{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,30]],"date-time":"2026-04-30T03:37:52Z","timestamp":1777520272277,"version":"3.51.4"},"reference-count":53,"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","issue":"1","content-domain":{"domain":["link.springer.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["BMC Evol Biol"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2008,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n          <jats:sec>\n            <jats:title>Background<\/jats:title>\n            <jats:p>In recent years it has been found that the combination of evolutionary game theory with population structures modelled in terms of dynamical graphs, in which individuals are allowed to sever unwanted social ties while keeping the good ones, provides a viable solution to the conundrum of cooperation. It is well known that in reality individuals respond differently to disadvantageous interactions. Yet, the evolutionary mechanism determining the individuals' willingness to sever unfavourable ties remains unclear.<\/jats:p>\n          <\/jats:sec>\n          <jats:sec>\n            <jats:title>Results<\/jats:title>\n            <jats:p>We introduce a novel way of thinking about the joint evolution of cooperation and social contacts. The struggle for survival between cooperators and defectors leads to an arms race for swiftness in adjusting social ties, based purely on a self-regarding, individual judgement. Since defectors are never able to establish social ties under mutual agreement, they break adverse ties more rapidly than cooperators, who tend to evolve stable and long-term relations. Ironically, defectors' constant search for partners to exploit leads to heterogeneous networks that improve the survivability of cooperators, compared to the traditional homogenous population assumption.<\/jats:p>\n          <\/jats:sec>\n          <jats:sec>\n            <jats:title>Conclusion<\/jats:title>\n            <jats:p>When communities face the prisoner's dilemma, swift reaction to adverse ties evolves when competition is fierce between cooperators and defectors, providing an evolutionary basis for the necessity of individuals to adjust their social ties. Our results show how our innate resilience to change relates to mutual agreement between cooperators and how \"loyalty\" or persistent social ties bring along an evolutionary disadvantage, both from an individual and group perspective.<\/jats:p>\n          <\/jats:sec>","DOI":"10.1186\/1471-2148-8-287","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2008,10,17]],"date-time":"2008-10-17T18:14:16Z","timestamp":1224267256000},"update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/springer_crossmark_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":40,"title":["The evolution of prompt reaction to adverse ties"],"prefix":"10.1186","volume":"8","author":[{"given":"Sven","family":"Van Segbroeck","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Francisco C","family":"Santos","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Ann","family":"Now\u00e9","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Jorge M","family":"Pacheco","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Tom","family":"Lenaerts","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"297","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2008,10,17]]},"reference":[{"issue":"5731","key":"856_CR1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"93","DOI":"10.1126\/science.309.5731.93","volume":"309","author":"E Pennisi","year":"2005","unstructured":"Pennisi E: How did cooperative behavior evolve. Science. 2005, 309 (5731): 93-93. 10.1126\/science.309.5731.93.","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"856_CR2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1017\/CBO9781139173179","volume-title":"Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics","author":"J Hofbauer","year":"1998","unstructured":"Hofbauer J, Sigmund K: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. 1998, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press"},{"key":"856_CR3","volume-title":"Game Theory Evolving","author":"H Gintis","year":"2000","unstructured":"Gintis H: Game Theory Evolving. 2000, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press"},{"key":"856_CR4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.3998\/mpub.20269","volume-title":"The Prisoner's Dilemma","author":"A Rapoport","year":"1965","unstructured":"Rapoport A, Chamah AM: The Prisoner's Dilemma. 1965, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor"},{"issue":"5805","key":"856_CR5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1560","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1133755","volume":"314","author":"MA Nowak","year":"2006","unstructured":"Nowak MA: Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science. 2006, 314 (5805): 1560-1563. 