{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,5]],"date-time":"2026-01-05T15:25:22Z","timestamp":1767626722983,"version":"3.37.3"},"reference-count":21,"publisher":"Wiley","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,21]],"date-time":"2022-01-21T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1642723200000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100001809","name":"National Natural Science Foundation of China","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","award":["71771031"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["71771031"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100001809","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,21]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>Controlling collusion in government bidding is a prerequisite for ensuring social justice and the smooth operation of projects. Based on the prospect theory, this article establishes a four-party evolutionary game model for tenderers, enterprises with higher willingness to collude, enterprises with lower willingness to collude, and supervising enterprises. The study uses replication dynamics to analyze the stability of strategy selection after the evolutionary game. The results show that higher project base returns increase the probability of collusion, while lower market competition, higher risk aversion, and stronger collusive regulation all reduce the probability of collusion. When regulators adopt a strong regulatory strategy, the remaining project participants tend to choose a noncollusive strategy.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1155\/2022\/6092802","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,22]],"date-time":"2022-01-22T03:05:37Z","timestamp":1642820737000},"page":"1-19","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["Four-Way Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Project Bidding Collusion in a State of Limited Rationality Based on Prospect Theory"],"prefix":"10.1155","volume":"2022","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9990-2300","authenticated-orcid":true,"given":"Chongsen","family":"Ma","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"College of Transportation Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha, Hu Nan 410000, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4237-791X","authenticated-orcid":true,"given":"Yun","family":"Chen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"College of Transportation Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha, Hu Nan 410000, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-1523-4523","authenticated-orcid":true,"given":"Sirui","family":"Nie","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"College of Transportation Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha, Hu Nan 410000, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"311","reference":[{"issue":"58","key":"1","first-page":"33","article-title":"Analysis of the causes of vertical collusion in bidding for government investment engineering projects","volume":"15","author":"Y. Chen","year":"2018","journal-title":"Journal of Changsha University of Technology (Natural Science Edition)"},{"key":"2","first-page":"1","article-title":"Analysis of collusive motives of construction market actors under different regimes","volume":"S1","author":"J. Wang","year":"2011","journal-title":"Construction Economics"},{"key":"3","first-page":"42","article-title":"Incentives, supervision and collusion prevention of principal-agents in substitute establishments","volume":"01","author":"Y. Xie","year":"2008","journal-title":"Mathematical Practice and Understanding"},{"issue":"11","key":"4","first-page":"86","article-title":"Analysis of collusion game among owners, contractors and supervisors of government projects[J]","volume":"28","author":"X. Yu","year":"2008","journal-title":"Exploration on Economic Issues"},{"issue":"01","key":"5","first-page":"34","article-title":"Analysis of collusive game of large projects under tracking audit mode[J]","volume":"31","author":"S. Cheng","year":"2012","journal-title":"Forecast"},{"key":"6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s00199-009-0502-9"},{"key":"7","first-page":"168","article-title":"A study of collusion regulation deterrence model for government investment proxy projects based on prospect theory","volume":"02","author":"Y. Wu","year":"2013","journal-title":"Journal of Management in Engineering"},{"key":"8","first-page":"65","article-title":"Research on preventing collusion in engineering bidding based on the \u201cprisoner's dilemma\u201d game","volume":"32.007","author":"X. Wang","year":"2013","journal-title":"Technoeconomics"},{"issue":"114","key":"9","first-page":"248","article-title":"Research on collusive evolutionary game of multiple interest subjects in engineering project bidding","volume":"16","author":"J. Chen","year":"2019","journal-title":"Journal of Railway Science and Engineering"},{"key":"10","first-page":"232","article-title":"Game analysis of collusion phenomenon in the process of mutual evaluation of engineering bid evaluation experts","volume":"3","author":"H. Zhang","year":"2014","journal-title":"Journal of Xi'an University of Technology"},{"issue":"95","key":"11","first-page":"275","article-title":"Analysis of collusion conditions of construction project bidding based on cooperative game","volume":"15","author":"Y. Chen","year":"2018","journal-title":"Journal of Railway Science and Engineering"},{"key":"12","first-page":"1","article-title":"Evolutionary game analysis and simulation with system dynamics for behavioral strategies of participants in crowd logistics","volume":"5","author":"Z. Yi","year":"2020","journal-title":"Transportation Letters: The International Journal of Transportation Research"},{"issue":"3","key":"13","first-page":"405","article-title":"The Effect of Individual perceptions of social corruption levels and practices on corruption intentions: a Case study of Public Agency suppliers","volume":"23","author":"J. I.-kun Kao","year":"2012","journal-title":"Korean Society and Administration Research"},{"key":"14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.strueco.2019.08.008"},{"key":"15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jtbi.2020.110345"},{"key":"16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1142\/s0218202519500428"},{"key":"17","article-title":"Does multi-attribute bidding in public construction projects prevent corruption while tenderers' preferences are open? A study of China's practice","volume":"13","author":"J. He","year":"2017","journal-title":"Eurasia Journal of Mathematics, Science and Technology Education"},{"issue":"2","key":"18","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"454","DOI":"10.1093\/jleo\/ewy020","article-title":"Corrigendum to: bid rigging and entry deterrence in public procurement: evidence from an investigation into collusion and corruption in quebec","volume":"35","author":"R. Clark","year":"2019","journal-title":"Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization"},{"issue":"4","key":"19","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1080\/01446193.2015.1059951","article-title":"Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review","volume":"33","author":"P. Ballesteros-P\u00e9rez","year":"2015","journal-title":"Construction Management & Economics"},{"volume-title":"Research on Collusion and its Prevention in Engineering Project Bidding","year":"2020","author":"H. Chunyan","key":"20"},{"volume-title":"Research on the Problem of Bid-Rigging and Governance of Engineering Projects under the Background of Electronic Bidding","year":"2020","author":"R. Dou","key":"21"}],"container-title":["Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/downloads.hindawi.com\/journals\/cin\/2022\/6092802.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/downloads.hindawi.com\/journals\/cin\/2022\/6092802.xml","content-type":"application\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/downloads.hindawi.com\/journals\/cin\/2022\/6092802.pdf","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,22]],"date-time":"2022-01-22T03:05:58Z","timestamp":1642820758000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.hindawi.com\/journals\/cin\/2022\/6092802\/"}},"subtitle":[],"editor":[{"given":"Hanliang","family":"Fu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"editor","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,21]]},"references-count":21,"alternative-id":["6092802","6092802"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1155\/2022\/6092802","relation":{},"ISSN":["1687-5273","1687-5265"],"issn-type":[{"type":"electronic","value":"1687-5273"},{"type":"print","value":"1687-5265"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2022,1,21]]}}}