{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,12,5]],"date-time":"2025-12-05T09:46:01Z","timestamp":1764927961376,"version":"3.46.0"},"reference-count":42,"publisher":"Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)","issue":"12","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Management Science"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2025,12]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>This paper presents an empirical model of sponsored search auctions where advertisers are ranked by bid and ad quality. Our model is developed under the \u201cincomplete information\u201d setting with a general quality scoring rule. We establish nonparametric identification of the advertiser\u2019s valuation and its distribution given observed bids and introduce novel nonparametric estimators. Using Yahoo! search auction data, we estimate value distributions and study the bidding behavior across product categories. We also conduct a counterfactual analysis to evaluate the impact of different quality scoring rules on the auctioneer\u2019s revenue. Product-specific scoring rules can enhance auctioneer revenue by at most 24.3% at the expense of advertiser profit (\u221228.3%) and consumer welfare (\u221230.2%). The revenue-maximizing scoring rule depends on market competitiveness.<\/jats:p>\n                  <jats:p>This paper was accepted by Jean-Pierre Dube, marketing.<\/jats:p>\n                  <jats:p>Funding: This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada under the Insight Development Grant [Grant 430-2022-00841] to D. Kim.<\/jats:p>\n                  <jats:p>Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1287\/mnsc.2023.02052 .<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2023.02052","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,4,15]],"date-time":"2025-04-15T10:43:53Z","timestamp":1744713833000},"page":"10047-10066","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Nonparametric Estimation of Sponsored Search Auctions and Impact of Ad Quality on Search Revenue"],"prefix":"10.1287","volume":"71","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-2327-6926","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Dongwoo","family":"Kim","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6, Canada"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4882-1292","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Pallavi","family":"Pal","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Business, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey 07030"}]}],"member":"109","reference":[{"key":"B1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/isre.2016.0637"},{"key":"B2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2014.2033"},{"key":"B3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1756-2171.2008.00004.x"},{"key":"B4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1093\/qje\/qjr028"},{"key":"B5","unstructured":"Athey S, Nekipelov D (2010) A structural model of sponsored search advertising auctions.\n                      Sixth Ad Auctions Workshop\n                      , 15:5."},{"key":"B6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ijindorg.2018.10.006"},{"key":"B7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1756-2171.2011.00143.x"},{"key":"B8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA12423"},{"key":"B9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/mic.5.4.163"},{"key":"B10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2014.04.010"},{"key":"B11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Charles D, Devanur NR, Sivan B (2016) Multi-score position auctions.\n                      Proc. 9th ACM Internat. 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