{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,26]],"date-time":"2024-03-26T02:18:29Z","timestamp":1711419509906},"reference-count":0,"publisher":"Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)","issue":"9","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":["AAAI"],"abstract":"<jats:p>We consider binary group decision-making under a rich model of liquid democracy: agents submit ranked delegation options, where each option may be a function of multiple agents' votes; e.g., \"I vote yes if a majority of my friends vote yes.\" Such ballots are unravelled into a profile of direct votes by selecting one entry from each ballot so as not to introduce cyclic dependencies. We study delegation via monotonic Boolean functions, and two unravelling procedures: MinSum, which minimises the sum of the ranks of the chosen entries, and its egalitarian counterpart, MinMax. We provide complete computational dichotomies: MinSum is hard to compute (and approximate) as soon as any non-trivial functions are permitted, and polynomial otherwise; for MinMax the easiness results extend to arbitrary-arity logical ORs and ANDs taken in isolation, but not beyond. For the classic model of delegating to individual agents, we give asymptotically near-tight algorithms for carrying out the two procedures and efficient algorithms for finding optimal unravellings with the highest vote count for a given alternative. These algorithms inspire novel tie-breaking rules for the setup of voting to change a status quo. We then introduce a new axiom, which can be viewed as a variant of the participation axiom, and use algorithmic techniques developed earlier in the paper to show that it is satisfied by MinSum and a lexicographic refinement of MinMax (but not MinMax itself).<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1609\/aaai.v38i9.28853","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,25]],"date-time":"2024-03-25T10:29:10Z","timestamp":1711362550000},"page":"9918-9925","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["Unravelling Expressive Delegations: Complexity and Normative Analysis"],"prefix":"10.1609","volume":"38","author":[{"given":"Giannis","family":"Tyrovolas","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Andrei","family":"Constantinescu","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Edith","family":"Elkind","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"9382","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,24]]},"container-title":["Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence"],"original-title":[],"link":[{"URL":"https:\/\/ojs.aaai.org\/index.php\/AAAI\/article\/download\/28853\/29622","content-type":"application\/pdf","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/ojs.aaai.org\/index.php\/AAAI\/article\/download\/28853\/29623","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"text-mining"},{"URL":"https:\/\/ojs.aaai.org\/index.php\/AAAI\/article\/download\/28853\/29622","content-type":"unspecified","content-version":"vor","intended-application":"similarity-checking"}],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,25]],"date-time":"2024-03-25T10:29:10Z","timestamp":1711362550000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/ojs.aaai.org\/index.php\/AAAI\/article\/view\/28853"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,24]]},"references-count":0,"journal-issue":{"issue":"9","published-online":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,25]]}},"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1609\/aaai.v38i9.28853","relation":{},"ISSN":["2374-3468","2159-5399"],"issn-type":[{"value":"2374-3468","type":"electronic"},{"value":"2159-5399","type":"print"}],"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2024,3,24]]}}}