{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,7,30]],"date-time":"2025-07-30T14:36:21Z","timestamp":1753886181871,"version":"3.41.2"},"reference-count":14,"publisher":"Wiley","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,24]],"date-time":"2010-10-24T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1287878400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":296,"URL":"http:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/3.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["onlinelibrary.wiley.com"],"crossmark-restriction":true},"short-container-title":["Economics Research International"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2010,1]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>We investigate how an incumbent firm can use the regulatory policy about entry and the informational advantage to protect his market position. This question is studied through the construction of a signalling game where we assume that the regulator has less information about demand than the firms. We conclude that there is a pooling equilibrium and partially separating equilibria in which entry is deterred and, if demand is high, there will be insufficient entry. The final effect on welfare depends on the tradeoff between short\u2010run benefits (lower price) and long\u2010run losses (weaker competition).<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1155\/2010\/105049","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,24]],"date-time":"2010-10-24T19:32:29Z","timestamp":1287948749000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1002\/crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Entry Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand"],"prefix":"10.1155","volume":"2010","author":[{"given":"Paula","family":"Sarmento","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Ant\u00f3nio","family":"Brand\u00e3o","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"311","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2010,10,24]]},"reference":[{"key":"e_1_2_7_1_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"48","DOI":"10.2307\/2555627","article-title":"Free entry and social inefficiency","volume":"17","author":"Mankiw N. G.","year":"1997","journal-title":"The Rand Journal of Economics"},{"key":"e_1_2_7_2_2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.7551\/mitpress\/5579.001.0001","volume-title":"Restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities","author":"Newbery D. M.","year":"2000"},{"key":"e_1_2_7_3_2","first-page":"986","article-title":"Regulating a monopolist with unknown demand","volume":"78","author":"Lewis T. R.","year":"1988","journal-title":"The American Economic Review"},{"key":"e_1_2_7_4_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/1912637"},{"key":"e_1_2_7_5_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2555717"},{"key":"e_1_2_7_6_2","unstructured":"KimJ. Signaling rather than incentive mechanism for entry regulation Discussion Paper Series A 2001 no. 403 Institute of Economic Research Hitotsubashi University."},{"key":"e_1_2_7_7_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/3003371"},{"key":"e_1_2_7_8_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2098020"},{"key":"e_1_2_7_9_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2297451"},{"key":"e_1_2_7_10_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.2307\/2555587"},{"volume-title":"Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory","year":"2001","author":"Rasmusen E.","key":"e_1_2_7_11_2"},{"key":"e_1_2_7_12_2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0047-2727(96)01604-0"},{"key":"e_1_2_7_13_2","unstructured":"StragierJ. Airline alliances and mergers: the emerging commission policy Proceedings of the 13th Annual Conference of the European Air Law Association November 2001 Zurich Switzerland."},{"key":"e_1_2_7_14_2","unstructured":"Transportation Research Board Entry and competition in the us airline industry: issues and opportunities Special Report 1999 no. 255 National Academy of Science US."}],"container-title":["Economics Research International"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"http:\/\/downloads.hindawi.com\/archive\/2010\/105049.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"http:\/\/downloads.hindawi.com\/archive\/2010\/105049.xml","content-type":"application\/xml","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/pdf\/10.1155\/2010\/105049","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,6,19]],"date-time":"2024-06-19T11:01:04Z","timestamp":1718794864000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/10.1155\/2010\/105049"}},"subtitle":[],"editor":[{"given":"W. 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