{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2025,10,12]],"date-time":"2025-10-12T20:18:05Z","timestamp":1760300285752},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)","issue":"01","license":[{"start":{"date-parts":[[2019,7,17]],"date-time":"2019-07-17T00:00:00Z","timestamp":1563321600000},"content-version":"unspecified","delay-in-days":0,"URL":"https:\/\/www.aaai.org"}],"content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["AAAI"],"abstract":"<jats:p>In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept that retain its desirable fairness properties do exist. We study the dynamics of (Walrasian) envy-free pricing mechanisms in this environment, showing that for any such pricing mechanism, the best response dynamic starting from truth-telling converges to a pure Nash equilibrium with small loss in revenue and welfare. Moreover, we generalize these bounds to capture all the (reasonable) Nash equilibria for a large class of (monotone) pricing mechanisms. We also identify a natural mechanism, which selects the minimum Walrasian envy-free price, in which for n=2 buyers the best response dynamic converges from any starting profile. We conjecture convergence of the mechanism for any number of buyers and provide simulation results to support our conjecture.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v33i01.33011812","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2019,9,12]],"date-time":"2019-09-12T07:43:52Z","timestamp":1568274232000},"page":"1812-1819","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":2,"title":["Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-Unit Markets"],"prefix":"10.1609","volume":"33","author":[{"given":"Simina","family":"Br\u00e2nzei","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Aris","family":"Filos-Ratsikas","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"9382","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,7,17]]},"container-title":["Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/ojs.aaai.org\/index.php\/AAAI\/article\/download\/4005\/3883","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/ojs.aaai.org\/index.php\/AAAI\/article\/download\/4005\/3883","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2022,11,7]],"date-time":"2022-11-07T06:30:05Z","timestamp":1667802605000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/ojs.aaai.org\/index.php\/AAAI\/article\/view\/4005"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2019,7,17]]},"references-count":0,"journal-issue":{"issue":"01","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2019,7,23]]}},"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1609\/aaai.v33i01.33011812","relation":{},"ISSN":["2374-3468","2159-5399"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2374-3468","type":"electronic"},{"value":"2159-5399","type":"print"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2019,7,17]]}}}