{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,22]],"date-time":"2026-09-22T10:12:26Z","timestamp":1790071946953,"version":"4.0.1"},"update-to":[{"DOI":"10.12688\/f1000research.180026.1","type":"new_version","label":"New version","source":"publisher","updated":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,3]],"date-time":"2026-09-03T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1788393600000}}],"reference-count":59,"publisher":"F1000 Research Ltd","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,3]],"date-time":"2026-09-03T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1788393600000},"content-version":"tdm","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"content-domain":{"domain":["f1000research.com"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["F1000Res"],"abstract":"<ns3:p>Background Acknowledging that past studies on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have focused on elite and state-centric viewpoints, this study centers on people\u2019s perspectives. The case of Brunei Darussalam, as one of the region\u2019s smallest nations, reveals unique elements in the interaction between public opinion and foreign policy. Given the Sultanate\u2019s consistent stance on closer ties with the regional organization, as evidenced by the positive responses during its ASEAN chairmanship in 2021, do the Brunei public hold similar views? Methods To reveal Brunei\u2019s perceptions vis-\u00e0-vis ASEAN and explore the relationship between those views and the Sultanate\u2019s ASEAN policies, this qualitative case study examines the applicability of Boucher\u2019s 2024 analytical framework of the \u2018top-down\u2019 approach, which argues that the people eventually embrace elites\u2019 views on foreign policy. It utilizes the secondary survey data published in the State of Southeast Asia 2025. It utilizes the survey report published in the State of Southeast Asia 2025. Results This study reveals consistency between Brunei respondent\u2019s perceptions with that of the Sultan in the following areas: 1) Measures to enhance ASEAN\u2019s resilience; 2) How ASEAN should respond to the Myanmar Issue and the South China Sea dispute; 3) Questions of alignment amid the great power rivalries influencing the Southeast Asian region; and 4) Perceptions of trust. Conclusions The alignment between the Brunei respondents\u2019 perceptions of ASEAN and the Sultan\u2019s implemented policies reveals a unique nexus in shaping public perceptions of foreign policy matters, making Boucher\u2019s top-down approach applicable to the case study.<\/ns3:p>","DOI":"10.12688\/f1000research.180026.2","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,3]],"date-time":"2026-09-03T08:59:06Z","timestamp":1788425946000},"page":"633","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.12688\/f1000research.crossmark-policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["ASEAN, Brunei Darussalam, and the Interplay of Foreign Policy and Public Opinion"],"prefix":"10.12688","volume":"15","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-5952-136X","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Bama Andika","family":"Putra","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Bristol England University of Bristol School of Sociology Politics and International Studies"},{"name":"Makassar South Sulawesi Universitas Hasanuddin Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3266-5974","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Sam","family":"Rany","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Graduate School Krong Battambang Battambang Province University of Battambang"}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"2560","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,3]]},"reference":[{"key":"ref3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"477-502","DOI":"10.1146\/ANNUREV.POLISCI.9.111605.105008","article-title":"Foreign policy and the electoral connection.","volume":"9","author":"J Aldrich","year":"2006","journal-title":"Annual Review of Political Science."},{"key":"ref4","article-title":"Advancing Myanmar\u2019s Peace Agenda: Initial Updates Under Laos Chairmanship 2024.","author":"H Alexandra","year":"2024"},{"key":"ref5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"23-36","DOI":"10.21512\/jas.v5i1.962","article-title":"Redefining ASEAN way: assessing normative foundation on inter-governmental relationship in Southeast Asia.","volume":"5","author":"M Aminuddin","year":"2017","journal-title":"J ASEAN Stud."},{"key":"ref7","article-title":"ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.","year":"2019"},{"key":"ref10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"333-343","DOI":"10.1080\/09557570903137776","article-title":"ASEAN\u2019s ways: still fit for purpose?.","volume":"22","author":"M Beeson","year":"2009","journal-title":"Cambridge Review of International Affairs."},{"key":"ref11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","first-page":"40-62","DOI":"10.15206\/ajpor.2015.3.1.40","article-title":"Is the ASEAN Economic Community Relevant To Gen Y Professionals? 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with reservations, Approved with reservations, Approved with reservations","URL":"https:\/\/f1000research.com\/articles\/15-633\/v2#article-reports","order":0,"name":"referee-status","label":"Referee status","group":{"name":"current-referee-status","label":"Current Referee Status"}},{"value":"10.5256\/f1000research.208347.r517510, Kittisak Wongmahesak, North Bangkok University, Bangkok, Bangkok, 11 Sep 2026, version 2, 3 approved with reservations","URL":"https:\/\/f1000research.com\/articles\/15-633\/v2#referee-response-517510","order":0,"name":"referee-response-517510","label":"Referee Report","group":{"name":"article-reports","label":"Article Reports"}},{"value":"10.5256\/f1000research.198599.r481188, Ludiro Madu, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, Special Region of Yogyakarta, 23 May 2026, version 1, 2 approved with reservations","URL":"https:\/\/f1000research.com\/articles\/15-633\/v1#referee-response-481188","order":1,"name":"referee-response-481188","label":"Referee Report","group":{"name":"article-reports","label":"Article Reports"}},{"value":"<b>bama andika putra<\/b>; \n<i>Posted: 10 Aug 2026<\/i>; Comment 1: First, the main concern is the strength of the causal claim. The article shows alignment or consistency between public opinion and elite foreign policy, but the evidence consists mainly of cross-sectional survey data and interpretation of Brunei\u2019s ASEAN policy. This does not fully demonstrate that elite views caused or shaped public opinion. The \n<b>authors should either soften causal language or provide clearer methodological justification<\/b>. \n<b>Terms such as \u201calignment,\u201d \u201cconvergence,\u201d and \u201cconsistency\u201d are well supported,<\/b> \n<b>whereas \u201cinfluenced by,\u201d \u201cshaped by,\u201d or \u201cformed by\u201d require more direct evidence of transmission mechanisms<\/b>.  We agree with Reviewer 2's statement. This article does not have the strength of the causal claim, and the safer option is to soften the causal language to avoid misinterpretations of the results. The revised paragraphs are below:  Paragraph 7, section 1: To claim the consistency between the views of the Brunei elites and the public, this study utilizes the publicly available data from the \u2018State of Southeast Asia 2025\u2019 survey report, published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. In this case, the survey includes elites and the informed public, allowing this study to generalize arguments based on the views of those directly involved in the discourse on Brunei and China. The survey provides answers to how Brunei respondents view ASEAN in general, ASEAN\u2019s role in contemporary regional challenges, questions on ASEAN\u2019s potential alignment, and the way forward for the regional organization (Seah \n<i>et al.<\/i>, 2025). Using this dataset, this study is able to isolate how Brunei respondents view the regional organization in 2025 and connect this to the potential influence that Brunei elites had in shaping those preferences, based on Brunei\u2019s ASEAN policies during and after its ASEAN chairmanship in 2021.   Paragraph 3, section 2: In doing so, Boucher\u2019s \u2018top-down\u2019 model serves as a good starting point to better understand the relations between the Brunei public and foreign policy decisions. As Boucher suggests, there is a clear gap between what political elites know and what the public understands (Boucher, 2024). Consequently, it is expected that public opinions would use the views of the elites as \u201c[\u2026] a heuristic shortcut for them (the public) to form an opinion\u201d (Boucher, 2024, p.254). This point has been repeatedly argued by past scholars who fall under the broad category of the top-down model, believing that the interactive relationship between the two variables is best described as consistent with the elite\u2019s views (Zaller, 1992; Druckman, 2001; Western, 2005; Boucher, 2024).   