{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,16]],"date-time":"2025-09-16T17:37:53Z","timestamp":1758044273852,"version":"3.44.0"},"reference-count":22,"publisher":"Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)","issue":"3","funder":[{"name":"NSF TRIPODS CCF Award","award":["2023166"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["2023166"]}]},{"name":"Northrop Grumman University Research Award","award":["ONR YIP award N00014-20-1-2571, and NSF award #1844729"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["ONR YIP award N00014-20-1-2571, and NSF award #1844729"]}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["dl.acm.org"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["ACM Trans. Econ. Comput."],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,30]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>\n            We study the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(\\mathcal {X}_\\star \\unicode{x00D7} \\mathcal {Y}_\\star\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            in two-player zero-sum matrix games. Fearnley and Savani [\n            <jats:xref ref-type=\"bibr\">18<\/jats:xref>\n            ] showed that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an\n            <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">n \u00d7 n<\/jats:italic>\n            input matrix where it needs to query \u03a9 (\n            <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">n<\/jats:italic>\n            <jats:sup>2<\/jats:sup>\n            ) entries in expectation to compute a\n            <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">single<\/jats:italic>\n            Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, Bienstock et\u00a0al. [\n            <jats:xref ref-type=\"bibr\">5<\/jats:xref>\n            ] showed that there is a special class of matrices for which one can query\n            <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">O(n)<\/jats:italic>\n            entries and compute its set of all Nash equilibria. However, these results do not fully characterize the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum matrix games.\n          <\/jats:p>\n          <jats:p>\n            In this work, we characterize the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(\\mathcal {X}_\\star \\unicode{x00D7} \\mathcal {Y}_\\star\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            in terms of the number of rows\n            <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">n<\/jats:italic>\n            of the input matrix\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(A \\in \\mathbb {R}^{n \\unicode{x00D7} n}\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            , row support size\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(k_1 := |\\bigcup \\nolimits _{x \\in \\mathcal {X}_\\star } \\text{supp}(x)|\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            , and column support size\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(k_2 := |\\bigcup \\nolimits _{y \\in \\mathcal {Y}_\\star } \\text{supp}(y)|\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            . We design a simple yet non-trivial randomized algorithm that returns the set of all Nash equilibria\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(\\mathcal {X}_\\star \\unicode{x00D7} \\mathcal {Y}_\\star\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            by querying at most\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(O(nk^5 \\cdot \\text{polylog}(n))\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            entries of the input matrix\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(A \\in \\mathbb {R}^{n \\unicode{x00D7} n}\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            in expectation, where\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(k := \\max \\lbrace k_1, k_2\\rbrace\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            . This upper bound is tight up to a factor of poly(\n            <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">k<\/jats:italic>\n            ), as we show that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an\n            <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">n \u00d7 n<\/jats:italic>\n            input matrix with\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(\\min \\lbrace k_1, k_2\\rbrace = 1\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            , for which it needs to query \u03a9 (\n            <jats:italic toggle=\"yes\">nk<\/jats:italic>\n            ) entries in expectation in order to find the set of all Nash equilibria\n            <jats:inline-formula content-type=\"math\/tex\">\n              <jats:tex-math notation=\"LaTeX\" version=\"MathJax\">\\(\\mathcal {X}_\\star \\unicode{x00D7} \\mathcal {Y}_\\star\\)<\/jats:tex-math>\n            <\/jats:inline-formula>\n            .\n          <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1145\/3732787","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,4,25]],"date-time":"2025-04-25T07:16:50Z","timestamp":1745565410000},"page":"1-18","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1145\/crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Query-Efficient Algorithm to Find all Nash Equilibria in a Two-Player Zero-Sum Matrix Game"],"prefix":"10.1145","volume":"13","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9142-6255","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Arnab","family":"Maiti","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Computer Science & Engineering, University of Washington","place":["Seattle, United States"]}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-7604-3133","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Ross","family":"Boczar","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Washington","place":["Seattle, United States"]}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-2054-2985","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Kevin","family":"Jamieson","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Washington","place":["Seattle, United States"]}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8936-0229","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Lillian","family":"Ratliff","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"University of Washington","place":["Seattle, United States"]}]}],"member":"320","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2025,9,12]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_3_2_2_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s00182-012-0328-8"},{"key":"e_1_3_2_3_2","volume-title":"Proceedings of the Asian Conference on Machine Learning","author":"Auger David","year":"2014","unstructured":"David Auger, Jialin Liu, Sylvie Ruette, David Lupien St-Pierre, and Olivier Teytaud. 2014. 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