{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,19]],"date-time":"2025-06-19T05:04:24Z","timestamp":1750309464820,"version":"3.41.0"},"reference-count":10,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2023,6,1]],"date-time":"2023-06-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1685577600000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.acm.org\/publications\/policies\/copyright_policy#Background"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["SIGecom Exch."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,6]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            Models in economics and game theory often assume that people behave as if they can solve very complex problems, which can lead to misleading conclusions. To address this, I propose that we supplement the theory of rational choice with a theory of\n            <jats:italic>tractable choice.<\/jats:italic>\n            Tractable choice asks what an individual can accomplish using resources like time, memory, or data, which are often in short supply. The field of economics has been disciplined when it comes to insisting that choices in models be rational, but is less diligent in requiring that choices be tractable under reasonable assumptions about what resources are available. Fortunately, theoretical computer science has developed deep insights and powerful frameworks for understanding tractability. Using a recent paper as a case study, I argue that tractability is a first-order concern when studying behavior.\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3699814.3699818","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,10,8]],"date-time":"2024-10-08T16:30:17Z","timestamp":1728405017000},"page":"35-41","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Tractable Choice"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"21","author":[{"given":"Modibo K.","family":"Camara","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Chicago"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,10,8]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_1_1_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3490486.3538256"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_2_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1145\/3490486.3538316"},{"volume-title":"2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS). 259--270","author":"Camara M. K.","key":"e_1_2_1_3_1","unstructured":"Camara, M. K., Hartline, J. D., and Johnsen, A. 2020. Mechanisms for a no-regret agent: Beyond the common prior. In 2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS). 259--270."},{"volume-title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. SODA '20","author":"Cummings R.","key":"e_1_2_1_4_1","unstructured":"Cummings, R., Devanur, N. R., Huang, Z., and Wang, X. 2020. Algorithmic price discrimination. In Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. SODA '20."},{"volume-title":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. EC '11. Association for Computing Machinery","author":"Echenique F.","key":"e_1_2_1_5_1","unstructured":"Echenique, F., Golovin, D., and Wierman, A. 2011. A revealed preference approach to computational complexity in economics. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. EC '11. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 101--110."},{"volume-title":"Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC '20. Association for Computing Machinery","author":"Immorlica N.","key":"e_1_2_1_6_1","unstructured":"Immorlica, N., Mao, J., Slivkins, A., and Wu, Z. S. 2020. Incentivizing exploration with selective data disclosure. In Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC '20. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 647--648."},{"key":"e_1_2_1_7_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20191717"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_8_1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.99.4.1508"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_9_1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Tversky A. and Kahneman D. 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211 4481 453--458.","DOI":"10.1126\/science.7455683"},{"key":"e_1_2_1_10_1","unstructured":"von Neumann J. and Morgenstern O. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press."}],"container-title":["ACM SIGecom Exchanges"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3699814.3699818","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1145\/3699814.3699818","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,19]],"date-time":"2025-06-19T01:10:33Z","timestamp":1750295433000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/dl.acm.org\/doi\/10.1145\/3699814.3699818"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2023,6]]},"references-count":10,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2023,6]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1145\/3699814.3699818"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/3699814.3699818","relation":{},"ISSN":["1551-9031"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"1551-9031"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2023,6]]},"assertion":[{"value":"2024-10-08","order":3,"name":"published","label":"Published","group":{"name":"publication_history","label":"Publication History"}}]}}