10.1126\/science.1133755.","journal-title":"Science"},{"key":"856_CR6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"826","DOI":"10.1038\/359826a0","volume":"359","author":"MA Nowak","year":"1992","unstructured":"Nowak MA, May RM: Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature. 1992, 359: 826-829. 10.1038\/359826a0.","journal-title":"Nature"},{"issue":"11","key":"856_CR7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"4877","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.91.11.4877","volume":"91","author":"MA Nowak","year":"1994","unstructured":"Nowak MA, Bonhoeffer S, May RM: Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 1994, 91 (11): 4877-4881. 10.1073\/pnas.91.11.4877.","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"issue":"1","key":"856_CR8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"65","DOI":"10.1006\/jtbi.1996.0243","volume":"184","author":"M Nakamaru","year":"1997","unstructured":"Nakamaru M, Matsuda H, Iwasa Y: The evolution of cooperation in a lattice-structured population. J Theor Biol. 1997, 184 (1): 65-81. 10.1006\/jtbi.1996.0243.","journal-title":"J Theor Biol"},{"issue":"1","key":"856_CR9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"69","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.58.69","volume":"58","author":"G Szab\u00f3","year":"1998","unstructured":"Szab\u00f3 G, Toke C: Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice. Phys Rev E. 1998, 58 (1): 69-10.1103\/PhysRevE.58.69.","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"key":"856_CR10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"030901","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.63.030901","volume":"63","author":"G Abramson","year":"2001","unstructured":"Abramson G, Kuperman M: Social games in a social network. Phys Rev E. 2001, 63: 030901-10.1103\/PhysRevE.63.030901.","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"issue":"5","key":"856_CR11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"056118","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.66.056118","volume":"66","author":"H Ebel","year":"2002","unstructured":"Ebel H, Bornholdt S: Coevolutionary games on networks. Phys Rev E. 2002, 66 (5): 056118-10.1103\/PhysRevE.66.056118.","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"issue":"2","key":"856_CR12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"021907","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.66.021907","volume":"66","author":"BJ Kim","year":"2002","unstructured":"Kim BJ, Trusina A, Holme P, Minnhagen P, Chung JS, Choi MY: Dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence: Prisoner's dilemma game on small-world networks. Phys Rev E. 2002, 66 (2): 021907-10.1103\/PhysRevE.66.021907.","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"key":"856_CR13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"643","DOI":"10.1038\/nature02360","volume":"428","author":"C Hauert","year":"2004","unstructured":"Hauert C, Doebeli M: Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the Snowdrift game. Nature. 2004, 428: 643-646. 10.1038\/nature02360.","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"856_CR14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"312","DOI":"10.1038\/nature03204","volume":"433","author":"E Lieberman","year":"2005","unstructured":"Lieberman E, Hauert C, Nowak MA: Evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Nature. 2005, 433: 312-316. 10.1038\/nature03204.","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"856_CR15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"098104","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevLett.95.098104","volume":"95","author":"FC Santos","year":"2005","unstructured":"Santos FC, Pacheco JM: Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation. Phys Rev Lett. 2005, 95: 098104-10.1103\/PhysRevLett.95.098104.","journal-title":"Phys Rev Lett"},{"key":"856_CR16","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"047107","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.72.047107","volume":"72","author":"G Szab\u00f3","year":"2005","unstructured":"Szab\u00f3 G, Vukov J, Szolnoki A: Phase diagrams for an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices. Phys Rev E. 2005, 72: 047107-10.1103\/PhysRevE.72.047107.","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"key":"856_CR17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"036133","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.71.036133","volume":"71","author":"J Vukov","year":"2005","unstructured":"Vukov J, Szab\u00f3 G: Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on hierarchical lattices. Phys Rev E. 2005, 71: 036133-10.1103\/PhysRevE.71.036133.","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"key":"856_CR18","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"502","DOI":"10.1038\/nature04605","volume":"441","author":"H Ohtsuki","year":"2006","unstructured":"Ohtsuki H, Hauert C, Lieberman E, Nowak MA: A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks. Nature. 2006, 441: 502-505. 