{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,5,8]],"date-time":"2026-05-08T09:10:33Z","timestamp":1778231433483,"version":"3.51.4"},"reference-count":29,"publisher":"Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)","issue":"2","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Mathematics of OR"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026,5]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>A randomized selection mechanism returns a probability distribution over individuals based on mutual nominations among them; it is impartial if the selection probability of each individual is independent of the nominations they cast and [Formula: see text]-optimal if the expected number of nominations received by the selected individual is always at least [Formula: see text] times that received by any individual. When individuals can cast multiple nominations, the permutation mechanism is [Formula: see text]-optimal, and this is the best possible. We show that the permutation mechanism does not provide the best possible factor in the natural situation when individuals cast exactly one nomination. Specifically, we provide a tight analysis of the permutation mechanism showing that it is [Formula: see text]-optimal in this case, and we design a new mechanism that is [Formula: see text]-optimal for [Formula: see text]. We further prove that no impartial mechanism can be better than [Formula: see text]-optimal.<\/jats:p>\n                  <jats:p>Funding: This research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Grant 431465007] and by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council [Grant EP\/T015187\/1].<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1287\/moor.2024.0431","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,6,4]],"date-time":"2025-06-04T12:22:11Z","timestamp":1749039731000},"page":"1486-1513","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection"],"prefix":"10.1287","volume":"51","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-4389-1398","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Javier","family":"Cembrano","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Algorithms and Complexity, Max Planck Institute for Informatics, 66123 Saarbr\u00fccken, Germany; and Institute of Mathematics, Technische Universit\u00e4t Berlin, 10623 Berlin, Germany"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-8403-9273","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Felix","family":"Fischer","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"School of Mathematical Sciences, Queen Mary University of London, London E1 4NS, United Kingdom"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-9061-2267","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Max","family":"Klimm","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Institute of Mathematics, Technische Universit\u00e4t Berlin, 10623 Berlin, Germany"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"109","reference":[{"key":"B1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Alon N, Fischer F, Procaccia A, Tennenholtz M (2011) Sum of us: Strategyproof selection from the selectors. 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