{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,17]],"date-time":"2026-04-17T16:21:38Z","timestamp":1776442898644,"version":"3.51.2"},"reference-count":56,"publisher":"Walter de Gruyter GmbH","issue":"1","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2024,1,1]],"date-time":"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1704067200000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"http:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,28]]},"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n                  <jats:p>\n                    Let\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_001.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>N<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mo>=<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mi>p<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mi>q<\/m:mi>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>N=pq<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    be the product of two balanced prime numbers\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_002.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>p<\/m:mi>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>p<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    and\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_003.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>q<\/m:mi>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>q<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    . In Elkamchouchi et al. (\n                    <jats:italic>Extended RSA cryptosystem and digital signature schemes in the domain of Gaussian integers<\/jats:italic>\n                    . In: ICCS 2002. vol. 1. IEEE Computer Society; 2002. p. 91\u20135.) introduced an Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)-like cryptosystem that uses the key equation\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_004.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>e<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mi>d<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mi>k<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                            <m:mrow>\n                              <m:msup>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mi>p<\/m:mi>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mn>2<\/m:mn>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                              <\/m:msup>\n                              <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                              <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                            <\/m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                          <\/m:mrow>\n                          <m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                            <m:mrow>\n                              <m:msup>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mi>q<\/m:mi>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mn>2<\/m:mn>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                              <\/m:msup>\n                              <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                              <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                            <\/m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                          <\/m:mrow>\n                          <m:mo>=<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>ed-k\\left({p}^{2}-1)\\left({q}^{2}-1)=1<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    , instead of the classical RSA key equation\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_005.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>e<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mi>d<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mi>k<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                            <m:mrow>\n                              <m:mi>p<\/m:mi>\n                              <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                              <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                            <\/m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                          <\/m:mrow>\n                          <m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                            <m:mrow>\n                              <m:mi>q<\/m:mi>\n                              <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                              <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                            <\/m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                          <\/m:mrow>\n                          <m:mo>=<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>ed-k\\left(p-1)\\left(q-1)=1<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    . Another variant of RSA, presented in Murru and Saettone (\n                    <jats:italic>A novel RSA-like cryptosystem based on a generalization of the R\u00e9dei rational functions<\/jats:italic>\n                    . In: NuTMiC 2017. vol. 10737 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer; 2017. p. 91\u2013103), uses the key equation\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_006.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>e<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mi>d<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mi>k<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                            <m:mrow>\n                              <m:msup>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mi>p<\/m:mi>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mn>2<\/m:mn>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                              <\/m:msup>\n                              <m:mo>+<\/m:mo>\n                              <m:mi>p<\/m:mi>\n                              <m:mo>+<\/m:mo>\n                              <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                            <\/m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                          <\/m:mrow>\n                          <m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                            <m:mrow>\n                              <m:msup>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mi>q<\/m:mi>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mn>2<\/m:mn>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                              <\/m:msup>\n                              <m:mo>+<\/m:mo>\n                              <m:mi>q<\/m:mi>\n                              <m:mo>+<\/m:mo>\n                              <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                            <\/m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                          <\/m:mrow>\n                          <m:mo>=<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>ed-k\\left({p}^{2}+p+1)\\left({q}^{2}+q+1)=1<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    . Despite the authors\u2019 claims of enhanced security, both schemes remain vulnerable to adaptations of common RSA attacks. Let\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_007.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>n<\/m:mi>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>n<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    be an integer. This article proposes two families of RSA-like encryption schemes: one employs the key equation\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_008.