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In \u201cPackage Bids in Combinatorial Electricity Auctions: Selection, Welfare Losses, and Alternatives,\u201d H\u00fcbner and Hug study this selection problem and propose decision-support algorithms that optimize bid choice under uncertainty. They provide theoretical bounds on welfare loss due to bid limits and validate their methods with simulations involving generators, storage systems, and flexible demand. 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