Paragraph 4, section 3: Bridged to the context of Brunei\u2019s public opinions in matters related to ASEAN, one can conclude that their embraced opinions are consistent with Brunei\u2019s political elites\u2019 view of the regional organization. As perhaps clear by this point, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah has a favorable perception of ASEAN, and this is evident throughout Brunei\u2019s ASEAN chairmanships. Therefore, the argument proposed is that Brunei\u2019s past active engagements continue to effectively shape policy preferences and public views of Brunei\u2019s external outlook in relation to the Southeast Asian region and ASEAN.  Paragraph 7, section 2: Although existing scholarship documents an evolving discourse seeking to make sense of Brunei\u2019s agency and active participation in ASEAN, the role of public opinion remains unexplored in these studies. Therefore, to better our understanding of how Brunei citizens perceive ASEAN\u2019s importance (and related issues), this study zooms in on Brunei's perceptions of the regional organization and identifies potential variables that could influence these perceptions. Arguing specifically for a top-down model (alignment between public opinion and elite perceptions\/foreign policy conduct), this study will be the first to examine how public opinion is formed in Brunei, measuring the interactive relationship between public opinion and regional foreign policy.  Paragraph 9, section 4.1: The data presented in this section show several unique patterns in how Brunei\u2019s public views ASEAN. Within the context of international developments, trust, and the strategic rivalries influencing the Southeast Asian region, there seems to be a strong convergence of views between the Brunei public and the Sultanate. As will be explored in the next section through Boucher\u2019s top-down analytical framework, it will be shown that Brunei\u2019s public opinion in 2025 converges with the Sultan\u2019s strategic views on ASEAN, expectations, and future projections. This can be seen in the Sultanate\u2019s recent policies, including during Brunei\u2019s ASEAN chairmanship in 2021, which clearly reflected the Sultan\u2019s priorities and views regarding ASEAN.  Paragraph 2, section 5: In doing so, Boucher\u2019s 2024 analytical framework of the \u2018top-down\u2019 model serves this study\u2019s intentions well. In understanding the nexus between public opinion and foreign policy, Boucher\u2019s study argues that elites\u2019 views are consistent with the public's preferences and opinions. Utilizing data from the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey report, this study bridges the analytical framework by means of identifying consistency between the Sultanate\u2019s ASEAN policies and perceptions towards the regional organization (primarily during Brunei\u2019s 2021 ASEAN chairmanship), with the public perceptions of Brunei respondents towards ASEAN (seen through respondents\u2019 answers in the 2025 survey).     Comment 2: Second, the representativeness of the survey data requires clearer discussion. The article notes that the 2025 survey had 2,023 respondents, with Brunei accounting for 7.4%, and that respondents were screened for ASEAN knowledge and interest in current affairs. This means that the data seems to reflect informed or policy-attentive respondents from academia, government, regional organizations, NGOs\/media, and the private sector, rather than the entire Brunei population. \n<b>The authors should, therefore, qualify repeated references to \u201cthe Brunei public,\u201d \u201cBrunei people,\u201d and \u201cgeneral public.\u201d<\/b>  \n<b>Response: Thank you for this comment, which is much similar to the suggestion of Reviewer 1.. To clarify the methodology, we have revised several paragraphs that makes clear who the respondents were in the ISEAS survey, and why they were chosen. The first paragraph revised is the slight description in the methodology of the article, followed by small areas of revised terminologies throughout the article.<\/b>   Paragraph 7, section 1: To claim the consistency between the views of the Brunei elites and the public, this study utilizes the publicly available data from the \u2018State of Southeast Asia 2025\u2019 survey report, published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. In this case, the survey includes elites and the informed public, allowing this study to generalize arguments based on the views of those directly involved in the discourse on Brunei and China. The survey provides answers to how Brunei respondents view ASEAN in general, ASEAN\u2019s role in contemporary regional challenges, questions on ASEAN\u2019s potential alignment, and the way forward for the regional organization (Seah \n<i>et al.<\/i>, 2025). Using this dataset, this study is able to isolate how Brunei respondents view the regional organization in 2025 and connect this to the potential influence that Brunei elites had in shaping those preferences, based on Brunei\u2019s ASEAN policies during and after its ASEAN chairmanship in 2021. Important to note here is that the respondents in the ISEAS survey represent elements from academia, government, regional organizations, NGOs\/media, as well as the private sector, which are more informed populations of Brunei (rather than the overall population).  Paragraph 2, section 2: Nevertheless, alternative themes can be explored regarding Brunei and ASEAN. Sidelining for the moment the variable of public opinion, several minor discourses still relate to the discussions put forward in this study: Brunei\u2019s placing of ASEAN as its foreign policy cornerstone, Brunei\u2019s use of ASEAN to counter great power rivalries, as well as discussions specific to Brunei\u2019s ASEAN chairmanships. Revealing how existing studies have interpreted and framed Brunei\u2019s foreign policy in relation to ASEAN enables this study to identify potential variables that influence the Brunei respondent\u2019s foreign policy perceptions.  Paragraph 8, section 3: In doing so, this discussion section is structured as follows. First, it aims to reveal how the Bruneian people perceive the significance of ASEAN across different questions and elements related to Southeast Asian regional dynamics. Understanding Brunei\u2019s public perceptions is done through the use of published data from the State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025, specifically focusing on Brunei respondents\u2019 answers. Several questions focus on Brunei respondents\u2019 perceptions of ASEAN amid international developments, how ASEAN responds to major powers\u2019 regional influence, and ASEAN\u2019s position in the US-China rivalry. After that, it offers a top-down model that focuses on the thesis that Brunei\u2019s elites' foreign policy preferences are aligned with the perceptions of the Brunei respondents, primarily through events during Brunei\u2019s ASEAN chairmanship in 2021. Elite perceptions, in the context of Brunei, are defined as the policies undertaken by the nation as a whole, without distinguishing between those of different ministries. As an absolute monarchy, the expectation is that differences of opinion are near non-existent, and that Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is the driving force of how Brunei should act in relation to ASEAN.  Paragraph 1, section 4: There is no doubt that Brunei elites view ASEAN with great importance; however, does a similar perception exist among the Brunei people, as represented by the informed public? This section first examines Brunei\u2019s public perceptions, focusing on the dataset of Brunei respondents that this study retrieved from the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute\u2019s State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025. After revealing those insights, the analytical framework of Boucher\u2019s interactive relationship between public opinion and foreign policy is adopted to decipher what causes the Brunei respondents to embrace certain perceptions of ASEAN.  Paragraph 2, section 4.1: The Brunei respondents\u2019 views on ASEAN can be divided into several specific sectors. The first sector asks the Brunei respondents for their opinions on certain international developments related to ASEAN. When asked, \u201cwhat is your top concern about ASEAN,\u201d as seen in Table 1 below, Brunei respondents mainly expressed concerns over the regional organization itself lacking the capacity to be relevant in the new world order (30.9%), followed by an external-based challenge that relates to ASEAN being an \u201c[\u2026] arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxies\u201d (26.2%) (Seah et al., 2025, p.16). Meanwhile, an equal number of votes chose the concerns of disunity (13.4%), disconnection from ordinary people (16.8%), and the inability to return to pre-pandemic economic growth rates (12.8%). In relation to that question, when asked how ASEAN can enhance its resilience, the majority of Brunei respondents selected accelerating measures for intra-regional trade and investment (28.2%), followed by the need to cooperate with strategic partners (24.8%) (Seah \n<i>et al.<\/i>, 2025).  Paragraph 1, section 4.2: To argue that a top-down model reflects the interactive relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, the elite\u2019s views and foreign policy must be highlighted. Therefore, in alignment with the analytical framework of Boucher\u2019s 2024 study, this section will explore the preferences and voices of the Brunei respondents as expressed in the State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025 and argue for consistency between the Brunei respondents\u2019 perceptions and the Sultan\u2019s. However, it also claims there could be room for a combination of a top-down and bottom-up model in Brunei, albeit in a limited sense.   