{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,8,23]],"date-time":"2026-08-23T18:20:05Z","timestamp":1787509205369,"version":"build-2736575974"},"reference-count":57,"publisher":"Public Library of Science (PLoS)","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,1,4]],"date-time":"2021-01-04T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1609718400000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100013064","name":"Key Research and Development Program of Jiangxi Province","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","award":["No.2018AAA0101100"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["No.2018AAA0101100"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100013064","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]},{"name":"the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, the International Cooperation Projectv","award":["No.2010DFR00700"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["No.2010DFR00700"]}]},{"name":"Fundamental Research of Civil Aircraft","award":["No. MJ-F-2012-04"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["No. MJ-F-2012-04"]}]},{"DOI":"10.13039\/501100004826","name":"Beijing Natural Science Foundation","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","award":["1192012, Z180005"],"award-info":[{"award-number":["1192012, Z180005"]}],"id":[{"id":"10.13039\/501100004826","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"crossref"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["www.plosone.org"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["PLoS ONE"],"abstract":"<jats:p>\n                    Prisoner\u2019s dilemma game is the most commonly used model of spatial evolutionary game which is considered as a paradigm to portray competition among selfish individuals. In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn, a strategy updating rule base on aspiration, has been proved to be an effective model to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner\u2019s dilemma game, which leads aspiration to receive lots of attention. In this paper, according to Expected Value Theory and Achievement Motivation Theory, we propose a dynamic aspiration model based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in which individual\u2019s aspiration is inspired by its payoff. It is found that dynamic aspiration has a significant impact on the evolution process, and different initial aspirations lead to different results, which are called\n                    <jats:italic>Stable Coexistence under Low Aspiration<\/jats:italic>\n                    ,\n                    <jats:italic>Dependent Coexistence under Moderate aspiration<\/jats:italic>\n                    and\n                    <jats:italic>Defection Explosion under High Aspiration<\/jats:italic>\n                    respectively. Furthermore, a deep analysis is performed on the local structures which cause defectors\u2019 re-expansion, the concept of END- and EXP-periods are used to justify the mechanism of network reciprocity in view of time-evolution, typical feature nodes for defectors\u2019 re-expansion called Infectors, Infected nodes and High-risk cooperators respectively are found. Compared to fixed aspiration model, dynamic aspiration introduces a more satisfactory explanation on population evolution laws and can promote deeper comprehension for the principle of prisoner\u2019s dilemma.\n                  <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pone.0244814","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,1,4]],"date-time":"2021-01-04T13:50:35Z","timestamp":1609768235000},"page":"e0244814","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1371\/journal.pone.corrections_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":10,"title":["Dynamic aspiration based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in spatial prisoner\u2019s dilemma game"],"prefix":"10.1371","volume":"16","author":[{"given":"Zhenyu","family":"Shi","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3747-9484","authenticated-orcid":true,"given":"Wei","family":"Wei","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Xiangnan","family":"Feng","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Xing","family":"Li","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Zhiming","family":"Zheng","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"340","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,1,4]]},"reference":[{"issue":"4489","key":"pone.0244814.ref001","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1390","DOI":"10.1126\/science.7466396","article-title":"The evolution of 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