{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,28]],"date-time":"2026-02-28T14:10:44Z","timestamp":1772287844924,"version":"3.50.1"},"posted":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"group-title":"SSRN","reference-count":11,"publisher":"Elsevier BV","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"abstract":"<jats:p>This paper investigates how regulatory instruments affect collusion sustainability in banking within a theoretical framework where: (i) banks compete simultaneously in loan and deposit markets characterized by different degrees of product differentiation; (ii) strategic interaction occurs through an infinitely repeated game with Nash reversion strategies; and (iii) capital requirements, reserve ratios, and interbank rates alter the relative profitability of each market. We show that the impact of these instruments on collusion depends critically on relative market differentiation: the same regulatory instrument can either facilitate or hinder coordination depending on which market exhibits greater product homogeneity. This non-monotonicity implies that regulators must account for market structure when calibrating policy instruments to avoid unintended effects on competitive intensity.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.6318373","type":"posted-content","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,28]],"date-time":"2026-02-28T13:39:37Z","timestamp":1772285977000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["How Banking Regulation Affects Collusion Sustainability: A Multimarket Contact Approach"],"prefix":"10.2139","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0002-2584-4352","authenticated-orcid":true,"given":"Helder","family":"Vasconcelos","sequence":"first","affiliation":[]},{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-2971-9572","authenticated-orcid":true,"given":"Duarte","family":"Brito","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]},{"given":"Laura","family":"Prekwinkel","sequence":"additional","affiliation":[]}],"member":"78","reference":[{"issue":"6","key":"ref1","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"967","DOI":"10.1016\/S0378-4266(99)00114-4","article-title":"Bank competition and ECB's monetary policy","volume":"24","author":"F C Bagliano","year":"2000","journal-title":"Journal of Banking & Finance"},{"key":"ref2","first-page":"578","volume":"13","author":"A Banal-Esta\ufffdol","year":"2007","journal-title":"Bank Mergers and Diversi\ufffdcation: Implications for Competition Policy"},{"issue":"1","key":"ref3","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"1","DOI":"10.2307\/2555490","article-title":"Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior","volume":"21","author":"B D Bernheim","year":"1990","journal-title":"The RAND Journal of Economics"},{"key":"ref4","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1016\/j.econlet.2023.111426","article-title":"Asymmetries in banking conduct: A Cournot-Bertrand Model","volume":"233","author":"E Dalla","year":"2023","journal-title":"Economics Letters"},{"key":"ref5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"427","DOI":"10.1007\/s11293-014-9425-3","article-title":"Monetary Policy Implications on Banking Conduct and Bank Clients'Behavior","volume":"42","author":"E Dalla","year":"2014","journal-title":"Atlantic Economic Journal"},{"key":"ref6","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jeconbus.2019.02.002","article-title":"Regulation & oligopoly in banking: the role of banking and cost structure","volume":"104","author":"E Dalla","year":"2019","journal-title":"Journal of Economics and Business"},{"key":"ref7","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"37","DOI":"10.1016\/0165-1765(83)90159-3","article-title":"Duopoly Supergames with Product Di\ufffderentiation","volume":"11","author":"Deneckere","year":"1983","journal-title":"Economics Letters"},{"key":"ref8","author":"X Freixas","year":"2008","journal-title":"Microeconomics of Banking"},{"key":"ref9","volume":"250","author":"J Mathis","year":"2025","journal-title":"Corrigendum to \"Asymmetries in banking conduct: A Cournot -Bertrand model"},{"key":"ref10","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.1016\/0167-7187(92)90043-X","article-title":"Cartel stability and product di\ufffderentiation","volume":"10","author":"T Ross","year":"1992","journal-title":"International Journal of Industrial Organization"},{"key":"ref11","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"836","DOI":"10.1111\/j.1468-036X.2010.00551.x","article-title":"Banking Competition and Capital Ratios","volume":"18","author":"K Schaeck","year":"2012","journal-title":"European Financial Management"}],"container-title":[],"original-title":[],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,2,28]],"date-time":"2026-02-28T13:40:47Z","timestamp":1772286047000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.ssrn.com\/abstract=6318373"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"references-count":11,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2139\/ssrn.6318373","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"subtype":"preprint"}}