{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,7,21]],"date-time":"2026-07-21T10:46:15Z","timestamp":1784630775046,"version":"3.55.0"},"reference-count":210,"publisher":"Emerald","issue":"3-4","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"published-print":{"date-parts":[[2024,12,31]]},"abstract":"<jats:p>A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A key challenge addressed by contracts\u2014known in economics as moral hazard\u2014is that, absent a properly set up contract, agents might engage in actions that are not in the principal's best interest. Another common feature of contracts is limited liability, which means that payments can go only from the principal\u2014who has the deep pocket \u2014to the agents.<\/jats:p>\n                  <jats:p>With classic applications of contract theory moving online, growing in scale, and becoming more data-driven, tools from contract theory become increasingly important for incentiveaware algorithm design. At the same time, algorithm design offers a whole new toolbox for reasoning about contracts, ranging from additional tools for studying the tradeoff between simple and optimal contracts, through a language for discussing the computational complexity of contracts in combinatorial settings, to a formalism for analyzing data-driven contracts.<\/jats:p>\n                  <jats:p>This survey aims to provide a computer science-friendly introduction to the basic concepts of contract theory.We give an overview of the emerging field of \u201calgorithmic contract theory\u201d and highlight work that showcases the potential for interaction between the two areas. We also discuss avenues for future research.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1561\/0400000113","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,12,31]],"date-time":"2024-12-31T10:59:07Z","timestamp":1735642747000},"page":"211-411","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":7,"title":["Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey"],"prefix":"10.1108","volume":"16","author":[{"given":"Paul","family":"D\u00fctting","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Google Research ,","place":["Switzerland"]}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Michal","family":"Feldman","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Tel Aviv University ,","place":["Israel"]}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]},{"given":"Inbal","family":"Talgam-Cohen","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[{"name":"Tel Aviv University and Technion\u2014Israel Institute of Technology ,","place":["Israel"]}],"role":[{"vocabulary":"crossref","role":"author"}]}],"member":"140","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,12,31]]},"reference":[{"issue":"2","key":"2026040314135495200_ref001","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"181","DOI":"10.1257\/jep.25.2.181","article-title":"Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?","volume":"25","author":"Aghion","year":"2011","journal-title":"J. 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