{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2023,10,31]],"date-time":"2023-10-31T08:12:40Z","timestamp":1698739960764},"reference-count":35,"publisher":"Walter de Gruyter GmbH","issue":"2","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &amp; Policy"],"abstract":"<jats:title>Abstract<\/jats:title>\n               <jats:p>This article explores the possibility of distorting the regulator\u2019s objective function as a way of overcoming the dynamic consistency problem of regulatory policy toward investment. We derive general conditions under which having the legislator distort the regulator\u2019s objective function away from social welfare allows increasing the range of parameter values for which it is possible to induce socially desirable investment. In particular, we show that when the regulator cannot commit to a regulatory policy, the legislator should give a relatively higher weight to the incumbent\u2019s profit in the regulator\u2019s objective function, if the incumbent invests, and a relatively higher weight to consumer surplus, if the incumbent does not invest.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1515\/bejeap-2013-0026","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,12]],"date-time":"2013-08-12T14:22:36Z","timestamp":1376317356000},"page":"563-594","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":1,"title":["Investment, Dynamic Consistency and the Sectoral Regulator\u2019s Objective"],"prefix":"10.1515","volume":"13","author":[{"given":"Duarte","family":"Brito","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Departamento de Ci\u00eancias Sociais Aplicadas, Faculdade de Ci\u00eancias e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Caparica, Portugal; and CEFAGE-UE, \u00c9vora, Portugal"}]},{"given":"Pedro","family":"Pereira","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Autoridade da Concorr\u00eancia, Lisboa, Portugal; and CEFAGE-UE, \u00c9vora, Portugal"}]},{"given":"Jo\u00e3o","family":"Vareda","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Autoridade da Concorr\u00eancia, Lisboa, Portugal; and CEFAGE-UE, \u00c9vora, Portugal"}]}],"member":"374","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2013,8,10]]},"reference":[{"issue":"2","key":"2023103015474452838_CIT0001_w2aab3b8e2436b1b7b1ab2b3b1Aa","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"295","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-0351.1996.tb00174.x","article-title":"Regulatory Reform in Telecommunications in Central and Eastern Europe","volume":"4","year":"1996","journal-title":"Economics of Transition"},{"issue":"5","key":"2023103015474452838_CIT0002_w2aab3b8e2436b1b7b1ab2b3b2Aa","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1176","DOI":"10.1162\/154247603770383424","article-title":"Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and 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