{"status":"ok","message-type":"work","message-version":"1.0.0","message":{"indexed":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,14]],"date-time":"2026-04-14T11:22:53Z","timestamp":1776165773492,"version":"3.50.1"},"posted":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"group-title":"SSRN","reference-count":13,"publisher":"Elsevier BV","content-domain":{"domain":[],"crossmark-restriction":false},"short-container-title":[],"abstract":"<jats:p>On October 10, 2025, the largest forced deleveraging event in cryptocurrency history triggered over$19 billion in liquidations across centralized and decentralized venues. During the cascade, Ethena\u2019ssynthetic dollar USDe dropped to $0.65 on Binance\u2014a 35% depeg\u2014while simultaneously tradingnear $0.99 on decentralized venues such as Curve and Uniswap. Using 1-minute candle data fromBinance\u2019s public API (4,321 candles across the event window), we document that this was not aglobal stablecoin failure but a venue-isolated depeg driven by a reflexive oracle feedback loop:Binance\u2019s pricing oracle referenced its own illiquid order book rather than deeper external pools,causing forced liquidations that further drained liquidity, which further depressed the oracle price. Weshow that during the same 12-hour window, USDC and FDUSD on the same exchange experiencedmaximum deviations of only 1.5% and 2.0% respectively\u2014stablecoins with direct mint\/redeemaccess on Binance maintained their pegs under identical stress. The depeg lasted 95 minutes below$0.99 and 53 minutes below $0.95. Despite the protocol remaining fully collateralized throughout,USDe\u2019s circulating supply fell from $14.7 billion to $6.4 billion over the following two months. TheBinance depeg served as a coordination focal point for deleveraging, producing economicconsequences of similar magnitude to an actual collateral crisis despite the protocol\u2019s technicalsoundness. We argue that stablecoin \u201dstability\u201d is not solely a property of collateral design butdepends critically on the microstructure of the venues where the asset trades, and that oraclearchitecture is a first-order determinant of peg resilience.<\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.2139\/ssrn.6574205","type":"posted-content","created":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,14]],"date-time":"2026-04-14T09:42:58Z","timestamp":1776159778000},"source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":0,"title":["When the Peg Breaks on One Exchange:Venue-Isolated Stablecoin Depegs and the Oracle Feedback Loop"],"prefix":"10.2139","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/orcid.org\/0009-0005-8477-9393","authenticated-orcid":true,"given":"Boon Chuan","family":"Lim","sequence":"first","affiliation":[],"role":[{"role":"author","vocabulary":"crossref"}]}],"member":"78","reference":[{"key":"ref1","article-title":"Post-mortem: October 10, 2025 market event","author":"Binance","year":"2026","journal-title":"Binance Blog"},{"issue":"6","key":"ref2","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"2201","DOI":"10.1093\/rfs\/hhn098","article-title":"Market liquidity and funding liquidity","volume":"22","author":"M K Brunnermeier","year":"2009","journal-title":"Review of Financial Studies"},{"key":"ref3","author":"Coindesk","year":"2025","journal-title":"No, Ethena's USDe didn't de-peg during Friday's crash"},{"key":"ref4","article-title":"Stablecoins in 2025: developments and financial stability implications","year":"2026","journal-title":"Federal Reserve Board"},{"issue":"1","key":"ref5","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"71","DOI":"10.1016\/0304-405X(85)90044-3","article-title":"Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders","volume":"14","author":"L R Glosten","year":"1985","journal-title":"Journal of Financial Economics"},{"key":"ref6","author":"R Joshi","year":"2025","journal-title":"Essays on stablecoins' stability"},{"key":"ref7","author":"B C Lim","year":"2026","journal-title":"Same shock, same assets, different microstructure: a comparative analysis of CeFi and DeFi venue performance during the October 10, 2025 cryptocurrency cascade"},{"key":"ref8","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","DOI":"10.3386\/w33882","author":"Y Ma","year":"2025","journal-title":"Stablecoin runs and the centralization of arbitrage"},{"issue":"2","key":"ref9","doi-asserted-by":"crossref","first-page":"293","DOI":"10.1016\/j.jfineco.2019.07.001","article-title":"Trading and arbitrage in cryptocurrency markets","volume":"135","author":"I Makarov","year":"2020","journal-title":"Journal of Financial Economics"},{"key":"ref10","author":"R Auer","year":"2024","journal-title":"Public information and stablecoin runs"},{"key":"ref11","author":"R Ahmed","year":"2025","journal-title":"Stablecoins: a revolutionary payment technology with financial risks"},{"key":"ref12","author":"Coingecko","year":"2026","journal-title":"What is October 10th? Crypto's 10\/10 mass market liquidation event"},{"key":"ref13","article-title":"Ethena and the mechanics of USDe","volume":"335","author":"Coin Metrics","year":"2025","journal-title":"State of the Network"}],"container-title":[],"original-title":[],"deposited":{"date-parts":[[2026,4,14]],"date-time":"2026-04-14T09:59:04Z","timestamp":1776160744000},"score":1,"resource":{"primary":{"URL":"https:\/\/www.ssrn.com\/abstract=6574205"}},"subtitle":[],"short-title":[],"issued":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"references-count":13,"URL":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2139\/ssrn.6574205","relation":{},"subject":[],"published":{"date-parts":[[2026]]},"subtype":"preprint"}}