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Because of the need to pay a certain cost, individual participants cooperate to maintain the long\u2010term stability of the blockchain jointly. In the course of such competition, the game between each other has appeared invisibly. To better understand the blockchain design of cooperation mechanisms, in this paper, we constructed a game framework between participants with different willingness, using evolutionary game theory, and complex network games. We analyzed how the behavior of participants potentially develops with cost and payoff. We consider the expected benefits of participants for the normal growth of the blockchain as the major factor. Considering the behavior of malicious betrayers, the blockchain needs to be maintained in the early stage. Numerical simulation supports our analysis.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1155\/2021\/1258730","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,11,9]],"date-time":"2021-11-09T01:50:07Z","timestamp":1636422607000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1002\/crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":23,"title":["Cooperation Mechanism in Blockchain by Evolutionary Game Theory"],"prefix":"10.1155","volume":"2021","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-2926-2747","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jinxin","family":"Zhang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4313-4530","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Meng","family":"Wu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"311","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,11,8]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_9_1_2","unstructured":"NakamotoS. 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