{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,9,22]],"date-time":"2026-09-22T20:43:49Z","timestamp":1790109829476,"version":"4.0.1"},"reference-count":53,"publisher":"Public Library of Science (PLoS)","issue":"8","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,6]],"date-time":"2021-08-06T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1628208000000},"content-version":"vor","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/"}],"funder":[{"DOI":"10.13039\/100005156","name":"Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung","doi-asserted-by":"publisher","id":[{"id":"10.13039\/100005156","id-type":"DOI","asserted-by":"publisher"}]}],"content-domain":{"domain":["www.plosone.org"],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["PLoS ONE"],"abstract":"<jats:p>A large body of empirical evidence suggests that altruistic punishment abounds in human societies. Based on such evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting cooperation in humans and possibly other species. However, as punishment is costly, its evolution is subject to the same problem that it tries to address. To suppress this so-called second-order free-rider problem, known theoretical models on the evolution of punishment resort to one of the few established mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. This leaves the question of whether altruistic punishment can evolve and give rise to the evolution of cooperation in the absence of such auxiliary cooperation-favoring mechanisms unaddressed. Here, by considering a population of individuals who play a public goods game, followed by a public punishing game, introduced here, we show that altruistic punishment indeed evolves and promotes cooperation in the absence of a cooperation-favoring mechanism. In our model, the punishment pool is considered a public resource whose resources are used for punishment. We show that the evolution of a punishing institution is facilitated when resources in the punishment pool, instead of being wasted, are used to reward punishers when there is nobody to punish. Besides, we show that higher returns to the public resource or punishment pool facilitate the evolution of prosocial instead of antisocial punishment. We also show that an optimal cost of investment in the punishment pool facilitates the evolution of prosocial punishment. Finally, our analysis shows that being close to a physical phase transition facilitates the evolution of altruistic punishment.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1371\/journal.pone.0254860","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,6]],"date-time":"2021-08-06T13:26:38Z","timestamp":1628256398000},"page":"e0254860","update-policy":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1371\/journal.pone.corrections_policy","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":21,"title":["Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment"],"prefix":"10.1371","volume":"16","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0001-5354-9839","authenticated-orcid":true,"given":"Mohammad","family":"Salahshour","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"340","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2021,8,6]]},"reference":[{"issue":"4489","key":"pone.0254860.ref001","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1390","DOI":"10.1126\/science.7466396","article-title":"The evolution of cooperation","volume":"211","author":"R Axelrod","year":"1981","journal-title":"science"},{"issue":"5805","key":"pone.0254860.ref002","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1560","DOI":"10.1126\/science.1133755","article-title":"Five rules for the evolution of cooperation","volume":"314","author":"MA Nowak","year":"2006","journal-title":"science"},{"issue":"8","key":"pone.0254860.ref003","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"597","DOI":"10.1038\/nrmicro1461","article-title":"Social evolution theory for microorganisms","volume":"4","author":"SA West","year":"2006","journal-title":"Nature reviews microbiology"},{"issue":"7269","key":"pone.0254860.ref004","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"51","DOI":"10.1038\/nature08366","article-title":"Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies","volume":"462","author":"T. 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