{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,5,8]],"date-time":"2026-05-08T00:28:57Z","timestamp":1778200137256,"version":"3.51.4"},"reference-count":3,"publisher":"Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)","issue":"2","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["Operations Research"],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026,3]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>One of the key claims in the paper \u201cRobust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard\u201d by Yu and Kong (2020) is proposition 4. This proposition states that when designing the best robust contract\u2014assuming the agent\u2019s utility function is piecewise linear and concave\u2014the optimal solution involves only progressive fixed payments and linear rewards with progressive commission rates. In this note, we provide a clear counterexample backed by a detailed proof to show that this claim is actually incorrect. We further use numerical examples to demonstrate that the contract design suggested by Yu and Kong can perform significantly worse than expected. Lastly, we identify and explain the specific mistakes in their mathematical proofs that led them to this incorrect conclusion.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1287\/opre.2024.1221","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,1,22]],"date-time":"2026-01-22T16:06:02Z","timestamp":1769097962000},"page":"722-729","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Technical Note\u2014Error Noted in \u201cRobust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard\u201d by Yu and Kong (2020)"],"prefix":"10.1287","volume":"74","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0006-9712-8618","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Jingyuan","family":"Yang","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-8160-6877","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Linwei","family":"Xin","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637"}]}],"member":"109","reference":[{"key":"B1","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1257\/aer.20131159"},{"key":"B2","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1016\/S0165-4101(01)00013-1"},{"key":"B3","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","DOI":"10.1287\/opre.2020.1994"}],"container-title":["Operations Research"],"original-title":[],"language":"en","link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/pubsonline.informs.org\/doi\/pdf\/10.1287\/opre.2024.1221","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,3,20]],"date-time":"2026-03-20T08:11:47Z","timestamp":1773994307000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/pubsonline.informs.org\/doi\/10.1287\/opre.2024.1221"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026,3]]},"references-count":3,"journal-issue":{"issue":"2","published-print":{"date-parts":[[2026,3]]}},"alternative-id":["10.1287\/opre.2024.1221"],"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1287\/opre.2024.1221","relation":{},"ISSN":["0030-364X","1526-5463"],"issn-type":[{"value":"0030-364X","type":"print"},{"value":"1526-5463","type":"electronic"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026,3]]}}}