{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,2,27]],"date-time":"2024-02-27T17:49:17Z","timestamp":1709056157369},"reference-count":15,"publisher":"Hindawi Limited","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2015,1,1]],"date-time":"2015-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1420070400000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100009087","name":"Spanish Ministry of Education and Science","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","award":["SEJ2009-11117\/ECON"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["SEJ2009-11117\/ECON"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100009087","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Journal of Applied Mathematics"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2015]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>This paper studies the conditions that improve bargaining power using threats and promises. We develop a model of strategic communication, based on the<jats:italic>conflict game with perfect information<\/jats:italic>, in which a noisy<jats:italic>commitment message<\/jats:italic>is sent by a better-informed sender to a receiver who takes an action that determines the welfare of both. Our model captures different levels of aligned-preferences, for which classical games such as<jats:italic>stag hunt<\/jats:italic>,<jats:italic>hawk-dove<\/jats:italic>, and<jats:italic>prisoner\u2019s dilemma<\/jats:italic>are particular cases. We characterise the Bayesian perfect equilibrium with nonbinding messages under<jats:italic>truth-telling beliefs<\/jats:italic>and<jats:italic>sender\u2019s bargaining power<\/jats:italic>assumptions. Through our equilibrium selection we show that the less conflict the game has, the more informative the equilibrium signal is and less credibility is necessary to implement it.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1155\/2015\/910614","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2015,9,1]],"date-time":"2015-09-01T21:40:40Z","timestamp":1441143640000},"page":"1-11","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":3,"title":["The Strategic Role of Nonbinding Communication"],"prefix":"10.1155","volume":"2015","author":[{"given":"Luis A.","family":"Palacio","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Escuela de Econom\u00eda y Administraci\u00f3n, Universidad Industrial de Santander, Calle 9 con 27, Bucaramanga, Colombia"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Alexandra","family":"Cort\u00e9s-Aguilar","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Escuela de Econom\u00eda y Administraci\u00f3n, Universidad Industrial de Santander, Calle 9 con 27, Bucaramanga, Colombia"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"given":"Manuel","family":"Mu\u00f1oz-Herrera","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"ICS, Faculty of Behavioural Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG Groningen, Netherlands"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"98","reference":[{"key":"12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1912531"},{"key":"14","year":"1960"},{"key":"15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/bf01766400"},{"key":"4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1467-9442.2006.00447.x"},{"key":"10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/jel.47.4.1109"},{"key":"7","year":"1987"},{"key":"8","volume-title":"Game-theoretic interpretations of commitment","year":"2001"},{"key":"9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0167-2681(93)90054-S"},{"key":"3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1913390"},{"key":"5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1006\/game.1993.1029"},{"key":"6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/jep.10.3.103"},{"key":"11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/0022-0531(90)90055-o"},{"key":"1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/0034-6527.00287"},{"key":"13","first-page":"281","volume":"46","year":"1956","journal-title":"The American Economic Review"},{"key":"2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/bf01669346"}],"container-title":["Journal of Applied Mathematics"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/downloads.hindawi.com\/journals\/jam\/2015\/910614.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/downloads.hindawi.com\/journals\/jam\/2015\/910614.xml","content-type":"application\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/downloads.hindawi.com\/journals\/jam\/2015\/910614.pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2020,5,15]],"date-time":"2020-05-15T20:01:39Z","timestamp":1589572899000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"http:\/\/www.hindawi.com\/journals\/jam\/2015\/910614\/"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2015]]},"references-count":15,"alternative-id":["910614","910614"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1155\/2015\/910614","relation":{},"ISSN":["1110-757X","1687-0042"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1110-757X","type":"print"},{"value":"1687-0042","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2015]]}}}