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>e<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mi>d<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mi>k<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                            <m:mrow>\n                              <m:msup>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mi>p<\/m:mi>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mi>n<\/m:mi>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                              <\/m:msup>\n                              <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                              <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                            <\/m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                          <\/m:mrow>\n                          <m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                            <m:mrow>\n                              <m:msup>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mi>q<\/m:mi>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mi>n<\/m:mi>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                              <\/m:msup>\n                              <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                              <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                            <\/m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                          <\/m:mrow>\n                          <m:mo>=<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>ed-k\\left({p}^{n}-1)\\left({q}^{n}-1)=1<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    for\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_009.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>n<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mo>&gt;<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mn>0<\/m:mn>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>n\\gt 0<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    , while the other uses\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_010.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>e<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mi>d<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mi>k<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>[<\/m:mo>\n                            <m:mrow>\n                              <m:mrow>\n                                <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:msup>\n                                    <m:mrow>\n                                      <m:mi>p<\/m:mi>\n                                    <\/m:mrow>\n                                    <m:mrow>\n                                      <m:mi>n<\/m:mi>\n                                    <\/m:mrow>\n                                  <\/m:msup>\n                                  <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                                  <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                                <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                              <\/m:mrow>\n                              <m:mrow>\n                                <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:msup>\n                                    <m:mrow>\n                                      <m:mi>q<\/m:mi>\n                                    <\/m:mrow>\n                                    <m:mrow>\n                                      <m:mi>n<\/m:mi>\n                                    <\/m:mrow>\n                                  <\/m:msup>\n                                  <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                                  <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                                <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                              <\/m:mrow>\n                            <\/m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>]<\/m:mo>\n                          <\/m:mrow>\n                          <m:mo>\u2044<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>[<\/m:mo>\n                            <m:mrow>\n                              <m:mrow>\n                                <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mi>p<\/m:mi>\n                                  <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                                  <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                                <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                              <\/m:mrow>\n                              <m:mrow>\n                                <m:mo>(<\/m:mo>\n                                <m:mrow>\n                                  <m:mi>q<\/m:mi>\n                                  <m:mo>\u2212<\/m:mo>\n                                  <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                                <\/m:mrow>\n                                <m:mo>)<\/m:mo>\n                              <\/m:mrow>\n                            <\/m:mrow>\n                            <m:mo>]<\/m:mo>\n                          <\/m:mrow>\n                          <m:mo>=<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>ed-k\\left[\\left({p}^{n}-1)\\left({q}^{n}-1)]\/\\left[\\left(p-1)\\left(q-1)]=1<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    for\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_011.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>n<\/m:mi>\n                          <m:mo>&gt;<\/m:mo>\n                          <m:mn>1<\/m:mn>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>n\\gt 1<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    . Note that we remove the conventional assumption of primes having equal bit sizes. In this scenario, we show that regardless of the choice of\n                    <jats:inline-formula>\n                      <jats:alternatives>\n                        <jats:inline-graphic xmlns:xlink=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1999\/xlink\" xlink:href=\"graphic\/j_jmc-2024-0013_eq_012.png\"\/>\n                        <m:math xmlns:m=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/1998\/Math\/MathML\">\n                          <m:mi>n<\/m:mi>\n                        <\/m:math>\n                        <jats:tex-math>n<\/jats:tex-math>\n                      <\/jats:alternatives>\n                    <\/jats:inline-formula>\n                    , continued fraction-based attacks can still recover the secret exponent. Additionally, this work fills a gap in the literature by establishing an equivalent of Wiener\u2019s attack when the primes do not have the same bit size.\n                  <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1515\/jmc-2024-0013","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,28]],"date-time":"2024-09-28T04:22:51Z","timestamp":1727497371000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":5,"title":["A security analysis of two classes of RSA-like cryptosystems"],"prefix":"10.1515","volume":"18","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-2169-2264","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Paul","family":"Cotan","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Simion Stoilow Institute of Mathematics of the Romanian Academy , 21 Calea Grivitei , Bucharest , Romania"}]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-3953-2744","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"George","family":"Te\u015feleanu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Simion Stoilow Institute of Mathematics of the Romanian Academy , 21 Calea Grivitei , Bucharest , Romania"}]}],"member":"374","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,9,28]]},"reference":[{"key":"2025120600251248577_j_jmc-2024-0013_ref_001","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Rivest RL, Shamir A, Adleman L. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun ACM. 1978;21(2):120\u20136.","DOI":"10.1145\/359340.359342"},{"key":"2025120600251248577_j_jmc-2024-0013_ref_002","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Shamir A. RSA for paranoids. RSA Laboratories Cryptobytes. 1995;1(3):1\u20134.","DOI":"10.1016\/1353-4858(95)90160-4"},{"key":"2025120600251248577_j_jmc-2024-0013_ref_003","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Elkamchouchi H, Elshenawy K, Shaban H. Extended RSA cryptosystem and digital signature schemes in the domain of Gaussian integers. In: ICCS 2002. vol. 1. IEEE Computer Society; 2002. p. 91\u20135.","DOI":"10.1109\/ICCS.2002.1182444"},{"key":"2025120600251248577_j_jmc-2024-0013_ref_004","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","unstructured":"Murru N, Saettone FM. A novel RSA-like cryptosystem based on a generalization of the R\u00e9dei rational functions. In: NuTMiC 2017. vol. 10737 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 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