10.1038\/nature04605.","journal-title":"Nature"},{"issue":"9","key":"856_CR19","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3490","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0508201103","volume":"103","author":"FC Santos","year":"2006","unstructured":"Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T: Evolutionary Dynamics of Social Dilemmas in Structured Heterogeneous Populations. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2006, 103 (9): 3490-3494. 10.1073\/pnas.0508201103.","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"key":"856_CR20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"067103","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.73.067103","volume":"74","author":"J Vukov","year":"2006","unstructured":"Vukov J, Szab\u00f3 G, Szolnoki A: Cooperation in the noisy case: Prisoner's dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs. Phys Rev E. 2006, 74: 067103-10.1103\/PhysRevE.73.067103.","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"issue":"4","key":"856_CR21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"e1892","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pone.0001892","volume":"3","author":"S Lozano","year":"2008","unstructured":"Lozano S, Arenas A, S\u00e1nchez A: Mesoscopic Structure Conditions the Emergence of Cooperation on Social Networks. PLoS One. 2008, 3 (4): e1892-10.1371\/journal.pone.0001892.","journal-title":"PLoS One"},{"issue":"7201","key":"856_CR22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"213","DOI":"10.1038\/nature06940","volume":"454","author":"FC Santos","year":"2008","unstructured":"Santos FC, Santos MD, Pacheco JM: Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games. Nature. 2008, 454 (7201): 213-216.","journal-title":"Nature"},{"issue":"4\u20136","key":"856_CR23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"97","DOI":"10.1016\/j.physrep.2007.04.004","volume":"446","author":"G Szab\u00f3","year":"2007","unstructured":"Szab\u00f3 G, F\u00e1th G: Evolutionary games on graphs. Phys Rep. 2007, 446 (4\u20136): 97-216. 10.1016\/j.physrep.2007.04.004.","journal-title":"Phys Rep"},{"key":"856_CR24","volume-title":"The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure","author":"B Skyrms","year":"2004","unstructured":"Skyrms B: The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. 2004, Cambridge University Press"},{"issue":"20","key":"856_CR25","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"259","DOI":"10.1098\/rsif.2007.1229","volume":"5","author":"T Gross","year":"2008","unstructured":"Gross T, Blasius B: Adaptive coevolutionary networks: a review. J R Soc Interface. 2008, 5 (20): 259-271. 10.1098\/rsif.2007.1229.","journal-title":"J R Soc Interface"},{"key":"856_CR26","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"99","DOI":"10.1016\/0303-2647(95)01548-5","volume":"37","author":"D Ashlock","year":"1996","unstructured":"Ashlock D, Smucker MD, Stanley EA, Tesfatsion L: Preferential partner selection in an evolutionary study of the Prisoner's Dilemma. BioSystems. 1996, 37: 99-125. 10.1016\/0303-2647(95)01548-5.","journal-title":"BioSystems"},{"issue":"16","key":"856_CR27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"9340","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.97.16.9340","volume":"97","author":"B Skyrms","year":"2000","unstructured":"Skyrms B, Pemantle R: A dynamic model of social network formation. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2000, 97 (16): 9340-9346. 10.1073\/pnas.97.16.9340.","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"issue":"5","key":"856_CR28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1181","DOI":"10.1111\/1468-0262.00155","volume":"68","author":"V Bala","year":"2000","unstructured":"Bala V, Goyal S: A noncooperative model of network formation. Econometrica. 2000, 68 (5): 1181-1229. 10.1111\/1468-0262.00155.","journal-title":"Econometrica"},{"issue":"6","key":"856_CR29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"065102","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.69.065102","volume":"69","author":"MG Zimmermann","year":"2004","unstructured":"Zimmermann MG, Egu\u00edluz VM, San Miguel M: Coevolution of dynamical states and interactions in dynamic networks. Phys Rev E. 2004, 69 (6): 065102-10.1103\/PhysRevE.69.065102.","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"issue":"4","key":"856_CR30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"977","DOI":"10.1086\/428716","volume":"110","author":"VM Eguiluz","year":"2005","unstructured":"Eguiluz VM, Zimmerman M, Cela-Conte CJ, San Miguel M: Cooperation and the emergence of role differentiation in the dynamics of social networks. Am J Soc. 2005, 110 (4): 977-1008. 