Paragraph 2, section 4.2: One of the first questions asked of Brunei respondents was what they perceived as the main concerns they had regarding ASEAN. Unsurprisingly, the majority of respondents expressed concern about great power rivalries and the need for ASEAN to enhance its resilience. Nevertheless, on the question of how ASEAN should strengthen its resilience, Brunei respondents voted for ASEAN to focus on increasing intra-regional trade and investment. One way of interpreting this view is the Sultan\u2019s introduction of \n<i>Wawasan Brunei 2035<\/i>. The grand strategy acknowledges that for too long, Brunei Darussalam has been dependent on its hydrocarbon resources (Slesman and Baha, 2023; Teja, 2024; CEIC, 2025). Therefore, moving forward, the Sultan is seeking ways to develop sustainable economic measures and diversify the economy (CSPS, 2022; Koh, 2024; Jetin and Khalid, 2025), a vision eventually embraced by the general public of Brunei. However, as a small nation of approximately half a million people, Brunei has severely limited choices. Given the Brunei respondents' embrace of increased intra-regional trade, there is therefore a certain level of consistency between the Brunei respondent\u2019s voices and the Sultan's approach to diversifying the state\u2019s economy.  Paragraph 4, section 4.2: The Sultan\u2019s South China Sea in the past two decades can also shed light on the Brunei respondents\u2019 perception of how ASEAN should respond to the South China Sea. At first, the results of the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey may suggest that Bruneians are encouraging a more decisive response from ASEAN. However, a deeper look at the available options would show that the six options themselves lean towards decisive action, albeit in different forms (excluding the option of ASEAN doing nothing) (Seah \n<i>et al.<\/i>, 2025). Consequently, the Brunei respondent\u2019s choice to push ASEAN to support actions that deter aggressive behavior and uphold international law remains consistent with the Sultanate's eventual policies.  Paragraph 6, section 4.2: Similarly, the respondents also expressed confidence in the CoC. This is indeed in alignment with the discourses the Sultanate has disseminated over the past two decades regarding the disputed waters of the South China Sea (Espena and Uy, 2020; IMOA, 2020; Putra, 2024; Sands, 2026). Brunei believes that it is essential to keep the momentum to conclude the CoC, as it is one of the platforms that have the potential to counter the challenges encountered by claimant states in the South China Sea, and allows for energy exploration deals to take place as a means to reflect the cooperative nature of the seas (CGTN, 2018; Druce and Julay, 2019; Yilmaz, 2025).   Paragraph 7, section 4.2: Moving on to the topic of major powers\u2019 regional influence in Southeast Asia, there is also a strong alignment between the views held by the respondents and the actual foreign policy pursued by Brunei years earlier. One perception that may surprise is that the respondents chose China and the US as the strongest political and strategic influences in Southeast Asia, ahead of ASEAN (in third place). Nevertheless, one needs to look more closely at recent trends in Brunei\u2019s bilateral relations with the two countries to understand why the the respondents embraces such a perspective.   Paragraph 10, section 4.2: Lastly, one can also draw on the interactive relationship between the respondent\u2019s opinions and the elite\u2019s decided policies and perceptions, based on how the public perceives where ASEAN should position itself amid the US-China strategic rivalry in Southeast Asia. As seen in the 2025 survey report, the majority of respondents chose the option that ASEAN should enhance its capacity to counter pressures from the major powers. The second option was that Brunei respondents chose that ASEAN should not side with China or the US. In the responses, another consistency emerges that aligns with the top-down analytical framework. Some arguments state that Brunei is hedging with the US and China (simultaneously), which shows that Brunei does not wish to side with one power to counter the other (Husseini, 2023). As the Sultan\u2019s position during the 2021 Brunei chairmanship of ASEAN, the critical part for ASEAN is to enhance its capabilities and make it relevant to Asia Pacific geopolitics through measures as stipulated in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (Acharya, 2019; ASEAN, 2019; Singh and Tsjeng, 2020).  Paragraph 3, section 5: This study reveals the public opinions of the Brunei people and shows a strong alignment between the Sultan\u2019s past ASEAN perspectives and approaches and the actual perceptions embraced by the general public. Regarding how Brunei respondents perceived several international developments, for example, Brunei identified that one area it should focus on is intra-regional trade and investment. This means that correlations are made between the Sultan\u2019s recent efforts to diversify Brunei\u2019s economy and how they perceive areas where ASEAN can benefit from further expansion. Furthermore, the Sultan\u2019s 2021 engagements with Myanmar, which led to the eventual \u2018Five-Point Consensus\u2019 in the same year, have also been embraced in public perceptions, which called for the establishment of active dialogue with all relevant stakeholders in Myanmar's internal conflicts, including the NUG.   Paragraph 5, section 5: Meanwhile, when Brunei respondents were asked how they viewed the major power contestations in Southeast Asia, they expressed trust in ASEAN and a slight alignment with China. In the question of political and strategic influence, and the actor trusted to champion the global free trade agenda, China claimed the first position from the perspective of the respondents. This is consistent with the Sultan\u2019s foreign policy over the past decade, in which the long-term grand strategy of diversifying the economy has received a positive response from Chinese officials, leading to the convergence of \n<i>Wawasan Brunei 2035 <\/i>and the Belt and Road Initiative. Nevertheless, the importance of ASEAN has remained relevant in both inquiries, ranking significantly higher than those of the other major powers. When respondents were asked what ASEAN should do vis-&agrave;-vis the US-China quest for influence, the respondents chose to focus on the within, by enhancing ASEAN\u2019s resilience and unity to counter any pressure from the main powers. This is again consistent with the Sultanate\u2019s foreign policy, which resembles hedging with the US and China, as well as continuing to support ASEAN-introduced measures that would enhance the regional organization's capacity to address uncertainties to come.  Paragraph 6, section 5: Nevertheless, the analytical framework used to assess Brunei\u2019s foreign policy preferences here comes with its limitations. The most prominent is that the survey reports considered take the views of screened elites and the informed public. Therefore, it does not have the capacity to generalize the overall views of the Brunei public, as it can only argue on the basis of alignment and consistency of views between the respondents who are Bruneian nationals and elites.       Comment 3: Third, the methodology should be strengthened. The article describes itself as qualitative, yet much of the analysis relies on descriptive survey percentages. \n<b>The authors should clarify whether it is a qualitative case study using secondary survey data<\/b> or a descriptive interpretive analysis. \n<b>They should also explain how survey questions were selected, how elite views were operationalized, and how policy documents, speeches, or ASEAN chairmanship actions were chosen and interpreted<\/b>.  The methodology section has been revised to address several of the concerns raised by Reviewer 2. The revisions:  Abstract: Methods: To reveal Brunei's perceptions vis-&agrave;-vis ASEAN and explore the relationship between those views and the Sultanate\u2019s ASEAN policies, this qualitative case study examines the applicability of Boucher\u2019s 2024 analytical framework of the \u2018top-down\u2019 approach, which argues that the people eventually embrace elites\u2019 views on foreign policy. It utilizes the secondary survey data published in the State of Southeast Asia 2025. Paragraph 7, section 1: To claim the consistency between the views of the Brunei elites and the public, this study utilizes the publicly available data from the \u2018State of Southeast Asia 2025\u2019 survey report, published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. In this case, the survey includes elites and the informed public, allowing this study to generalize arguments based on the views of those directly involved in the discourse on Brunei and China. The survey provides answers to how Brunei respondents view ASEAN in general, ASEAN\u2019s role in contemporary regional challenges, questions on ASEAN\u2019s potential alignment, and the way forward for the regional organization (Seah \n<i>et al.