{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,9]],"date-time":"2026-03-09T09:53:13Z","timestamp":1773049993529,"version":"3.50.1"},"reference-count":41,"publisher":"Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)","issue":"2","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["M&amp;SOM"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>Problem definition: We examine how market and economic factors influence the occurrence of forced labor in supply chains and how buying companies can develop optimal contracts to prevent forced labor in the presence of information asymmetry between the buyer and the agent. Methodology\/results: We develop a game-theoretic model of a labor supply chain comprising a socially aware buyer and a profit-maximizing labor agent. Our equilibrium analysis shows that the audit cost affects the extent to which the buyer can extract surplus from the agent. In the asymmetric information case, we design a menu of contracts and show that the difference in the agent\u2019s earnings dictates how an unconstrained optimal contract can be adjusted to be incentive compatible. Our result suggests that it is optimal for the buyer to leave a surplus to agents with high recruitment capability (measured in terms of the labor pool size) regardless of the audit cost. As we extend our analysis to the multiagent case, we develop a \u201csequential\u201d menu of contracts that ensures no coercion and maximum buyer profit. We apply our model to a data set of labor agents for recruiting foreign agricultural workers in the United States. Managerial implications: To implement incentive-compatible contracts that deter coercive labor outcomes, the buyer may need to allocate informational rents to the agent by foregoing a portion of its surplus. We find that information asymmetry regarding the agent\u2019s true recruitment capability necessitates that the buyer offers a \u201cmenu of contracts\u201d to prevent the risk of forced labor. This menu benefits exactly one type of agent, depending on the earnings differential between the available contracts, but always leaves a financial surplus for agents with strong recruitment capabilities. When multiple potential agents are available, the buyer can employ a reverse auction mechanism to select one agent. Though the core insights from contracting with a single agent continue to apply, their impact diminishes as the number of potential agents grows.<\/jats:p>\n                  <jats:p>Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1287\/msom.2023.0438 .<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.2023.0438","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2025,12,17]],"date-time":"2025-12-17T16:57:16Z","timestamp":1765990636000},"page":"643-662","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Forced Labor in Labor Supply Chains: Contracting and Information Asymmetry"],"prefix":"10.1287","volume":"28","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-1476-6181","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Felix","family":"Papier","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Information, Data & Operations Department, ESSEC Business School, 95021 Cergy, France"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-9597-7620","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Christopher","family":"Tang","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-8530-5601","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Javaiz","family":"Parappathodi","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Department of Management, University of Sussex Business School, Brighton BN1 9SL, United Kingdom"}],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"109","reference":[{"key":"B1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.3982\/ECTA8963"},{"key":"B2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.1110.0366"},{"issue":"3","key":"B3","first-page":"412","volume":"88","author":"Basu K","year":"1998","journal-title":"Amer. 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NBC News (October 22), https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/news\/world\/private-contractors-are-accused-abusive-labor-practices-us-military-ba-rcna52110."},{"key":"B7","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2020.3679"},{"key":"B8","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.2017.0653"},{"key":"B9","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.1070.0716"},{"key":"B10","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2016.2466"},{"key":"B11","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/poms.13849"},{"key":"B13","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.2018.0733"},{"key":"B14","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2019.3456"},{"key":"B15","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2023.4851"},{"key":"B16","unstructured":"Dreier H (2023) Alone and exploited, migrant children work brutal jobs across the U.S.\n                      New York Times\n                      (February 25), https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2023\/02\/25\/us\/unaccompanied-migrant-child-workers-exploitation.html."},{"key":"B17","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.1120.1705"},{"key":"B18","unstructured":"Fruit Growers News (2022) Forced labor of Mexican agricultural H-2A workers brings charges.\n                      Fruit Growers News\n                      (April 19), https:\/\/fruitgrowersnews.com\/news\/forced-labor-of-mexican-agricultural-h-2a-workers-brings-charges\/."},{"key":"B19","volume-title":"Game Theory","author":"Fudenberg D","year":"1991","edition":"4"},{"key":"B20","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1108\/SCM-02-2015-0046"},{"key":"B21","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.2021.1077"},{"key":"B22","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.2015.2256"},{"key":"B23","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.1070.0795"},{"key":"B24","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.2021.1063"},{"key":"B25","unstructured":"ILO (2020) ILO indicators of forced labour. Technical report, International Labour Office, Geneva."},{"key":"B26","unstructured":"ILO (2022) Global estimates of modern slavery: Forced labour and forced marriage. Technical report, International Labour Office, Geneva."},{"key":"B27","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.2019.0795"},{"key":"B28","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ejor.2022.12.028"},{"key":"B29","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ijpe.2023.108809"},{"key":"B30","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/j.ejor.2018.02.032"},{"key":"B31","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/jscm.12258"},{"key":"B32","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.2023.1196"},{"key":"B33","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.2021.0978"},{"key":"B34","unstructured":"NHTH (2025) National human trafficking hotline. Accessed June 20, 2025, https:\/\/humantraffickinghotline.org\/en\/statistics."},{"key":"B35","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.2015.0550"},{"key":"B36","unstructured":"Polaris (2022) Labor trafficking on specific temporary work visas: A data analysis 2018-2020. Technical report, Polaris, Washington, DC."},{"key":"B37","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/msom.2022.0304"},{"key":"B38","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1111\/poms.12313"},{"key":"B39","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1080\/00207543.2018.1467062"},{"key":"B40","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/mnsc.1070.0708"},{"key":"B41","unstructured":"UNODC (2015) The role of recruitment fees and abusive and fraudulent practices of recruitment agencies in trafficking in persons. Technical report, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna."},{"key":"B42","unstructured":"USDOJ (2022) Three defendants sentenced in multistate racketeering conspiracy involving forced labor of Mexican agricultural H-2A workers. 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