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We show that when bidders are ex ante heterogeneous, a second-price auction with an optimally chosen flexible reserve price not only generates strictly higher expected revenue than that of a second-price auction with any fixed reserve price but is also revenue-maximizing among all mechanisms that implement discrimination-free social choice functions. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of all second-price auctions with a flexible reserve price. Finally, we discuss real-life implementation.<\/jats:p>\n                  <jats:p>This paper was accepted by Martin Bichler, behavioral economics and decision analysis.<\/jats:p>\n                  <jats:p>Funding: This work was supported by Oesterreichische Nationalbank [Grant 19021] and the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72203148].<\/jats:p>\n                  <jats:p>Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1287\/mnsc.2024.04584 .<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2024.04584","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,7,22]],"date-time":"2025-07-22T12:39:34Z","timestamp":1753187974000},"page":"2267-2283","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Optimal Discrimination-Free Auctions"],"prefix":"10.1287","volume":"72","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-4269-3063","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Bo","family":"Chen","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"College of Economics, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518060, China"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-1292-0344","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Dmitriy","family":"Knyazev","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"109","reference":[{"key":"B1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/opre.2020.0651"},{"key":"B2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jet.2020.105091"},{"key":"B3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2019.3459"},{"key":"B4","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3982\/QE1781"},{"key":"B5","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-937X.00139"},{"key":"B6","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1007\/s00355-011-0535-4"},{"key":"B7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.1110.0534"},{"key":"B8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA8882"},{"key":"B9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/0002828043052330"},{"key":"B10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/1467-937X.00140"},{"key":"B11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jmateco.2017.11.007"},{"key":"B12","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2014.2022"},{"key":"B13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.2014.0645"},{"key":"B14","unstructured":"Bergemann D, Breuer K, Cramton P, Hirsch J, Ndiaye, J, Ockenfels A (2025) Soft-floor auctions: Harnessing regret to improve efficiency and revenue. 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