<\/i>, 2025). Using this dataset, this study is able to isolate how Brunei respondents view the regional organization in 2025 and connect this to the potential influence that Brunei elites had in shaping those preferences, based on Brunei\u2019s ASEAN policies during and after its ASEAN chairmanship in 2021. Important to note here is that the respondents in the ISEAS survey represent elements from academia, government, regional organizations, NGOs\/media, as well as the private sector, which are more informed populations of Brunei (rather than the overall population). Furthermore, to argue the alignment of views between Brunei\u2019s informed public and the Sultan, policy documents of Brunei, speeches, and general indication of alignment preferences through primary documents are considered in this study.      Comment 4: Fourth, the article \n<b>should more clearly distinguish correlation, interpretation, and evidence. For example, linking respondents\u2019 preference for intra-regional trade and investment to Wawasan Brunei 2035 is plausible, but the article does not directly show that respondents knew or were influenced by that vision.<\/b> Similarly, claims that public views on Myanmar or the South China Sea were shaped by \n<b>Brunei\u2019s 2021 ASEAN chairmanship would be stronger with evidence from public discourse, media framing, government communication, speeches, education\/socialization, or longitudinal comparison before and after 2021.<\/b>  \n<b>We agree that there is room to improve the point of this study\u2019s correlation, interpretation and evidence. However, I do not engage with this recommendation due to several reasons. First, to adopt a longitudinal comparison between the 2024 survey and those before, this would go beyond the reach of this article\u2019s case study, which is primarily focused on 2024 due to the unique context during that time. Furthermore, the 2021 ASEAN chairmanship already provides a firm indication of Brunei\u2019s alignment preferences, which does not require this study to delve deeper into the specifics of how it is being framed. Third, using public discourse and media framing analysis would be difficult within the context of Brunei, considering the highly restricted information flow of the country. Therefore, the discourses introduced by the Sultanate is straightforward, and hard to misinterpret, despite the lack of a clear method to analyze the emerging discourses. <\/b>  Comment 5: Fifth, alternative explanations should be addressed. \n<b>Support for ASEAN or preference for hedging may also reflect Brunei\u2019s small-state vulnerability, economic dependence, regional identity, media environment, education, respondents\u2019 professional background, or broader ASEAN norm<\/b>s. The article briefly mentions an interactive relationship between public opinion and elites, but this point remains underdeveloped.  We agree with the suggestion of the article. Important to note, however, the primary burden of this case study is to argue the potential relevance of the top-down approach in making sense of the alignment between the Brunei informed public and the Sultan\u2019s policy preferences. Therefore, I acknowledge the presence of these alternative explanations, and cite that these can be explored in future studies. The revisions at the end of the conclusion section: Nevertheless, the analytical framework used to assess Brunei\u2019s foreign policy preferences here comes with its limitations. The most prominent is that the survey reports considered take the views of screened elites and the informed public. Therefore, it does not have the capacity to generalize the overall views of the Brunei public, as it can only argue on the basis of alignment and consistency of views between the respondents who are Bruneian nationals and elites. Second, it also acknowledges that there is room to interpret that the Sultanate\u2019s foreign policy directions are influenced by other factors that are well elaborated within the small state, economic dependence, regional identity, media environment, and regionalization norm literature. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to argue each and every alternative explanation, primarily as this article falls under the category of a case study. These explanations could be an intriguing point of inquiry in future studies.   Comment 6: Sixth, the data availability statement is useful because it links to the 2024 and 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey reports. However, the \n<b>authors should clarify whether they used only public aggregate tables or country-level raw data. If aggregate percentages were used, this should be stated; if raw data were used, th<\/b>e authors should explain where the dataset can be accessed and how the Brunei subset was isolated.  We have revised the data availability statement below: \n<b>Data Availability Statement<\/b>: The data used for this study are aggregated percentages published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak State of Southeast Asia survey reports, with specific percentages on the informed public of Brunei being traceable due to the survey\u2019s country focus approach. These documents can be accessed online: 1. The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report (Seah et al., 2024): https:\/\/www.iseas.edu.sg\/centres\/asean-studies-centre\/state-of-southeast-asia-survey\/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2024-survey-report\/ 2. The State of Southeast Asia 2025 Survey Report (Seah et al., 2025): https:\/\/www.iseas.edu.sg\/centres\/asean-studies-centre\/state-of-southeast-asia-survey\/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2025-survey-report\/&nbsp;   Comment 7: Finally, several presentation issues should be corrected. \n<b>For example, \u201cBrunei respondent\u2019s perceptions\u201d should be \u201cBrunei respondents\u2019 perceptions\u201d; \u201cbottom-down model\u201d appears where \u201cbottom-up model\u201d seems intended; and \u201csoroka wlezien 2004, sobel 2001\u201d is inconsistently formatted. <\/b>Careful proofreading is needed to improve grammar, consistency, and reference formatting.","URL":"https:\/\/f1000research.com\/articles\/15-633\/v2#referee-comment-16887","order":2,"name":"referee-comment-16887","label":"Referee Comment","group":{"name":"article-reports","label":"Article Reports"}},{"value":"10.5256\/f1000research.208347.r518463, Yuni Intarti, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, West Java, 14 Sep 2026, version 2, 3 approved with reservations","URL":"https:\/\/f1000research.com\/articles\/15-633\/v2#referee-response-518463","order":3,"name":"referee-response-518463","label":"Referee Report","group":{"name":"article-reports","label":"Article Reports"}},{"value":"<b>bama andika putra<\/b>; \n<i>Posted: 16 Sep 2026<\/i>; \n<b>Comment 1<\/b>. The primary causal assertion surpasses the available evidence. This is the most critical issue and must be addressed. The manuscript demonstrates congruence; however, congruence does not equate to a top-down causal process. For instance, it notes that respondents favor intra-regional trade and investment and interprets this in relation to Wawasan Brunei 2035. Similarly, respondent preferences regarding Myanmar are retrospectively linked to Brunei's conduct during its 2021 ASEAN chairmanship. While these interpretations are plausible, the evidence does not substantiate that respondents formed their attitudes due to the Sultan's preferences. This issue becomes particularly evident when the manuscript asserts that elite perceptions and policies 'shape Brunei's public perceptions' and subsequently concludes that the top-down framework can be 'confidently' applied. A cross-sectional survey in 2025, compared retrospectively with policies formulated around or before 2021, cannot independently determine the direction of causality. The authors must therefore choose between two strategies. The preferable and realistically achievable solution is to reframe the paper as a study of policy-attitude congruence and systematically replace causal expressions such as shapes, influences, formed by, 'causes,' and 'embraced because of' with is consistent with, corresponds with, converges with, or is compatible with. Alternatively, if the authors wish to maintain a genuine top-down causal argument, they require substantially stronger evidence of the transmission mechanism, such as longitudinal evidence, media or government communication analysis, speeches directed toward domestic audiences, educational\/socialization mechanisms, exposure data, or systematic process tracing.  