745.3188944"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Jin Y. and Lu P. 2022. First-price auction is 1 - 1\/e2 efficient. To appear in Proceedings of the 63rd IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) 2022.","DOI":"10.1109\/FOCS54457.2022.00024"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Jin Y. and Lu P. 2023. The price of stability for first-price auction. To appear in Proceedings of the 34th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) 2023.","DOI":"10.1137\/1.9781611977554.ch14"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3313276.3316331"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","volume-title":"16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 4-6, 1999, Proceedings, C. Meinel and S. Tison, Eds. Lecture Notes in Computer Science","volume":"1563","author":"Koutsoupias E.","unstructured":"Koutsoupias, E. and Papadimitriou, C. H. 1999. Worst-case equilibria. In STACS 99, 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 4-6, 1999, Proceedings, C. Meinel and S. Tison, Eds. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1563. 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