10.1086\/428716.","journal-title":"Am J Soc"},{"key":"856_CR31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"056118","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.72.056118","volume":"72","author":"MG Zimmermann","year":"2005","unstructured":"Zimmermann MG, Egu\u00edluz VM: Cooperation, social networks, and the emergence of leadership in a prisoner's dilemma with adaptive local interactions. Phys Rev E. 2005, 72: 056118-10.1103\/PhysRevE.72.056118.","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"issue":"10","key":"856_CR32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"e140","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pcbi.0020140","volume":"2","author":"FC Santos","year":"2006","unstructured":"Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T: Cooperation prevails when individuals adjust their social ties. PLoS Comput Biol. 2006, 2 (10): e140-10.1371\/journal.pcbi.0020140.","journal-title":"PLoS Comput Biol"},{"issue":"25","key":"856_CR33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"258103","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevLett.97.258103","volume":"97","author":"JM Pacheco","year":"2006","unstructured":"Pacheco JM, Traulsen A, Nowak MA: Coevolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking. Phys Rev Lett. 2006, 97 (25): 258103-10.1103\/PhysRevLett.97.258103.","journal-title":"Phys Rev Lett"},{"issue":"7","key":"856_CR34","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1036","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.1060.0625","volume":"53","author":"N Hanaki","year":"2007","unstructured":"Hanaki N, Peterhansl A, Dodds PS, Watts DJ: Cooperation in evolving social networks. Management Science. 2007, 53 (7): 1036-1050. 10.1287\/mnsc.1060.0625.","journal-title":"Management Science"},{"key":"856_CR35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"40","DOI":"10.1016\/j.physd.2007.02.004","volume":"228","author":"C Biely","year":"2007","unstructured":"Biely C, Dragosits K, Thurner S: The prisoner's dilemma on co-evolving networks under perfect rationality. Physica D. 2007, 228: 40-48.","journal-title":"Physica D"},{"issue":"5757","key":"856_CR36","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"88","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1116869","volume":"311","author":"G Kossinets","year":"2006","unstructured":"Kossinets G, Watts DJ: Empirical analysis of an evolving social network. Science. 2006, 311 (5757): 88-90. 10.1126\/science.1116869.","journal-title":"Science"},{"issue":"21","key":"856_CR37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"11149","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.200327197","volume":"97","author":"LA Amaral","year":"2000","unstructured":"Amaral LA, Scala A, Barthelemy M, Stanley HE: Classes of small-world networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2000, 97 (21): 11149-11152. 10.1073\/pnas.200327197.","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"key":"856_CR38","volume-title":"Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary Origin of Freedom","author":"PH Rubin","year":"2002","unstructured":"Rubin PH: Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary Origin of Freedom. 2002, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press"},{"issue":"1","key":"856_CR39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"168","DOI":"10.1086\/344546","volume":"108","author":"NR Buchan","year":"2002","unstructured":"Buchan NR, Croson TA, Dawes RM: Swift neighbors and persistent strangers: A cross-cultural investigation of trust and reciprocity in social exchange. Am J Soc. 2002, 108 (1): 168-206. 10.1086\/344546.","journal-title":"Am J Soc"},{"key":"856_CR40","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"745","DOI":"10.1038\/nature02432","volume":"428","author":"JM McNamara","year":"2004","unstructured":"McNamara JM, Barta Z, Houston AI: Variation in behaviour promotes cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Nature. 2004, 428: 745-748. 10.1038\/nature02432.","journal-title":"Nature"},{"key":"856_CR41","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"30004","DOI":"10.1209\/0295-5075\/77\/30004","volume":"77","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2007","unstructured":"Szolnoki A, Perc M, Szab\u00f3 G: Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games. Europhys Lett. 2007, 77: 30004-10.1209\/0295-5075\/77\/30004.","journal-title":"Europhys Lett"},{"key":"856_CR42","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"043036","DOI":"10.1088\/1367-2630\/10\/4\/043036","volume":"10","author":"A Szolnoki","year":"2008","unstructured":"Szolnoki A, Perc M: Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation. New J Phys. 2008, 10: 043036-10.1088\/1367-2630\/10\/4\/043036.","journal-title":"New J Phys"},{"issue":"1 Pt 1","key":"856_CR43","first-page":"011090","volume":"74","author":"A Traulsen","year":"2006","unstructured":"Traulsen A, Nowak MA, Pacheco JM: Stochastic Dynamics of Invasion and Fixation. Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys. 2006, 74 (1 Pt 1): 011090-","journal-title":"Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys"},{"issue":"4","key":"856_CR44","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"1331","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.79.4.1331","volume":"79","author":"I Eshel","year":"1982","unstructured":"Eshel I, Cavalli-Sforza LL: Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 1982, 79 (4): 1331-1335. 