Response: Thank you for this insightful comment. After considering the options, we have went on to proceed with the first strategy choice offered by the reviewer, which is to reframe the paper as a study of policy-attitude congruence. As a consequence, the revisions replaces all causal expressions such as influences, causes, and shapes, and embracements, with several of the following congruence languages: consistent with, coverges with, compatible with, etc. The locations of these revisions can be seen in the following: 1. Abstract: Background Acknowledging that past studies on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have focused on elite and state-centric viewpoints, this study centers on people\u2019s perspectives. The case of Brunei Darussalam, as one of the region\u2019s smallest nations, reveals unique elements in the interaction between public opinion and foreign policy. Given the Sultanate\u2019s consistent stance on closer ties with the regional organization, as evidenced by the positive responses during its ASEAN chairmanship in 2021, do the Brunei public hold similar views? Methods To reveal Brunei\u2019s perceptions vis-&agrave;-vis ASEAN and explore the relationship between those views and the Sultanate\u2019s ASEAN policies, this qualitative case study examines the applicability of Boucher\u2019s 2024 analytical framework of the \u2018top-down\u2019 approach-under which elite and public positions are expected to converge-to assess the degree of policy-attitude congruence in Brunei. It utilizes the secondary survey data published in the State of Southeast Asia 2025. It utilizes the survey report published in the State of Southeast Asia 2025. Results This study reveals consistency between Brunei respondent\u2019s perceptions with that of the Sultan in the following areas: 1) Measures to enhance ASEAN\u2019s resilience; 2) How ASEAN should respond to the Myanmar Issue and the South China Sea dispute; 3) Questions of alignment amid the great power rivalries influencing the Southeast Asian region; and 4) Perceptions of trust. Conclusions The alignment between the Brunei respondents\u2019 perceptions of ASEAN and the Sultan\u2019s implemented policies reveals a consistent pattern of congruence between elite and public positions on foreign policy matters, a pattern compatible with Boucher\u2019s top-down framework. 2. Last paragraph of section 1: To claim the consistency between the views of the Brunei elites and the public, this study utilizes the publicly available data from the \u2018State of Southeast Asia 2025\u2019 survey report, published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. In this case, the survey includes elites and the informed public, allowing this study to generalize arguments based on the views of those directly involved in the discourse on Brunei and China. The survey provides answers to how Brunei respondents view ASEAN in general, ASEAN\u2019s role in contemporary regional challenges, questions on ASEAN\u2019s potential alignment, and the way forward for the regional organization ( Seah et al., 2025). Using this dataset, this study is able to isolate how Brunei respondents view the regional organization in 2025 and examine the extent to which these preferences are congruent with Brunei\u2019s ASEAN policies during and after its ASEAN chairmanship in 2021. Important to note here is that the respondents in the ISEAS survey represent elements from academia, government, regional organizations, NGOs\/media, as well as the private sector, which are more informed populations of Brunei (rather than the overall population). Furthermore, to argue the alignment of views between Brunei\u2019s informed public and the Sultan, policy documents of Brunei, speeches, and general indication of alignment preferences through primary documents are considered in this study. 3. Paragraph 6 of Section 3: Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this study to assert which model would be most favorable for explaining the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy in the context of Brunei vis-&agrave;-vis ASEAN. The discussion will therefore first focus on how the top-down model, understood here as a pattern of policy-attitude congruence rather than demonstrated causal transmission, best explains Brunei respondents\u2019 perceptions. However, it will also acknowledge the potential for citizens\u2019 views to influence the Brunei elite\u2019s perceptions of ASEAN. The arguments presented in this article also consider the highly restricted nature of Brunei\u2019s information flow, in which accessible information would tend to be based on the Sultan\u2019s preferences. 4. First paragraph of section 4: There is no doubt that Brunei elites view ASEAN with great importance; however, does a similar perception exist among the Brunei people, as represented by the informed public? This section first examines Brunei\u2019s public perceptions, focusing on the dataset of Brunei respondents that this study retrieved from the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute\u2019s State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025. After revealing those insights, the analytical framework of Boucher\u2019s interactive relationship between public opinion and foreign policy is adopted to examine the extent to which the Brunei respondents\u2019 perceptions of ASEAN correspond with elite positions. 5. Title of Section 4.2: Congruence with elite positions: Policy documents and the Sultan\u2019s ASEAN record 6. Paragraph 2, section 4.2: One of the first questions asked of Brunei respondents was what they perceived as the main concerns they had regarding ASEAN. Unsurprisingly, the majority of respondents expressed concern about great power rivalries and the need for ASEAN to enhance its resilience. Nevertheless, on the question of how ASEAN should strengthen its resilience, Brunei respondents voted for ASEAN to focus on increasing intra-regional trade and investment. One way of interpreting this view is the Sultan\u2019s introduction of \n<i>Wawasan Brunei 2035<\/i>. The grand strategy acknowledges that for too long, Brunei Darussalam has been dependent on its hydrocarbon resources ( Slesman and Baha, 2023; Teja, 2024; CEIC, 2025). Therefore, moving forward, the Sultan is seeking ways to develop sustainable economic measures and diversify the economy ( CSPS, 2022; Koh, 2024; Jetin and Khalid, 2025), a vision whose economic priorities correspond with those expressed by the informed public of Brunei. However, as a small nation of approximately half a million people, Brunei has severely limited choices. Given the Brunei respondents\u2019 embrace of increased intra-regional trade, there is therefore a certain level of consistency between the Brunei respondents\u2019 voices and the Sultan\u2019s approach to diversifying the state\u2019s economy. 7. Paragraph 3, section 4.2: Specifically looking at the Brunei respondents\u2019 views on the tensions in Myanmar, how do the respondents\u2019 preferences to engage with all actors in Myanmar correspond with Brunei\u2019s own diplomatic conduct? Back in 2021, during Brunei\u2019s ASEAN chair, Brunei\u2019s role was pivotal in the conclusion of the \u2018Five-Point Consensus.\u2019 The consensus reflected ASEAN\u2019s interests in responding to the Myanmar crisis, calling for an immediate end to violence, acceptance of humanitarian aid, dialogue with all involved conflicting parties, and allowing the ASEAN envoy to visit Myanmar ( Thuzar &amp; Seah, 2022; APHR, 2023; Aung, 2023; Tene, 2024). Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, at that time, also expressed his willingness to mediate among all parties concerned, which was welcomed by the NUG ( Bandial, 2021). Therefore, when asked four years later about their opinion on how to respond to the Myanmar crisis, the Brunei respondents aligned on the need to engage the NUG to facilitate diverse interests and views in working toward a solution to the situation. Within the same question, only a slight minority answered that ASEAN should not do anything (4.7%) ( Seah et al., 2025), which further shows the public\u2019s opinions in 2025 to be consistent with the Sultan\u2019s ASEAN approach and policies back in 2021. The unique position embraced by the Sultan is related to the vast discourses on issues related to ASEAN\u2019s power limitations, especially within the context of human rights in Southeast Asia. 8. Last paragraph of section 4: These explanations suggest that elite perceptions and policies are consistent with, and precede, the corresponding Brunei public perceptions, though the cross-sectional survey data used here cannot establish the direction of causality between the two. Nevertheless, there is also the potential to argue that an interactive relationship exists between public opinion and foreign policy, in which both variables influence one another ( Sobel, 2001; Soroka &amp; Wlezien, 2004). Testing such a possibility is beyond the scope of the present data. Brunei Darussalam is an absolute monarchy, which suggests that public opinion\u2019s influence on policymaking is likely limited, and it is not possible to verify this claim in a closed state like Brunei with the data available. Consequently, this study argues that a top-down framework of congruence-rather than a demonstrated causal transmission-is the most defensible reading of the relations identified here. Establishing whether elite views actually cause public preferences, and through what mechanism, would require future studies using longitudinal data or a research design on systematic process tracing. 