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In such divisible double auction, all the agents (both buyers and sellers) are expected to submit their bid profiles, and dynamically achieve the best responses. In practice, these agents may not trust each other without a market mediator. Fortunately, smart contract is extensively used to ensure digital agreement among mutually distrustful agents. The consensus protocol helps the smart contract execution on the blockchain to ensure strong integrity and availability. However, severe privacy risks would emerge in the divisible double auction since all the agents should disclose their sensitive data such as the bid profiles (i.e., bid amount and prices in different iterations) to other agents for resource allocation and such data are replicated on all the nodes in the network. Furthermore, the consensus requirements will bring a huge burden for the blockchain, which impacts the overall performance. To address these concerns, we propose a hybridized TEE-Blockchain system (system and auction mechanism co-design) to privately execute the divisible double auction. The designed hybridized system ensures privacy, honesty and high efficiency among distributed agents. The bid profiles are sealed for optimally allocating divisible resources while ensuring truthfulness with a Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we conduct experiments and empirical studies to validate the system and auction performance using two real-world applications.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1186\/s42400-021-00100-x","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,12,1]],"date-time":"2021-12-01T02:03:18Z","timestamp":1638324198000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":9,"title":["Privacy preserving divisible double auction with a hybridized TEE-blockchain system"],"prefix":"10.1186","volume":"4","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4537-3498","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Bingyu","family":"Liu","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Shangyu","family":"Xie","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Yuanzhou","family":"Yang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Rujia","family":"Wang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Yuan","family":"Hong","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,12,1]]},"reference":[{"key":"100_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"191","DOI":"10.1016\/j.enpol.2016.09.063","volume":"100","author":"DE Aliabadi","year":"2017","unstructured":"Aliabadi DE, Kaya M, \u015eahin G (2017) An agent-based simulation of power generation company behavior in electricity markets under different market-clearing mechanisms. 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