10.1073\/pnas.79.4.1331.","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"key":"856_CR45","unstructured":"Wilson EO: Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. 2000, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975"},{"issue":"17","key":"856_CR46","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"7301","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0610172104","volume":"104","author":"LM Bettencourt","year":"2007","unstructured":"Bettencourt LM, Lobo J, Helbing D, Kuhnert C, West GB: Growth, innovation, scaling, and the pace of life in cities. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2007, 104 (17): 7301-7306. 10.1073\/pnas.0610172104.","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"issue":"11","key":"856_CR47","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"3994","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0504902103","volume":"103","author":"M Milinski","year":"2006","unstructured":"Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck HJ, Marotzke J: Stabilizing the Earth's climate is not a losing game: Supporting evidence from public goods experiments. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2006, 103 (11): 3994-3998. 10.1073\/pnas.0504902103.","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"issue":"7","key":"856_CR48","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"2291","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0709546105","volume":"105","author":"M Milinski","year":"2008","unstructured":"Milinski M, Sommerfeld RD, Krambeck HJ, Reed FA, Marotzke J: The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2008, 105 (7): 2291-2294. 10.1073\/pnas.0709546105.","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"issue":"7","key":"856_CR49","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"2261","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.0800033105","volume":"105","author":"A Dreber","year":"2008","unstructured":"Dreber A, Nowak MA: Gambling for global goods. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2008, 105 (7): 2261-2262. 10.1073\/pnas.0800033105.","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"key":"856_CR50","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"056128","DOI":"10.1103\/PhysRevE.72.056128","volume":"72","author":"FC Santos","year":"2005","unstructured":"Santos FC, Rodrigues JF, Pacheco JM: Epidemic spreading and cooperation dynamics on homogeneous small-world networks. Phys Rev E. 2005, 72: 056128-10.1103\/PhysRevE.72.056128.","journal-title":"Phys Rev E"},{"issue":"3","key":"856_CR51","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"7229","DOI":"10.1073\/pnas.092080099","volume":"99","author":"MW Macy","year":"2002","unstructured":"Macy MW, Flache A: Learning dynamics in social dilemmas. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2002, 99 (3): 7229-7236. 10.1073\/pnas.092080099.","journal-title":"Proc Natl Acad Sci USA"},{"key":"856_CR52","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/acprof:oso\/9780198515906.001.0001","volume-title":"Evolution of Networks: From Biological Nets to the Internet and WWW","author":"SN Dorogotsev","year":"2003","unstructured":"Dorogotsev SN, Mendes JFF: Evolution of Networks: From Biological Nets to the Internet and WWW. 2003, Oxford: Oxford University Press"},{"key":"856_CR53","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"47","DOI":"10.1103\/RevModPhys.74.47","volume":"74","author":"R Albert","year":"2002","unstructured":"Albert R, Barab\u00e1si AL: Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Rev Mod Phys. 2002, 74: 47-98. 10.1103\/RevModPhys.74.47.","journal-title":"Rev Mod Phys"}],"container-title":["BMC Evolutionary Biology"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/link.springer.com\/content\/pdf\/10.1186\/1471-2148-8-287.pdf","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2021,9,1]],"date-time":"2021-09-01T01:26:17Z","timestamp":1630459577000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/bmcevolbiol.biomedcentral.com\/articles\/10.1186\/1471-2148-8-287"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2008,10,17]]},"references-count":53,"journal-issue":{"issue":"1","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2008,12]]}},"alternative-id":["856"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1186\/1471-2148-8-287","relation":{},"ISSN":["1471-2148"],"issn-type":[{"value":"1471-2148","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2008,10,17]]},"assertion":[{"value":"20 May 2008","order":1,"name":"received","label":"Received","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"17 October 2008","order":2,"name":"accepted","label":"Accepted","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}},{"value":"17 October 2008","order":3,"name":"first_online","label":"First Online","group":{"name":"ArticleHistory","label":"Article History"}}],"article-number":"287"}}