9. Last paragraph of section 5: Nevertheless, the analytical framework used to assess Brunei\u2019s foreign policy preferences here comes with its limitations. The most prominent is that the survey reports considered take the views of screened elites and the informed public. Therefore, it does not have the capacity to generalize the overall views of the Brunei public, as it can only argue on the basis of alignment and consistency of views between the respondents who are Bruneian nationals and elites. Second, it also acknowledges that there is room to interpret that the Sultanate\u2019s foreign policy directions are influenced by other factors that are well elaborated within the small state, economic dependence, regional identity, media environment, and regionalization norm literature. However, this article is beyond the scope to argue each alternative explanation, primarily because it is a case study. Relatedly, because the survey data are cross-sectional and were collected independently of any measure of respondents\u2019 exposure to elite communication, this study can establish congruence between public and elite positions but cannot, on this evidence alone, establish that elite views caused those public positions; confirming a causal transmission mechanism would require a longitudinal data or process tracing, which we identify as a priority for future research   \n<b>Comment 2<\/b>:&nbsp;The dependent variable, as currently conceptualized, does not accurately represent 'Brunei public opinion.' This issue must be addressed. The sampling design presents a fundamental construct-validity problem. Respondents were selected based on their knowledge and interest, encompassing government officials, regional-organization personnel, academics, media\/NGO representatives, and business respondents. These individuals can be characterized as informed, policy-attentive, or elite-adjacent, but they do not constitute a representative sample of Brunei's population. More critically, some respondents categorized under the 'public' side of the theoretical framework are themselves members of government or policy-oriented elites. This situation introduces potential contamination between the purported independent variable\u2014elite preferences\u2014and the dependent variable\u2014public opinion. Such overlap may artificially enhance the perceived convergence between elite and public views. The authors acknowledge the limitation of representativeness in the conclusion, noting that the survey cannot be generalized to the broader Brunei public. However, this acknowledgment is belated and not consistently reflected throughout the paper. Section headings such as 'How Brunei citizens view ASEAN,&quot;\\' along with terms like 'Brunei people' and 'Brunei public opinion, remain overly broad. The terminology should be standardized throughout as 'Brunei respondents,' 'Brunei's informed public,' or 'policy-attentive respondents.' If affiliation-level data are available, a more robust analysis would involve distinguishing between government and non-government respondents. This approach would directly address the theoretical distinction between elite and non-elite attitudes.  Response: We acknowledge the issue raised by the reviewer, and agree that the terminologies of Brunei public, Brunei people, and Brunei citizens need to be changed to Brunei respondents or Brunei\u2019s informed\/policy-attentive public. The revisions covers this concern, in addition to clarifications provided on the respondents and their background occupations. Nevertheless, the revisions provided below does not engage on the reviewer\u2019s suggestion to disaggregate government from non-government respondents, because the survey assessed in this article only publishes aggregate, national-level percentages. The revisions: 1. First sentences of the abstract: Background Acknowledging that past studies on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have focused on elite and state-centric viewpoints, this study centers on people\u2019s perspectives. The case of Brunei Darussalam, as one of the region\u2019s smallest nations, reveals unique elements in the interaction between public opinion and foreign policy. Given the Sultanate\u2019s consistent stance on closer ties with the regional organization, as evidenced by the positive responses during its ASEAN chairmanship in 2021, does Brunei\u2019s informed public hold similar views? 2. Last paragraph of section 1: Important to note here is that the respondents in the ISEAS survey represent elements from academia, government, regional organizations, NGOs\/media, as well as the private sector, which are more informed populations of Brunei (rather than the overall population). Such a limitation is important to acknowledge, as this study frames the respondents as informed public citizens or a policy-attentive public, rather than a general representation of the Brunei people. Furthermore, to argue the alignment of views between Brunei\u2019s informed public and the Sultan, policy documents of Brunei, speeches, and general indications of alignment preferences through primary documents are considered in this study. Accordingly, this study is designed to assess policy-attitude congruence between Brunei\u2019s informed public and the Sultanate\u2019s ASEAN policy record, not to establish a causal transmission-based relationship between the two. This is in consideration of the nature of the ISEAS survey data, which does not make it feasible for inference about the direction of causality. 3. Last paragraph of section 3: In doing so, this discussion section is structured as follows. First, it aims to reveal how the informed public perceives the significance of ASEAN across different questions and elements related to Southeast Asian regional dynamics. Bruneian people perceive the significance of ASEAN across different questions and elements related to Southeast Asian regional dynamics. Understanding these perceptions is done through the use of published data from the State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025, specifically focusing on Brunei respondents\u2019 answers. Several questions focus on Brunei respondents\u2019 perceptions of ASEAN amid international developments, how ASEAN responds to major powers\u2019 regional influence, and ASEAN\u2019s position in the US-China rivalry. After that, it offers a top-down model that focuses on the thesis that Brunei\u2019s elites\u2019 foreign policy preferences are aligned with the perceptions of the Brunei respondents, primarily through events during Brunei\u2019s ASEAN chairmanship in 2021. Elite perceptions, in the context of Brunei, are defined as the policies undertaken by the nation as a whole, without distinguishing between those of different ministries. As an absolute monarchy, the expectation is that differences of opinion are near non-existent, and that Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is the driving force of how Brunei should act in relation to ASEAN. 4. Section title change: 4. How Brunei\u2019s informed public view ASEAN 5. First two sentences of section 4: There is no doubt that Brunei elites view ASEAN with great importance; however, does a similar perception exist among Brunei\u2019s informed public? This section first examines the perceptions of Brunei respondents retrieved from the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute\u2019s State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025. 6. Last paragraph of section 4.1: The data presented in this section show several unique patterns in how Brunei\u2019s informed public views ASEAN. Amid international developments, trust, and the strategic rivalries shaping Southeast Asia, respondents' views seem to converge strongly with those of the Sultanate. As the next section will show through Boucher\u2019s top-down analytical framework, Brunei\u2019s informed public opinion in 2025 converges with the Sultan\u2019s strategic views on ASEAN, expectations, and future projections. This is evident in the Sultanate\u2019s recent policies, including during Brunei\u2019s ASEAN chairmanship in 2021, which clearly reflected the Sultan\u2019s priorities and views on ASEAN. 7. Paragraph 10, section 4.2: Lastly, one can also draw on the interactive relationship between the respondents\u2019 opinions and the elite\u2019s decided policies and perceptions, based on how Brunei\u2019s informed public perceives where ASEAN should position itself amid the US-China strategic rivalry in Southeast Asia. As seen in the 2025 survey report, the majority of respondents chose the option that ASEAN should enhance its capacity to counter pressures from the major powers. The second option was that Brunei respondents chose that ASEAN should not side with China or the US. In the responses, another consistency emerges that aligns with the top-down analytical framework. Some arguments state that Brunei is hedging with the US and China (simultaneously), which shows that Brunei does not wish to side with one power to counter the other ( Husseini, 2023). As the Sultan\u2019s position during the 2021 Brunei chairmanship of ASEAN, the critical part for ASEAN is to enhance its capabilities and make it relevant to Asia Pacific geopolitics through measures as stipulated in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific ( Acharya, 2019; ASEAN, 2019; Singh &amp; Tsjeng, 2020).  \n<b>Comment 3<\/b>:&nbsp;The methodology section necessitates a dedicated and significantly more transparent presentation. Currently, methodological details are dispersed across the introduction and analytical sections, rather than being consolidated into a reproducible research design. The article identifies itself as a qualitative case study; however, much of its empirical evidence comprises secondary descriptive survey percentages. Consequently, the manuscript should include a distinct Methods\/Research Design section that specifies: -&nbsp;the rationale for selecting Brunei as a case study, whether the study is theory-testing, theory-probing, or&nbsp;interpretive. - the specific survey materials from 2024 and 2025 utilized. -&nbsp;the number of respondents from Brunei. - the procedures for survey sampling and weighting. - the reasons for selecting particular survey questions. - the operationalization of elite preference. - the speeches, government documents, and policy actions that form the elite-policy corpus. - and the analytical criteria used to classify survey responses as aligned, partly aligned, or not aligned.  This is particularly crucial because the paper defines elite perceptions as policies enacted by the nation as a whole and presumes minimal ministerial differences due to the political system. This presumption is an empirical assumption rather than a methodological fact and thus requires justification rather than being inherently integrated into the operationalization.  Response: Unfortunately, this isn\u2019t the approach taken by the authors. Although the main data is from survey materials, the ultimate goal is to provide a theory-proving qualitative case study that allows the interpretation of Boucher\u2019s 2024 top-down model to be assessed within the context of Brunei. We did have the option of making a dedicated methodology section, however, we risk using the same materials of what has been published by the survey reports, including a sub-section on case selection, study design, survey materials, sample, weighting, selection of survey questions, etc. Therefore, rather than a dedicated methods section, we focus our third section on the implementation of the framework, not the duplication of the survey\u2019s methods. If there is something that lacks clarity with how we described the research design in the first section, please do inform us.  \n<b>Comment 4<\/b>:&nbsp;The analysis is susceptible to confirmation bias, as evidence of correspondence is selected and interpreted post hoc. This issue must be addressed. The manuscript typically commences with a respondent preference and subsequently identifies a government policy that can be broadly interpreted as consistent with this preference. This approach complicates the falsification of the top-down proposition. A more rigorous methodology would involve a transparent analytical matrix, including columns such as: survey question, year, respondent result, predicted elite position, documentary evidence for that elite position, expected direction of congruence, observed congruence, contradictory evidence, and interpretation. Additionally, the paper should examine non-congruent cases rather than solely interpreting convergence. For instance, the discussion on the South China Sea highlights Brunei's traditionally 'muted' stance, while respondents appear to support more decisive ASEAN action. The manuscript subsequently interprets these positions as consistent by adopting a broader rule-of-law framework. While this may ultimately be defensible, the analytical criteria must be established prior to observing the result. Otherwise, almost any position can be reframed as alignment.  Response: We agree with this comment. The revisions first looked to make classification criteria before providing the findings, and made some specific changes on the framing of several case studies: 1. Paragraph 2, section 4: The classifications of aligned, partly aligned, or not aligned are made in the reading of the survey results. It is considered aligned when a leading response option matches the direction of a specific elite position. Meanwhile, it is considered partially aligned when the elite position diverges in terms of emphasis or degree. Lastly, it is interpreted as not aligned when the leading response option of the informed public opinion contradicts the documented elite position. These indicators are applied consistently across the case studies. 2, paragraphs 4-5, section 4.2: Brunei\u2019s documented history as a \u2018muted\u2019 or \u2018silent\u2019 claimant in the South China Sea (2024; Kurniati, Laksono &amp; Aulia, 2025; Sands, 2026) suggests an elite preference for low-key, non-confrontational diplomacy rather than deterrence-oriented rhetoric. This is ofcourse puzzling, considering the recurring intrusions by Chinese law enforcement vessels into Brunei\u2019s claimed waters (Elleman, 2017; Hart, 2018; Jacques, 2018; Druce &amp; Julay, 2019). &nbsp;The 2025 results only partly match this. Most informed Brunei respondents favored ASEAN taking a more principled stance in upholding international law (63.1%) and deterring aggressive behavior (54.4%). Nevertheless, we note but do not use this to explain the mismatch away, that the survey\u2019s response options were skewed toward decisive framings, which is a measurement limitation that argues for caution rather than a basis for still asserting congruence. Respondents\u2019 support for the Code of Conduct (29.8%) is one item that does converge with a specific, sustained element of Brunei\u2019s documented conduct: its continuous diplomatic investment in concluding the CoC ( Espena &amp; Uy, 2020; Hayat, 2021; IRSEA, 2021) and its general disposition to frame the dispute in legal rather than military terms. Brunei\u2019s joint exercises with the US ( Wilson, 2024; Nguyen, 2025) show its conduct is not purely passive, but these exercises are not accompanied by the kind of public deterrence rhetoric the survey\u2019s leading response options imply. That said, the most plausible criteria for classifying the South China Sea case are partly aligned and not aligned. The evidence supports congruence on the narrower claim that Brunei\u2019s informed public and the Sultanate favor a rule-of-law-based, CoC-oriented resolution, but not the broader claim that public and elite convergence exists on how assertively ASEAN or Brunei should act. 3. paragraph 8 added, section 4.2: Consequently, we categorize the convergence of economic interests as partially aligned rather than fully aligned. The public\u2019s high trust in China is congruent with the economic convergence between the two states\u2019 grand strategies. However, China\u2019s own law enforcement intrusions into Brunei\u2019s claimed waters sit in direct tension with that same public trust. 4. Section 4.2 (the second last paragraph): Interestingly, several questions in the 2025 survey report asked about the potential alignment of ASEAN if the regional organization were forced to choose one side. Regarding whom they would prefer to align with between the US and China, the majority of Brunei respondents chose China, with 55.0% of votes ( Seah et al., 2025). Meanwhile, as seen in Table 4 below, in a scenario where ASEAN had to seek the help of a third party to hedge against the US-China strategic rivalry, there was a mix of responses, without a definitive actor the Bruneians perceived as dominant. This is reflected in the votes for the European Union (24.8%) and Japan (24.8%), which are close to those for other countries, including Australia (13.4%), the United Kingdom (12.8%), and India (16.8%). Unfortunately, there is no documented Sultanate preference for any specific third party on this question. Therefore, applying the criteria leads to the conclusion that the case is not aligned because it lacks a comparable elite position. 5. Section 5 (the second last paragraph added): Nevertheless, not every finding in this study supports the top-down reading equally. On the South China Sea and major-power trust concerns, the findings are classified as partly aligned rather than aligned. In addition, third-party hedging is difficult to place within the three specified categories, as no comparable elite position exists.  \n<b>Comment 5<\/b>:&nbsp;Alternative explanations necessitate analytical evaluation rather than mere acknowledgment. The conclusion identifies potential alternative explanations, including small-state characteristics, economic dependence, regional identity, media environment, and regionalization norms. While this inclusion is commendable, relegating these alternatives to future research is inadequate if the article's primary aim is to establish the explanatory value of a specific model. The discussion should, at a minimum, consider whether the observed attitudes are equally consistent with competing explanations. For example, support for ASEAN might stem from small-state security logic, positive attitudes toward China could be attributed to material economic relations, support for hedging might result from structural pressures rather than elite cueing, and ASEAN-oriented attitudes could be a product of long-term regional socialization. Although the authors are not required to test every conceivable theory, they must demonstrate why the evidence more strongly supports the proposed interpretation over obvious alternatives.  Response: We agree with this suggestion and have responded to them in the conclusion section. It acknowledges the alternative explanations. The revisions (last two paragraphs of the article): The analytical framework used to assess Brunei\u2019s foreign policy preferences here comes with its limitations. The most prominent is that the survey reports considered take the views of screened elites and the informed public. Therefore, it does not have the capacity to generalize the overall views of the Brunei public, as it can only argue on the basis of alignment and consistency of views between the respondents who are Bruneian nationals and elites. Second, it acknowledges that the Sultanate\u2019s foreign policy directions may be influenced by other factors, as elaborated in the literature on small-state economics, economic dependence, regional identity, media environments, and regionalization norms. Although the explanations would not differ significantly, they do provide a different lens of interpretation to assessing Brunei\u2019s foreign policy, which considers different variables utilized in this study.   \n<b>Comment 6<\/b>:&nbsp;Quantitative interpretation requires increased caution and transparency, particularly when percentages are central to the analysis. Although formal inferential statistics are not essential for this qualitative case-study design, the manuscript treats descriptive percentages as substantively meaningful and presents comparisons between the years 2024 and 2025. For instance, Table 4 contrasts the two survey years regarding preferences for third-party hedging. Consequently, the authors should report the actual Brunei sample size for each survey year, rather than merely the 7.4% share of the overall 2025 sample. They should also clarify whether results are weighted, discuss changes in sample composition across survey years, and refrain from interpreting changes between years as substantive shifts unless comparability is established. If inferential significance is not being tested, this should be explicitly stated. Additionally, the term 'correlation' should be avoided unless an actual statistical correlation has been estimated. The conclusion currently asserts that correlations are made between economic diversification and respondents' views. More accurate terms would be correspondence, association at the interpretive level, or descriptive congruence.  Response: We agree that the actual Brunei sample sizes and the status of the year-on-year comparisons should be stated plainly. We respond this comment by making two targeted revisions, as seen below: 1. paragraph before table 2: Another group of questions in the State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025 asked Brunei respondents about the major powers\u2019 influence. In one question, they were asked which country or regional organization has the most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia. Unsurprisingly, the majority of Brunei respondents embraced a positive view towards three leading actors in 2025: ASEAN (18.1%), China (31.5%), and the US (22.8%). When specifically asked about the Brunei respondents\u2019 views on ASEAN, as seen in Table 2 below, a total of 96.3% of the Brunei respondents surveyed in 2025 expressed that they welcomed ASEAN\u2019s \u201c[\u2026] growing regional political and strategic influence,\u201d with only 3.7% choosing that they are worried about ASEAN\u2019s influence ( Seah et al., 2025, p. 35). Worthy to note is that the 2024-2025 subsample size differs by year, with 78 respondents in 2024 (3.9% of that year\u2019s total), and 150 in 2025 (7.4%). Nevertheless, neither year applies additional weighting within Brunei\u2019s own figures beyond ISEAS\u2019 equal 10% weighting of each country for ASEAN-wide averages. 2. Paragraph before table 4: Interestingly, several questions in the 2025 survey report asked about the potential alignment of ASEAN if the regional organization were forced to choose one side. Regarding whom they would prefer to align with between the US and China, the majority of Brunei respondents chose China, with 55.0% of votes ( Seah et al., 2025). Meanwhile, as seen in Table 4 below, in a scenario where ASEAN had to seek the help of a third party to hedge against the US-China strategic rivalry, there was a mix of responses, without a definitive actor the Bruneians perceived as dominant. This is reflected in the votes for the European Union (24.8%) and Japan (24.8%), which are close to those for other countries, including Australia (13.4%), the United Kingdom (12.8%), and India (16.8%). As with Table 2, these 2024-2025 figures are reported descriptively, not as a tested or substantive shift. Unfortunately, there is no documented Sultanate preference for any specific third party on this question. Therefore, applying the criteria leads to the conclusion that the case is not aligned because it lacks a comparable elite position. 3. Paragraph 3, section 5: This study reveals the Brunei respondents and shows a strong alignment between the Sultan\u2019s past ASEAN perspectives and approaches and the actual perceptions embraced by the respondents. Regarding how Brunei respondents perceived several international developments, for example, Brunei identified intra-regional trade and investment as an area it should focus on. This reflects a descriptive correspondence between the Sultan\u2019s recent efforts to diversify Brunei\u2019s economy and how respondents perceive areas where ASEAN can benefit from further expansion, rather than a statistical correlation in the technical sense. &nbsp;&nbsp;Furthermore, the Sultan\u2019s 2021 engagements with Myanmar, which led to the eventual \u2018Five-Point Consensus\u2019 that same year, also resonated in public perceptions, which called for active dialogue with all relevant stakeholders in Myanmar\u2019s internal conflicts, including the NUG.  \n<b>Comment 7<\/b>:&nbsp;Reproducibility is currently incomplete and requires attention. The Data Availability Statement includes links to the 2024 and 2025 ISEAS survey reports, which are beneficial but inadequate for ensuring full reproducibility of the manuscript's analysis. The authors should clearly specify whether they extracted aggregate country percentages or accessed individual-level data. Furthermore, they should provide a supplementary evidence table detailing each survey item utilized, the specific report page or table from which it was sourced, every policy document or speech used as evidence of the Sultanate's position, and the criteria by which the two sets of evidence were compared. In the absence of such an audit trail, while another researcher may reproduce the percentages, they cannot reliably replicate the interpretive finding of 'alignment.'  Response: data availability statement revised. However, this section does not permit the display of tables. All survey figures used in this study are aggregate, country-level percentages taken from the published reports that can be accessed online:  \n<b>1.<\/b> The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report ( Seah et al., 2024): https:\/\/www.iseas.edu.sg\/centres\/asean-studies-centre\/state-of-southeast-asia-survey\/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2024-survey-report\/ \n<b>2.<\/b> The State of Southeast Asia 2025 Survey Report ( Seah et al., 2025): https:\/\/www.iseas.edu.sg\/centres\/asean-studies-centre\/state-of-southeast-asia-survey\/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2025-survey-report\/   \n<b>Comment 8<\/b>: The literature review is notably comprehensive, integrating established scholarship on public opinion and foreign policy with recent studies on Brunei, ASEAN, great-power rivalry, and regional developments. The manuscript employs the recent Boucher 2024 framework as its theoretical foundation. Consequently, the age of the literature is not perceived as a significant limitation. Nonetheless, the hierarchy of evidence requires enhancement. Peer-reviewed scholarship and official primary documents should bear the primary analytical responsibility. While media reports and think-tank commentary provide valuable context, they should not replace systematic evidence in determining the Sultanate's policy preferences or the causal mechanisms. Additionally, the abstract contains a statement where the term 'bottom-down model' is used, although 'bottom-up' is evidently intended.  Response: We agree with this comment, and revised the last paragraph of section 3: In the Brunei context, elite perceptions are defined as the policies undertaken by the nation as a whole, without distinguishing between different ministries. As an absolute monarchy, the expectation is that differences of opinion are nearly non-existent and that Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah drives how Brunei should act in relation to ASEAN. Therefore, in establishing the Sultanate\u2019s documented positions in ASEAN, the main documents considered are primary sources such as the Sultan\u2019s statements, Brunei government and ASEAN documents, and official policy records. Meanwhile, news reporting and think tank reports are used only to corroborate factual details or provide context and characterizations of events (not as the sole basis for establishing the Sultanate\u2019s policy preferences).","URL":"https:\/\/f1000research.com\/articles\/15-633\/v2#referee-comment-17183","order":4,"name":"referee-comment-17183","label":"Referee Comment","group":{"name":"article-reports","label":"Article Reports"}},{"value":"The author(s) declared that no grants were involved in supporting this work","order":5,"name":"grant-information","label":"Grant Information"},{"value":"This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.","order":0,"name":"copyright-info","label":"Copyright"}]}}